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Abstract 
 
While many Vietnam studies mention that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam 
face soft budget constraints, a limited amount of studies actually focus on this issue. Most 
of them are based on the analysis of macro level data and few are firm level analyses such 
as Tenev et al. (2003) and Gainsborough (2005) which contain both private firms and 
SOEs in the data set and compare SOEs with private firms in terms of budget constraints. 
Despite their insightfulness, details of budget constraints among SOEs remain 
unanswered. To fill this gap, this dissertation analyses the data collected from returned 
questionnaires from and conducted interviews with 22 local and central SOEs including 
five equitised SOEs in Hai Phong in 2005. Contrary to the conventional claim, this 
dissertation finds that the budget constraints on SOEs in Hai Phong have tended to be 
hardened since the late 1990s and also some large SOEs face softer budget constraints 
than small SOEs do. This dissertation explains these findings in terms of state-business 
relations. Firstly, the hardened budget constraints on SOEs can be explained by the 
strategy of the state to reduce the number of SOEs and to form big SOEs, which this 
dissertation calls divestiture and concentration. Secondly, given the importance of 
Gainsborough’s argument that connections of SOE directors with politicians and bankers 
decide the softness of budget constraints, this dissertation argues that the softer budget 
constraint on large SOEs is the outcome of the rational choice of the state whose political 
priority is to keep the dominance of the state sector in the socialist-oriented market 
economy. By providing financial support to loss-making SOEs, the state will obtain 
political gain in exchange of financial burdens. Given its budget constraint, the state tends 
to support large SOEs to maximise its political gain. 
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1. Introduction 
The state sector in Vietnam has been criticised that it faces soft budget constraints. When 
stagnating and ineffective state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play the leading role, the state 
has to pump in even more resources, in some cases to save SOEs that have gone or are on 
the verge of going bankrupt (Harvard Kennedy School 2013: 7; see also International 
Monetary Fund 2005, Malesky and Taussig 2009, Matheson 2013, Tenev et al. 2003, 
Tran Huu Huynh et al. 2012, World Bank 2008, 2012).1 The data sets used in those 
analyses are macroeconomic data showing the credit accessibility of SOEs such as the 
proportion of capital spent in the state sector, the proportion of loans to SOEs out of total 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) loans or the proportion of outstanding loans to 
SOEs. As a result, despite widespread criticism of soft budget constraints of SOEs, we 
have been lack of understanding of how actually budget constraints work at the firm 
level.2 Furthermore, the implication of soft budget constraints on the behaviour of SOE 
directors has not been addressed properly. 
 
The soft budget constraints syndrome 
Soft budget constraints have become a useful concept for looking at enterprises in 
socialist countries since János Kornai published his Economics of Shortage in 1980. 
Kornai described stories of economic inefficiency in the Eastern European socialist 
economies and concluded that the continuous state involvements in bailouts of loss-
making SOEs caused investment hunger and shortages in the economy. A shortage 
                                                     
1
 Nguyen Van Thang and Freeman (2009) argue that provinces which have heavier 
dominance of SOEs are likely to show slower GDP growth and lower GDP per capita and 
they concluded that favouritism of SOEs has crowded out private businesses. They say that 
provinces have to choose either a pro-SOEs or a pro-private attitude, but they do not explain 
why some provinces chose a pro-SOEs attitude and others did not. 
2
 Why is there a lack of studies on budget constraints in Vietnam? Gainsborough (2005: 
2) suggests that because “enquiries about the softness or otherwise of the budget constraint 
quickly leads the researcher into the realm of politics, and firms – understandably – are not 
always willing to discuss such matters”. 
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economy also led to an expansion drive and a hoarding tendency which sustained the 
shortage phenomena and locked the economy in a vicious circle. 
  
Kornai (1980) argues that resource constraints and soft budget constraints are the 
characteristics of a socialist economy while demand constraints and hard budget 
constraints are those of a market economy. Only a central government is able to change 
the economic environment by making the budget constraint harder. Because of this 
difference, the adjustment mechanism such as a price adjustment and profit incentive 
mechanism which are ubiquitous in the market economy, fail to apply to the socialist 
economy (Kornai 1980, 1998). 
  
Easy access to capital can be used as a simple definition of soft budget constraints. 
However, the essential feature of the SBC syndrome, but missed often, is the 
establishment of SOEs’ managers ‘expectation’ of being bailed out by the state in the 
case of making a loss. This ex ante expectation inspires the managers of SOEs to generate 
ex post expectation of being bailed out, which as a result forms a vicious circle of 
investment hunger, shortage, loss-making and bailouts in socialist economies (Kornai 
1980: 192, 1998, 2001, Kornai et al. 2003). 
  
The state is likely to bail loss-making firms out when managers or directors make a loss. 
Recurrent rescues by the state make directors of state enterprise expect another rescue 
when they make the next loss, and this expectation shapes a particular pattern of 
behaviour among SOE directors (Kornai 2001). The belief of SOE directors that the state 
will bail them out makes them indifferent to losses or profits. Instead, their decisions are 
guided by other considerations such as satisfying higher level managers or maximising 
their personal benefits. 
  
16 
 
Once soft budget constraints are institutionalised, it is very hard to get rid of them 
because the constraints become incorporated in directors’ decision making as they 
account for the state subsidy before they make their production plans. If the state 
withdraws the subsidy at a later stage it risks making the enterprise bankrupt. Therefore, 
hardening budget constraints depends upon a credible announcement by the state that it 
will not bail out firms in the future and a gradual enforcement of the announcement 
(Kornai et al. 2003). 
  
The viability of the reform depends not only on the political credibility and the will of 
higher level political leaders but also on the perception of directors of state firms. If 
directors still have some expectation of bailouts, then it cannot be said that budget 
constraints are hard, even if the state consistently announces that there will be no bailouts. 
If no one believes the state announcement and all enterprises continue to behave in a loss-
making way, a no-bailout policy will potentially result in widespread bankruptcies, and 
such a policy is not likely to be credible. Credibility is therefore a collective action 
problem for the state: it has to make a significant number of enterprises believe in the 
policy for it to be credible to all enterprises. 
 
The softness of the budget constraints on SOEs can be used as a proxy representing the 
relations between the state and SOEs (businesses in general). Kornai (1980) suggests that 
the state wants to bail out loss-making SOEs because of its paternalism.3 The soft budget 
constraints syndrome involves two parties – a provider and a receiver of financial support 
– and both are likely to maximise each party’s economic and political benefit. The 
                                                     
3
 Paternalism is defined as “the system in which a government or an employer protects 
the people who are governed or employed by providing them with what they need, but does 
not give them any responsibility and freedom of choice” (emphasis added; Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary 6
th
 Ed. p. 928). Under the centrally-planned socialist economic system, 
the definition of paternalism was applicable but this ‘strict’ paternalism is not applicable to 
socialist countries which experience reform because SOE directors are given responsibilities 
and freedom of management to a certain extent. 
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implication that the soft budget constraints syndrome represents the state-business 
relations is largely ignored in Vietnam studies. Most of them simply point out that SOEs 
have enjoyed the soft budget constraints without providing detail analysis of the reality of 
the budget constraints and of the state-business relations. Gainsborough (2005), an 
important reference to this dissertation, is an exception. 
  
Furthermore, the consideration of state-business relations represented by the softness of 
budget constraints on SOEs enables us to do comparative analyses. For example, it is 
widely accepted that it is difficult to distinguish the state sector from the private sector in 
Vietnam as the border between them is quite murky (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
and Cheshier 2010, Fforde 2007, Gainsborough 2003b among others). This feature is not 
peculiar to Vietnam only but is also found in Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo 1997, Jomo and 
Gomez 2000, Tan 2008) and Singapore (Gainsborough 2009b, Hamilton-Hart 2000). 
SOEs in Vietnam and government-linked companies (GLCs) in Malaysia have been 
accused of facing soft budget constraints while GLCs in Singapore are often referred to a 
symbol of efficiency and good governance. Except Gainsborough (2009), it has rarely 
been addressed why the same factor has led to the inefficient state sector in Vietnam and 
Malaysia while it has resulted in a significantly different outcome in Singapore (see 
Chapter 3).4  
 
Vietnam studies on budget constraints 
During the subsidy period, the situation in Vietnam was not quite different from that in 
Eastern European socialist economies. The Vietnamese SOEs faced the coexistence of 
shortages in the market and surpluses in enterprise stocks (Beresford and Fforde 1997, 
Cheshier 2010, Hiebert 1996). Nonetheless, as we examine in Chapter 2, it is difficult to 
                                                     
4
 Gainsborough (2009: 1325-6) suggests that the Singaporean state is “more effective 
in asserting the existence of a clear-cut boundary between state and society, and between 
public and private, than the state in Vietnam.” 
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conclude that the Vietnamese SOEs faced soft budget constraints under the central 
planning system because Vietnam was a country which had a weak tax base and relied 
heavily on aid. It had considerably large debt compared to other Asian countries such as 
Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand (Dapice 1993: 170).5 Furthermore, 
Vietnam’s economy relied largely upon the aid from the Soviet bloc. For example, the 
central budget revenues in Vietnam were seriously squeezed when the aid from the Soviet 
bloc which was roughly equivalent to one billion US dollars was cut off drastically after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 but a decline in flows had started even earlier 
(Dollar 1993: 207). 
  
Given that the Vietnam’s economy was frequently suffered from a budget deficit even 
with the help of aid, it is unlikely that SOEs faced soft budget constraints. While SOEs 
were given a priority in resource allocation but it is another matter whether they had 
sufficient soft budget constraints like as the SOEs in the Eastern European economies did. 
The fact that there was nationwide fence-breaking by SOEs in Vietnam under the 
planning system implies that the budget constraints on SOEs were not soft. The 
suspension of Soviet aid aggravated the situation. The government had to reduce the 
support to SOEs while it wanted to collect more tax revenue from SOEs (see Chapter 2; 
Fforde 2004, 2007). 
 
After major transition to the market mechanism started in 1989, it was expected that the 
budget constraints on SOE would be hardened. Some argue that the budget constraints on 
SOEs began to be hardened with the introduction of key reforms since the late 1980s 
(Beresford 1997, Porter 1993). However, resource allocation began to be concentrated in 
the state sector which carries the leading role in the economy. The state treated in favour 
                                                     
5
 Dapice (1993: 170) shows that the size of the budget deficit of Vietnam was ten times 
larger than that of  other countries in his analysis of the statistics of past South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand (as of 1960) and Indonesia (as of 1967) with those of the current Vietnam (as of 
1990). 
19 
 
of SOEs and the private sector was relatively ignored. Contrary to a typical argument that 
economic reform is likely to induce hard budget constraints on SOEs, the reform in 
Vietnam has made the budget constraints on SOEs rather ‘soft’.6 Despite of this 
conventional perception of soft budget constraints, we do not have many studies on 
budget constraints which both private firms and SOEs face in Vietnam. 
 
Nonetheless, there are insightful firm-level analyses based on survey researches covering 
the issue of ‘credit accessibility’ of firms. For example, Tenev et al. (2003) examine 
whether the private firms and SOEs play on a level field in Vietnam.7  Not providing an 
explicit conclusion that SOEs face soft budget constraints, they find that the degree of 
difficulty in terms of ‘access to financing’ and the ‘cost of financing’, private firms 
scored 2.43 and 2.06 respectively and SOEs 2.21 and 2.28 (ibid.: 12).8  It is not clearly 
mentioned that whether the difference in these numbers has significance even if we 
ignore the fact that number 2 means a ‘minor’ obstacle. It also is unclear why private 
firms which felt that the access to financing is more difficult answered that the cost of 
financing mattered less than what SOEs felt.  
 
Malesky and Taussig (2009)9 also find that having connections is important in doing 
business in Vietnam and connected private firms10 are significantly more likely to receive 
                                                     
6
 Indeed, after subsidised prices for input materials were finally abolished in 1989, 
many SOEs were forced to close down their operations because they were unable to purchase 
input materials at market prices which were much higher than subsidised prices. This 
provided fuel for arguments against further hardening of SOE budget constraints (Beresford 
and Fforde 1997: 123-4). 
7
 The survey set of is composed of 629 private firms and 117 SOEs of which 295 
private firms and 70 SOEs were interviewed across eleven cities and provinces. 
8
 The numbers are calculated by assigning a value of 4 if a constraint is perceived as 
sever, 3 if a constraint is perceived as ‘major’, 2 if ‘minor’ and 1 if no obstacle. The higher 
the number, the more severe the constraint (Tenev et al. 2003: 12). 
9
 Malesky and Taussig (2009) is based on an extensive data set composed of 6,400 
firms across all 64 of Vietnam’s provinces but it unfortunately does not include SOEs in their 
analysis. Detail information of the survey is available at http://www.pcivietnam.org/. 
20 
 
bank financing, but they argue that “much of the financing of the most dynamic and 
fastest growing business activity in the Vietnamese economy takes place outside the 
traditional banking sector” (emphasis added; ibid. : 538).11 However, Tenev et al. (2003: 
73) argue that “no strong direct relationship between degree of informality and a firm’s 
ability to access resources such as bank loans, land, business services, and the court 
system” (emphasis added).  
 
There are some firm-level analyses which focus on private firms and do not directly 
tackle the issue of soft budget constraints. For example, Hemlin et al. (1998) examine the 
development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) based on 500 private firms 
whose firm size in terms of number of workers is below 100. This study did does not 
focus on budget constraint issue but find that access to bank loans is one of the most 
significant obstacles (ibid.: 41-2). Rand (2005) reaches the same conclusion in the 
analysis of the credit constraints on 1,119 private firms selected from Enterprise Survey 
2002 published  by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. Cheshier (2010) provides an 
excellent in-depth analysis of the class formation in Vietnam by examining 200 largest 
firms in Vietnam and 200 largest Vietnamese firms in which state-owned, privately-
owned and foreign-owned firms are included. He argues that the capitalist in Vietnam has 
largely been connected to the state sector. However, the issue of budget constraints is not 
the main theme of his analysis. 
 
Lastly, but most importantly, Gainsborough (2005) focuses on the issue of budget 
constraints based on interviews with 24 private and state-owned firms in four provincial 
                                                                                                                                                 
10
 They used three variables to reflect the connectedness by asking whether the owner 
of the firm was i) former party, government official, or military officer; ii) former SOE 
manager; or iii) former SOE employee (Malesky and Taussig 2009: 545). 
11
 See Allen et al. (2005), Hansen et al. (2004), Le et al. (2006) so-called ‘connection-
based’ lending in the private sector and its impact on economic growth. 
21 
 
Vietnam.12 Like as Tenev et al. (2003) and Malesky and Taussig (2009), he concludes 
that the connections among politicians, managers of SOEs and bankers are a critical 
factor which influences the softness of budget constraints. His emphasis, however, is put 
on that the importance of connections applies regardless of ownership type of the firm.13 
Therefore, it is difficult to draw a general conclusion about budget constraints depending 
on ownership type. There is no reason to presume that SOEs face softer budget 
constraints. He argues that  
 
insofar as soft budget constraints (SBCs) are at least in part a consequence 
of a particular type of relationship between firms and politicians or firms and 
banks, the differing character of these relationships from one place to another 
is likely to result in different outcomes (Gainsborough ibid..: 3). 
 
Another finding he provides to tackle the softness of budget constraints is firms’ reliance 
on their ‘own equity (von tu co)’ as a source of their investment.14 He argues that “the 
heavy reliance on ‘own capital’ for all firms regardless of ownership type … suggests that 
general speaking companies are not specially ‘flush’ with budget or bank capital” 
(Gainsborough ibid.: 8). This tendency is also found in the interview set of this 
dissertation while the priority as a source investment slightly moves toward bank loans 
(see Chapter 6). 
 
While Tenev et al. (2003), Gainsborough (2005) and Malesky and Taussig (2009) 
provide insightful comparative analyses of budget constraints between SOEs and private 
firms, budget constraints among SOEs are still largely unknown. This dissertation 
                                                     
12
 His sample set is composed of two locally-managed SOEs, two equitised SOEs and 
two limited liability companies from each of four locations (Hai Phong, Lao Cai, Tay Ninh 
and Can Tho). 
13
 The distinction between a state-owned or privately-owned is quite complicated in 
Vietnam and thus it needs further explanation. See Chapter 2 about murky property rights in 
Vietnam. 
14
 Von tu co is translated into either ‘own capital’ or ‘own equity’. See Chapter 2 and 6 
for more detail discussion of own equity. 
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addresses this issue and collected data from SOEs only by applying the methodology of 
Gainsborough (2005). The survey sample is composed of twenty-two locally-managed 
and centrally-managed SOEs including five equitised SOEs which operated in Hai Phong 
in 2005.15  
 
Budget constraints on SOEs in Vietnam: Findings 
To address the issues of soft budget constraints, the interview asked four questions to 
interviewees.16  
 Whether the SOE has the support from the state or local budget 
 Whether the SOE has tax break or tax exemption 
 Whether the SOE has an obstacle to getting bank loans 
 How does the SOE director think about bailouts? 
While there are limited number of SOEs in the sample, findings from the analysis of the 
interview are consistent across SOEs. We can point out two main findings here before 
examining the interview in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Firstly, the budget constraints on SOEs have tended to be ‘hardened’. Providing financial 
support to SOEs has changed over time. Direct support from the state or provincial 
budget dramatically decreased since the late 1990s whereas indirect support through the 
banking system, particularly through state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), has been a 
main channel. This finding coincides with that of Gainsborough (2005) and the cases 
observed in the former Eastern European planned economies (Kornai et al. 2003). Also 
there was no lax application of taxation rules and it has been harder to get bank loans. 
Meanwhile, in terms of the expectations of being bailed out among SOE directors, most 
of them answered that they do not think the state has to bail loss-making SOEs out but 
                                                     
15
 See Chapter 5 for detail of data collection. 
16
 The interviewees were either directors or vice directors of interviewed SOEs. This 
dissertation calls them ‘SOE directors’ or interviewees. 
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directors must take responsibility for the loss. The expectations of SOE director have 
moved towards ‘hard’ budget constraints. 
  
Secondly, while the SOE directors answered that the state regulations made the access to 
capital more and more difficult since the late 1990s, not all the interviewed SOEs faced 
the same level of softness in budget constraints. Some of large centrally-managed SOEs 
faced relatively soft budget constraints than small locally-managed SOEs and equitised 
SOEs did. The directors of centrally-managed SOEs in general were quite confident in 
terms of their ability to get bank loans and also they ‘expected’ that the state would help 
them if something happens. In contrast, the directors of locally-managed SOEs and 
equitised SOEs did not strongly express the same confidence. As Cheshier (2010) agues 
all SOEs cannot be the same in terms of size and connections. 
 
These two finding appears conflict each other but it is not unusual in Vietnam. Vu Quoc 
Ngu (2002: 9-10) argues that SOE reform measure showed mixed signals between 1990s 
and 2000s during which the state was determined to downsize SOEs on the one hand and 
also “subsidies were given to loss making SOEs in the form of direct grant, postponement 
of taxes, rolling-over or writing-off of the bad debts”. According to Vietnam Economic 
Times (No. 64, 2000), for three years from 1997 to 1999, state budget directly financed 
SOEs with nearly VND 8,000 billion. SOEs were also exempted from paying taxes 
amounting to VND 2,288 billion and their bad debts estimated to be VND 1,088 billion 
were written off. This made the amount that SOEs received from state budget greater than 
the amount they contributed to it. 
 
How can we interpret these seemingly conflicting findings? Do budget constraints harden 
or soften? If we remind that the key respect of the soft budget constraints syndrome is the 
establishment of expectation of bailouts and together with other findings, we may 
conclude that the SOEs in Hai Phong face harder budget constraints. On the other hand, if 
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we focus on the second finding, we cannot say the SOEs in Hai Phong face hard budget 
constraints. At least some of them seem to have softer budget constraints. 
 
Beresford (2008) may support that the budget constraints on SOEs has been hardened. In 
a review of doi moi, she seeks the reason why the state sector was awarded political 
privilege under doi moi, but has been unable to seize the commanding heights of the 
economy from the fact that the state’s inability, especially under donor pressure, to 
provide crucial investment support to the state sector and the lack of strong state 
coordination leaves scope for increasing influence of sectional business interests in 
politics.  
 
What we can surely say is that conventional wisdom on the ‘soft’ budget constraints on 
SOEs needs to be revised. As Gainsborough (2005: 3) says “it is unlikely to be a simple 
yes or no answer” because budget constraints can be soft or hard largely depending on the 
state’s policy and individual or a group of SOEs are likely to face different types of 
budget constraints within the same tide. 
 
Gainsborough (ibid.) provides an insightful analysis of how the political economy of 
budget constraints works in a nexus of individual firm-politician-banker and focuses on 
individuals’ inter-relations and their influences over budget constraints on individual 
firms at the micro-level. This dissertation complements his analysis by explaining the 
finding that the large SOEs in Hai Phong face softer budget constraint while SOEs in 
general face hard budget constraints. This is the outcome of the pursuit of government 
policies whose priority is given to maintaining the dominance of the state sector. The 
state wants to keep this priority at minimum cost. While the SOE director wants to 
maximise his/her pecuniary and non-pecuniary gain. 
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Budget constraints: a proxy of state-business relations 
As we examined earlier, bailouts involve political decisions. These are the outcomes of 
the negotiations between the state and SOE directors. Although doing bailouts is 
determined solely by the state, the decision is most likely to be affected by how the 
relations between the state and SOEs directors are formed (Gainsborough 2005). 
Depending on this, the softness of budget constraints which each or a group of SOEs face 
is likely to vary. 
  
Why does the state decide to bail them out? Kornai (1980, 1998, 2001) suggests that 
socialist states decide bailouts because of their paternalism. Contrary to Kornai, 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argue that paternalism is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for soft budget constraints. They show that the transaction cost is an 
important factor in determining bailouts. In a decentralised economic system, the ex post 
cost of refinancing bad projects is so high that doing bailout is inefficient, which hardens 
budget constraints. Similarly Qian and Roland (1998) suggest from the Chinese 
experience that as the fiscal system has become more decentralised over the reform, the 
competition among provinces and thus refinancing bad projects becomes not economical. 
  
There are a series of analyses arguing that the state bails loss-making SOEs out because it 
can obtain some kind of benefits. For example, public ownership of a firm in which both 
the state and the private sector has a stake can contribute to soften budget constraints (Li 
1992). Boycko et al. (1996) suggest that politicians may want to provide SOEs with 
financial support to ease the pressure of unemployment, which could benefit the 
politicians in election. 
  
On the other hand, some studies show that privatisation is not a solution to remove the 
soft budget constraints syndrome. For instance, Röller and Zhang (2005) argue that firms 
in socialist and transitional economies are likely to have soft budget constraints because 
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they are often obliged to provide both social goods and private goods simultaneously. 
Under this situation, politicians are unlikely to commit not to bail out firms experiencing 
financial trouble. Similarly Lin and Li (2008) show that when the state impose policy 
burdens such as keeping employment or doing business in uneconomic strategic areas17 
on SOEs or privatised firms, they are likely to have soft budget constraints. Hence, 
privatisation will not eradicate soft budget constraints but exacerbates as long as the firms 
undertake policy burdens. 
 
This dissertation extends Gainsborough (2005) and Lin and Li (2008) by incorporating 
the specificity of Vietnam’s political economy. The specificity of Vietnam results directly 
from its political system whose summit is the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). 
Vietnam, as its Constitution declares, still maintains the principle of single-party rule 
which guides the ‘socialist-oriented’ market economy in which the state sector is 
presumed to dominate the economy.18 If the dominance of the state sector is challenged, it 
is likely that the state will lose the credibility of people given that the majority of 
Vietnamese have both direct and indirect relationships with the state sector including the 
CPV (Cheshier 2010, Dang Phong and Beresford 1998, Gainsborough 2010b).19 The 
dominance of the state sector is likely to be a telling indicator reflecting the influence of 
the CPV over society. Discontent of the supporters can put pressure to the state and the 
                                                     
17
 Lin and Li (2008: 92-3) identify two types of policy burdens: a social policy burden 
and a strategic policy burden. The social policy burden refers to keeping redundant workers, 
providing retirement pensions and other social services while the strategic policy burden 
stems from that fact that the enterprises are forced to enter the industries which they do not 
have comparative advantage.   
18
 See Article 51 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam revised 28
th
 
November 2013. Also the People’s Army has responsibility to protect the CPV as declared in 
Article 65: “The people's armed forces shall show absolute loyalty to the Fatherland, the 
People, the Party and the State”. 
19
 It is very difficult to differentiate the state and the CPV because of overlapped 
responsibilities between the state and the CPV. For example, the President and the Prime 
Minister are also members of the Politburo of the CPV, so is the Chairman of the National 
Assembly. 
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CPV even though the voting power of the people is not properly reflected in general 
elections (Fforde 2011).20 
  
A dichotomy between politics and economy expresses the importance of maintaing the 
legitimacy of the CPV in Vietnam. Beresford and Fforde (1997) suggest that the co-
existence of the reformers and the conservatives within the CPV under the name of the 
balance of power can be explained by examining how the leadership of Vietnam has tried 
to keep socialism. They argue that the Party leadership have operated two principles to 
protect socialism: ‘definitional’ principle and ‘operational’  
 
“The definitional principle defines socialism in terms of public ownership of the 
means of production, central planning, and distribution according to labour 
productivity whereas the operational principle includes a central monopoly of 
foreign trade, a state monopoly over the domestic circulation of goods, 
cooperative production in agriculture and the handicraft industry, planning of 
industrial production, state control of finance and credit, state determination of 
virtually all prices and planned allocation of labour” (Beresford and Fforde ibid., 
112). 
 
According to this framework, both the conservatives and the reformers within the CPV 
aim at keeping socialism, but the reformers are the group who attempt to strengthen 
socialism by modifying the operation of the system.21 As a result of the compromise 
                                                     
20
 Nonetheless, the election at local levels in particular at the commune level is 
different from the nationwide general election. At the commune level, the voting power of the 
constituents has tended to reflect more directly albeit a tension between the people and the 
CPV is expressed (Fforde 2011). 
21
 While the CPV has been the centre of the power structure in Vietnam, it does not 
mean that their dominance has been left intact (Beresford 2001, Fforde 1993, 2007, 
Gainsborough 2003c, Vasavakul 1996). “Dismantling the old administrative control and 
command mechanism over production units … created a vacuum that was filled by more 
informal systems of control and ownership. The grant of commercial freedoms resulted in a 
virtual appropriation of state property by manages, bureaucrats and Party officials. On the 
other hand, this may have succeeded in releasing power that resulted challenged the authority 
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between these two factions, the feature of the political economy of Vietnam was formed:  
politically conservative but economically pragmatic (Rama 2008).22 Even though there 
has been modification in the operation of the socialist system, the Vietnam’s leadership 
have not given up the idea that the state sector must hold a leading role in the national 
economy. In this context, individual politicians in the state apparatus are allowed to seek 
their personal interests and consequently it might cause a negative effect on economic 
growth, but if these gain-seeking activities are likely to threat the political regime, it 
would not be tolerated. This works as a significantly strong constraint on the behavioural 
pattern of politician and SOE director. 
 
This dissertation assumes that individual politicians not only serve their own interests but 
also their behaviour is restricted by the interests of the state.23 In our analysis, as a result, 
the state is considered as an entity to pursue its own interests instead of as an aggregated 
set of individual politicians maximising their gains, which can cause the problem of 
coordination failure or collective action (Olson 1965, 1982). The state seeking its own 
interests is not necessarily benevolent and thus its interests do not inevitably coincide 
with the public interest. The interests of the state may include maximising its budget 
revenue, increasing its influence over SOEs and the most importantly maintaining the 
current political system in which the CPV stands at the summit (Fforde 2007). Among 
these, the first priority of the Vietnamese state is to keep the ‘socialist-oriented’ market 
system in which the state sector dominates and plays the leading role in the economy as 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the state and the legitimacy of the Party, particularly where they were associated with 
corruption and other abuse” (Painter 2005b: 274). 
22
 Some studies view this tension has dragged reform process in Vietnam. The different 
views of these two groups tension made it difficult to make hard reform policies. Furthermore, 
the so-called ‘democratic centralism’ or the collective leadership system makes decision-
makings harder and longer. This ‘balance-of-power’ nature of Vietnam’s politics has added 
more difficulty in setting up and implementing reform drive strongly (Abuza 1998, Dinh 
Quan Xuan 2000, Sidel 1997). 
23
 Fforde (2013) argues that there is no domestic sovereignty in Vietnam which makes 
it possible for the state (or the CPV) to pursue policies without being interrupted by others. 
See Chapter 2 for more detail. 
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announced in its Constitution.24 If we put it another way, keeping the leadership of the 
CPV is the top priority in the state interests.25  
 
The benefit which the state expects to obtain by bailing loss-making SOEs out is not 
pecuniary but political one.  It can consolidate its constituency and its legitimacy by 
keeping the leadership of the CPV and the dominance of the state sector. On the other 
hand, the associated cost is likely to be both pecuniary and political one. Bailouts 
evidently piles up public debts. If, however, the state let loss-making SOEs die, the state 
is likely to lose the confidence of people. This is the political cost but it can reduce the 
burden on the state budget by not providing financial support.  
 
If the state maximises its interests by considering the cost and the benefit, it is likely that 
it would choose to help a large SOE over a small one when both of them make a loss. 
Given that a failure of a large SOE will draw immediate attention of people, letting it die 
can impose a political burden on the state because this may give a wrong signal to people 
that the state would let its dominance be seriously waned.  
 
                                                     
24
 Dr Vo Tri Thanh, a well-known Vietnamese economist, says that Vietnam needs 
market but should be ‘under state management’ by ‘socialism orientation’ through a leading 
role of the state sector in the economy (Vo Tri Thanh 2009) 
25
 But at this state we have an unanswered question. For what reasons do the CPV 
leadership want to initiate the changes in budget constraints? The interests of the organised 
groups are likely to be affected a certain extent when significant transitions occur in socio-
economic settings. Although it is generally assumed that powerful interest groups prefer to 
maintain the status quo, there is no reason to presume such a behavioural pattern. This 
preference for the status quo shown by powerful interest groups could better be understood in 
the sense that the status quo is likely to be a product of the unceasing efforts of organised 
powerful groups to develop socio-economic institutional settings which best fit to serve the 
achievement and preservation of the interests of these groups. Unless institutional changes are 
highly likely to create higher benefits for organised powerful groups – of course factions 
within the organised powerful groups may have conflicts of interests, they are likely to choose 
an option to keep the status quo. Instead interest groups will compare what they will either 
lose or obtain from different strategies of change, and these benefits and costs will vary 
according to the political and economic organisation of the interest groups. 
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Whereas SOEs are considered as one of state organs, it is not necessary to presume that 
the interests of the state and those of SOE directors are identical. Rather, it is more likely 
that the interests of these two parties are different. We, however, do not need to deny a 
possibility that both parties may have the same interests such as promoting economic 
growth and serve the public. Because the state and SOE directors have different interests, 
conflicts of interests are unavoidable whenever new policies applicable to SOEs are 
introduced.26 The top priority of SOE directors is to keep their position from which they 
can obtain official wages and non-pecuniary revenues. In order to keep their position, the 
SOEs they serve must not make a loss repeatedly. Also directors aim to gain more 
autonomy from the state in terms of business operation.  
 
Modelling the behaviour the state and SOEs directors 
It is assumed that both the state and SOE directors maximise their payoff. In the model 
used in Lin and Li (2008: 94-5), the payoff of an SOE director is denoted by  
(1) UD = w − 𝑒(𝑞) 
where w denotes the director’s wage and e(q) the director’s effort paid in producing the q 
amount of output. 
 
The payoff of the state when it provides financial support is denoted by 
(2) US = 𝐵(𝐿) − 𝑆 
where B(L) represents the benefit of the policy burden to the state and S the amount of 
subsidy the state provides when the SOE makes a loss equivalent to |𝜋(𝑞) − 𝐿| in which 
𝜋(𝑞)denotes the firm’s profit and L the policy burden on the SOE.27 
 
                                                     
26
 Interests-maximising activities of the state and SOE directors are described as a 
game of re-centralisation and decentralisation played by the state and SOE directors (Fforde 
2007, Gainsborough 2003c). A discussion on this issue is made in Chapter 2. 
27
 If there is no subsidy, the payoff function will be US = B(L) + π(q) − L. 
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While the wage might be an important factor determining the payment for the SOE 
director, this dissertation assumes that the SOE director is more interested in maintaining 
their position because he/she is likely to obtain extra pecuniary or non-pecuniary revenue 
derived from the position, given that the official wage for them is quite low in Vietnam.28 
 
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the fact that whether the SOE director can keep his/her 
position is directly related to the performance of the SOE which he/she works for. If the 
SOE records a loss for two or three years consecutively, the director is to be dismissed. 
Therefore, the SOE director has to put effort in revenue seeking in order to avoid making 
a loss. Practically, however, keeping the position is closely related to the connections the 
director has established. Furthermore, we have to consider that the SOE director now has 
to put his/her effort into both revenue seeking and connections management, which has a 
trade-off relationship. If he/she devotes α effort in revenue seeking, 1 − α effort should 
be devoted to connections management. 
 
The revised payoff function of the SOE director is 
(3) 𝐔𝐃 = 𝐰 + 𝐰𝐧 − 𝛂 ∙ 𝐞(𝐪) − (𝟏 − 𝛂) ∙ 𝐞(𝐜)  
where wn represents the non-pecuniary revenue and e(c) the director’s effort put in 
managing his/her connections. The payoff of the director depends on his/her pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary revenue and his/her effort put in formal and informal activities in the 
form of time and money. It is highly likely that the type of connections which the director 
has established greatly influences over the lobbying for financial support in the case of 
loss-making. A better-connected director is more likely to have favoured support from the 
state. 
 
                                                     
28
 For example, the Ministry of Industry determined the wage for directors of the 
largest SOE, Petro Vietnam, between VND 32 and 36 million per month in 2013, which is 
equivalent to USD 1,600 and 1,800 (http://baodatviet.vn/kinh-te/dai-gia/soi-bang-luong-sep-
tap-doan-doanh-nghiep-nha-nuoc-3053499). 
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Designing the payoff function of the state, we consider three cases. Firstly, if an SOE 
makes a profit, the state does not need to provide financial support and its tax revenue 
increases. Its political benefit increases or unchanged. Secondly, if an SOE makes a loss 
and the state chooses to bail this loss-making SOE out. As a result, the state bears an 
economic burden with reduce tax revenue. The state, however, alleviates its political 
burden by maintaining the state sector dominance through the bailout. Thirdly, if an SOE 
makes a loss and the state choose not to bail the SOE out. This incurs the political burden 
on the state and also reduces tax revenue. 
 
The revised payoff function of the state can be defined as follows: 
(4.1) 𝐔𝐆 = 𝑩(𝑷)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝑻   (if π(q) > 0) 
(4.2) 𝐔𝐆 = 𝑩(𝑷)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑻 − 𝑺  (if π(q) < 0 and there is subsidy) 
(4.3)  𝐔𝐆 = 𝑩(𝑷)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  − 𝑪(𝑷) − 𝑻  (if π(q) < 0 and there is no subsidy) 
where 𝐵(𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ denotes a given political benefit which can be obtained from the dominant 
state sector, 𝐶(𝑃) political burden resulting from the weakened state sector, T the amount 
of tax revenue and S the amount of subsidy.  
 
In contrast to the assumption of Lin and Li (2008) that the payoff of the state has a 
negative relationship to the amount of the subsidy, the financial support has a positive 
effect upon the payoff of the state. It enables the state to keep the political benefit without 
adding the political burden although it is not explicitly observed in the payoff function 
(4.2). 
 
In the case of loss-making, the state has to compare its payoff (4.2) with payoff (4.3) and 
the decision will depend on the condition of C(P) ⋛ S. We can assume that the state will 
choose to subside if the political burden is larger than or equal to the economic burden, i.e. 
C(P) ≥ S. 
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What if the political burden is smaller than the economic burden? It is not a 
straightforward matter because keeping the current political system and the dominance of 
the state sector is a top priority of the state. It implies that C(P) should be weighted or S is 
multiplied by θ, where 0 < θ < 1. The higher priority is put on the state sector 
dominance the smaller the size of θ is. Taking into account this condition, the state will 
choose to provide financial support as long as 
1
𝜃
𝐶(𝑃) < 𝑆. 
 
How long the state will be able to subside is entirely dependent upon its fiscal capacity. It 
implies that the state cannot bailout every single loss-making SOE. It is likely that the 
state chooses an SOE which carries the largest political and economic impact at the given 
economic burden. It is apt to pick a large SOE rather than a small one. It explains why 
large SOE face relatively softer budget constraints than other SOEs. 
 
Furthermore, Vietnam might have been constrained by the influence of international 
organisations and donor countries because the more Vietnam opens to the world, the 
more constraints were imposed for the return of foreign aids and investment funds, 
particularly from the multilateral organisation such as the World Bank and the Paris 
Club.29 It is not difficult to guess that Vietnam had to show its good faith to donor 
countries somehow by not rejecting the policy advices strongly (Kolko 1997). Vietnam 
corrects its strategies more or less according to the recommendations from those 
organisations.  
 
                                                     
29
 The Paris Club is a multilateral organisation, composed of twenty countries such as 
France, Japan, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Germany, Australia, Italy, etc. and 
sixteen international organisations. It held a conference co-chaired by the World Bank and the 
UNDP in Paris in 1993 in order to help clear the debt of Vietnam to the IMF amounted to 
1.86 billion USD. Vietnam requested to disburse 650 million USD of it by 1994 and it was 
accepted which was quite a rare case in the history of international aid (Kolko 1997). 
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Nonetheless, it does not mean that Vietnam has actually followed the advice of the donor 
community. The Vietnamese state manages such pressure by “appearing to sign up to 
things without then moving to implement them (a kind of 'take the money and run' 
approach).” (Gainsborough 2010a: 483).30 It is argued that the CPV leadership, in fact, 
have modified the state sector reform policies which are based on the recommendations 
of the donor countries in order to ensure, instead of weakening, the authority of the 
Vietnamese state (Painter 2005a, 2006).  
 
Concluding remarks: The behaviour of the SOE director and the state 
The SOE director maximises his/her payoff by allocating his/her effort either in official 
revenue seeking activities or in unofficial connections management. This allocation of 
his/her effort is likely to depend on the market power of an SOE. If the SOE has 
monopoly power, it is likely to make a profit. Of course, not all SOEs having monopoly 
power make a profit especially when they have to deliver social services to the public 
despite higher production costs. If the SOE confronts competition, it is less likely to make 
a profit given its inefficiency and competition pressure from private firms. 
 
The likelihood of financial support from the state will affect the effort allocation of the 
SOE director. If the state is mostly likely to provide financial support, the director would 
put more effort in managing connections. If, on the contrary, the state is unlikely to 
provide financial support, the director would put more effort in revenue seeking. 
  
                                                     
30
 This clever scheme of the Vietnamese state however has not resulted in a ‘bad’ 
relationship between Vietnam and donor communities because of the coincidence of the 
interests of each other. See Gainsborough (ibid., 484). 
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Table 1: The behaviour of the SOE director 
SOE’s market power Monopolist Competitive 
State subsidy 
Likely to make a profit 
Spend more effort in e(c) 
Likely to make a loss 
Spend more effort in e(c) 
No state subsidy 
Likely to make a profit 
Spend more effort in e(q) 
Likely to make a loss 
Spend more effort in e(q) 
 
When the SOE director expects that the state is likely to provide financial support, he/she 
puts more effort into managing the connections regardless of the market power of the 
SOE. On the contrary, if the SOE director anticipates that the state is unlikely to provide 
financial support, he/she devotes more effort into official revenue seeking activities 
whether the SOE has market power or not. 
 
The state’s preference for large SOEs in the decision of providing financial support 
enhances the SOE director’s expectation. In turn, this would influence the profitability of 
the SOE. The expectation of being bailed out makes him/her pay more attention to 
establishing the connections and managing them than to improving operation of the firm. 
This behavioural pattern is likely to lower the profitability of the SOE. 
 
As shown in Table 1 above, the behaviour pattern of the state and the SOE director 
causing discriminated soft budget constraints among SOEs in Vietnam is summarised as 
follows: 
i) The director of a large SOE having monopoly power is likely to put more effort 
into managing the connections. 
ii) The SOE is likely to make a loss because the director spends less effort into 
running businesses. 
iii) The director has better connections is likely to have favoured financial support. 
36 
 
iv) The state prefers the large SOE when it decides bailouts. 
 
If this process is repeated, the discriminated soft budget constraints on the SOE would be 
embedded in politics and economy. As Gainsborough (2005) argues the softness of 
budget constraints is affected by the connections in which politicians, SOEs director and 
bankers are intertwined. This dissertation develops this idea by showing that the softness 
of budget constraints can be the determined structurally through the behaviour of payoff 
maximising state and the SOE director. 
 
The plan of the dissertation 
We review literature on SOEs reform policies by dividing the period 1975-1990 and 
1991-present to examine the changes in budget constraints to SOEs and how the state-
SOEs relations change in Chapter 2 and then review the literature on the rational of SOEs 
and examine the development of government-linked companies (GLCs) in Singapore and 
Malaysia in which similarity to Vietnam is found in terms of the dominance of the state 
sector and the blurred distinction between the state and the private sector in Chapter 3. 
We describe the dominance and the performance of SOEs of Vietnam in Chapter 4 and 
then explain the methodology used to collect data in Chapter 5. We analyse the data set to 
examine budget constraints on SOEs in Hai Phong in which no strong evidence of ‘soft’ 
budget constraints on SOEs is found but a group of SOEs have better access to bank loans 
in Chapter 6. At last, we draw a conclusion and point out the limitation of this dissertation 
in Chapter 7. 
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2. State-owned enterprises reform policies in Vietnam 
The symbolic significance of doi moi declared at the Sixth National Congress31 of the 
CPV in December 1986 gives people the impression that doi moi was a single event 
having strong impact.32 However, doi moi were a set of continuous trials and polices 
towards a market-based economy through which the state legalised some market activities 
which were considered as ‘out-of-plan’ but widely adopted in the state sector (Beresford 
and Dang Phong 2000, Cheshier 2010, Fforde 2007, Rama 2008). 
 
2.1. Reform in general 
After national reunification, Vietnam (the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) extended the 
economic model established under the regime of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV; North Vietnam) to the domain of the former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) 
while at the same time strengthening the economic model of the Democratic Republic of 
                                                     
31
 It is said the draft of the Political Report of the National Congress circulated at the 
start of 1986 was extremely conservative. However, the death of the then General Secretary 
Le Duan changed the situation dramatically. Truong Chinh who replaced Le Duan guided the 
editing of the Political Report which became extremely reformist (Fforde 2007: 189).  
32
 Symbolic speeches of two then General Secretary of the CPV are as follows: 
“Over the past years we have committed errors springing from “left infantilism” and 
voluntarism and from running counter to objective laws. These errors have 
manifested themselves in the fact that we have built an economic structure over-
emphasizing large-scale heavy industry and surpassing our possibilities; that we 
have maintained for too long a bureaucratic subsidy-based system of management in 
which the infrastructure could not support a huge superstructure, leading to a great 
deal of dependence on foreign aid; that we have been precipitate in seeking to 
complete socialist transformation by quickly doing away with all non-socialist 
components of the economy. For the community of socialist countries, renovation is 
the way leading to the satisfaction of the requirements of the time, of the legitimate 
and ever-increasing needs of the people. For our country, renovation is all the more 
necessary: it is a matter of vital importance” (Truong Chinh 1986: 4-5); 
“In order to make the situation change, this Sixth Congress should make a 
renovation of our party in the fields of thinking, working style, organization and 
cadres. ... To this end, we have to struggle against the old, against conservatism and 
sluggishness, against dogmatism and stereo-typism, against subjectivism and 
hastiness, against degeneration and depravity, against those die-hard and obsolete 
habits” (Nguyen Van Linh 1987: 14). 
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Vietnam in the northern part. It was stated by a top leader of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam, Truong Chinh, the former General Secretary and a Politburo member, that “both 
zones must carry out together the socialist revolution and socialist construction at 
different levels. The North, which is ahead of the South on the road of transition to 
socialism, has now to do its best to help the South catch up with it.”, at the Political 
Consultative Conference on National Reunification held in November 1975 after the Fall 
of Saigon on 30 April 1975 (Truong Chinh 1975: 3). 
 
However, there were a series of debates within the leaderships of the CPV whether the 
extension of the DRV economic system33 to southern Vietnam should be done 
immediately or required a trial period (Rama 2008: 13-5). Whereas the leadership put the 
emphasis on economic restoration rather than transition at the beginning, the focus got 
started moving towards a single socialist economic system both in North and South 
(Beresford 1988, Fforde and de Vylder 1996, Ljunggren 1993, Vo Nhan Tri 1990). 
Enterprises were requested to form joint ventures with the state in 1976 and the 
collectivisation in the agricultural sector began in 1977 and a campaign denunciating 
large-scale trade was launched in 1978 (Ljunggren 1993: 59).34 
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 The DRV economic system refers the Vietnamese version of neo-Stalinist model 
which has the central planning system and the use of microeconomic institutions like as 
cooperatives and SOEs in common (see Introduction of Fforde and de Vylder (1996)). 
34
 This was the response by the leadership to the remnant of capitalism in the South. 
The vestiges of capitalist institutions and perceptions in the southern part of Vietnam, in 
particular within the sector of circulation and distribution, were a nuisance for the central 
authority in Hanoi trying to achieve socialist economic management. The two-price system, 
combined with the remnants of capitalism, provided individual agents with the opportunity of 
profiteering through unlawful market trade activities. This, in turn, caused a shortage of goods 
distributed through state market channels. While the state was unable to secure goods, these 
goods were traded in unauthorised markets at higher prices. The socialist state management 
was therefore distorted. Plenty of documents in the Party Daily (Nhan dan) and the Party 
Monthly (Hoc tap which changed its name into Tap chi Cong san in 1977) pointed out this 
type of problem over the period. 
39 
 
Insufficient procurement of necessary consumer goods and foodstuffs, aggravated by 
natural calamities, affected the central authority’s perception of the efficiency of the state 
management system. Pham Van Dong (1978), the then Prime Minster and a member of 
the Politburo, stressed a focus on agricultural production as well as supporting industry 
and crafts that were producing consumer goods to meet the peoples’ demands for foods 
and daily necessities.35 In contrast to the emphasis of Mr. Pham Van Dong, the 
investment in heavy industry increased from 21.4 per cent in 1976 to 29.7 per cent in 
1980 (Vu Quoc Ngu 2002: 3). Large investment in heavy industry changed in the early 
1980s and the productivity in the industrial sector improved (see Table 2, p. 43). 
 
However, the CPV had faced the fact that the handicrafts and artisan industry and private 
capitalists which were considered as the out-of-state-sector activities or the tail of the 
capitalist regime and treated unfavourably could produce and develop some state sector 
goods more efficiently, and the Sixth Plenum help in August 1979 accepted the important 
role of those activities in fulfilling people’s demands for daily consumer goods.36 Now 
what mattered were not the forms of production but the efficiency of the production. All 
ownership forms had to be fully utilised to meet the urgent task of providing consumer 
goods and food products.37 At the same time, the so-called ‘still-surviving petty 
bourgeoisie’ in the circulation and distribution sectors of basic consumer commodities, 
especially in the southern part of the nation, was blamed for the economic difficulties by 
the leadership (Le Duan 1984, Le Duan and Pham Van Dong 1975).  
                                                     
35
 It was a deviation from the propaganda of the Fourth National Congress of the CPV 
which gave priority to the development of heavy industry. It was a slight modification in the 
means to achieve the goal of socialist transformation in Vietnam, as Pham Van Dong himself 
clearly pointed out in his speech. There was no official acceptance so far of the possible errors 
in the economic plan and its implementation. 
36
 Some scholars view the Sixth Plenum of the Fourth National Congress of the CPV 
was an important turning point from which the Vietnamese leadership had set the idea of 
reform in their mind (Fforde and de Vylder 1996, Nguyen Khac Vien 1982). 
37
 At that time, there were three ownership forms – state, collective and individual – in 
the north while five ownership forms existed in the south – joint state-private and private 
capitalist ownership in addition to those three forms. 
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Vietnam’s pre-reform situation was characterised by low savings rates, negligible 
agricultural surpluses and heavy reliance on foreign aid. While reforms boosted 
Vietnamese rural incomes38, the continued state monopoly of agricultural input supplies 
and certain product markets dominated by SOEs deprived farmers of a larger share of 
agricultural productivity gains (Fforde 1999). State credit allocations – the lion’s share of 
all formal credit – continued to favour state enterprises. Relying on owners’ savings, 
reinvested profits and small-scale informal sector borrowing, these enterprises generally 
remained small and undercapitalised (O'Conner 1998: 13-4).39 
 
In the agricultural sector, for example, Government Resolution No. 9/CP on ‘Food Policy’ 
in 198040 and Politburo Directive No. 100-CT/TW on ‘Improving and Extending Contract 
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 Refer to Hy Van Luong and Unger (1998) and Kirkvliet and Selden (1998) for an in-
depth analysis of rural development during the early period of reform. 
39
 The Chinese rural industry can be a good reference to assess the role of the rural 
economy in economic growth. In China, the central government actively encouraged the 
growth of the non-state sector. The collectively-owned township and village enterprises were 
a key element of this aim. Economically, on the one hand, they provided an organisational 
form conducive to mobilising local savings and pooling risk, politically, on the other hand, 
their ownership could be reconciled with official socialist ideology. The number of township 
and village enterprises roughly doubled to over 23 million between 1985 and 1996. The 
labour force employed by the township and village enterprises also roughly doubled over the 
same period to 135 million people. Thus, the employment level of township and village 
enterprises rose from 19 to 28 per cent of rural employment. Over the same period, the TVE 
contribution to gross industrial output rose even more steeply, from under 20 per cent to 55 
per cent (O'Conner 1998: 21-2). 
40
 The title in Vietnamese is Nghị quiết số 9-CP về chính sách lương thục. It stipulated 
new methods of production, collection, collection, purchase and distribution of food in order 
to incorporate the circulation and distribution of food products within the state sector by 
introducing agricultural tax and an incentive system. The amount of agricultural tax imposed 
was an average ten per cent of the volume of produced grain payable in grain and the 
obligatory sales of grain to the state. In addition, for the creation of the incentive to increase 
productivity, a new distribution method based on personal performance was designed and 
substituted for the existing predetermined quantity distribution norm. The new method was 
designed to give each according to his/her work (SWE, FE/6405/C2/1-6, 26 April 1980). 
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System in Agricultural Cooperatives’ in 198141 showed significant movement towards a 
‘socialist’ market economy by approving a contract system which was commonly 
adopted among cooperatives particularly in the South.42 At last, the Party leadership 
issued Politburo Resolution No. 10-NQ/TW on ‘Reforming the Management of the 
Agricultural Sector’ in 198843 to deal with a serious shortage of food, which led to the 
decollectivisation of agricultural cooperatives and transformed the character of 
agricultural cooperatives from rigid centrally planned entities to flexible autonomous 
commodity producing units.44 The size of large cooperatives was adjusted; various 
combinations of labour and means of production were allowed to organise new 
cooperatives and production brigades45; and land was allocated to tillers for a period of 
ten to fifteen years by a contract.46 Most means of production owned by collectives were 
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 It was issued by the Secretariat (Ban Bí thư) of the CPV. The title in Vietnamese was 
Chì thi số 100-CT/TW về cải tiến công tác khoán, mở rộng khoán sản phẩm đến nhóm và 
người lao động trong Hợp tác xã nông nghiệp. The party leadership endorsed the application 
of the end-product contract system which was already widespread in 1980. There was a 
custom in rural areas that the cooperatives signed contracts with the individual farmers for the 
production of winter crops independent of the state production plan. It was initiated by the 
cooperatives themselves and witnessed well-performed results. More and more cooperatives 
adopted this end-product system and it was finally applied to the rice production in 1982 by 
the central authority (the Communist Party of Viet Nam 1986). 
42
 It was reported that there was an increase in food production of twenty-seven per 
cent during the 1981-1985 period and ninety-two per cent of northern households recorded 5-
20 per cent surplus of food production between 1984 and 1985 (Nguyen Phu Trong et al. 
1995). 
43
 The title in Vietnamese was Nghị quyết số 10-NQ/TW về đổi mới quản lý kinh tế 
nông nghiệp.  
44
 According to the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam, the production of paddy rice grew 
at 12.6 per cent in 1988 and at 11.7 in 1989, while the growth rate was just 0.8 per cent in 
1986 and -5.6 per cent in 1987. 
45
 According to the resolution of the Sixth Plenum (the Sixth National Congress of the 
CPV) in March 1989, agricultural cooperatives and production brigades are “business 
organisations which are established by labourers who pool capital and labour force on 
voluntary basis and are managed in accordance with democratic principles” (Dang Duc Dam 
1995: 56). 
46
 The land allocation over the decollectivisation was conducted based on 
egalitarianism because of the pressure from the rural communities. As a result, the size of unit 
plot to the farmers was nearly even to all farmers. The problem, however, was that the plots 
were scattered because of the rule of egalitarianism. The small scale cultivation caused slow 
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either sold to individual households or commercialised for lending. Output could be sold 
freely at market prices either to the government or to the open market. The 
decollectivisation, however, caused another problem as the functions provided by 
cooperatives were strongly damaged due to the severe cut of budget after 1989 (Beresford 
2006: 208). 
 
The situation in the industrial sector was not quite different from that in the agricultural 
sector. There were widespread out-of-plan activities of SOEs which faced improper input 
allocation by the central planning system but still were required to fulfil product targets.47 
Through those out-of-plan activities, SOEs sometimes had sought to increase cash 
incomes, or the income in kind paid to workers. Alternatively, disposal of minor products 
enabled the SOE to obtain inputs used in the production of major lines (Dam Van Nhue 
and Le Si Thiep 1981: 24; recited in Fforde 2007: 133). SOEs were able to do revenue 
seeking and in many cases do profit seeking and actively sought those opportunities. 
Fforde (2007) argues these ‘commercialisation of SOEs’ was one of growth factors in 
Vietnam before and after doi moi. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
productivity growth and it became even worse because farmers had to move long distance to 
work. The egalitarian based land allocation may be counted as a good policy reflecting the 
demand of farmers but it turned out as a bad policy for the productivity growth in the rural 
area in Vietnam. On the other hand, it is said that the Chinese government pursued policies 
that favour those households who already have a head start in what is called a ‘wager-on-the-
strong’. It enabled for farmers to have a large scale cultivating plot, which in turn resulted in 
fast productivity growth in farming in China (Hy Van Luong and Unger 1998). 
47
 This situation was described with a saying in Vietnam ‘scarcity and abundance at the 
same time (vưa thừa vưa thiếu)’. It is reported that there were about two thousand industrial 
enterprises which hired over 600 thousand workers in 1981. However, one third of the 
enterprises was idle and operated at half their capacity. Many workers were sent to 
agricultural and mining sectors and paid seventy per cent of the agreed salary level during 
their idle periods (Vu Duy Hoang 1982). 
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Table 2: Industrial output growth (1976-1985) 
Annual rate of growth (%) 1976-1980 1980-85 
Total 0.6 9.5 
State sector -1.5 8.1 
Of which: Central -3.5 7.8 
Local 2.9 8.6 
Heavy industry 1.1 6.4 
Light industry -0.6 11.2 
Adopted from Vu Quoc Ngu (2002: 5).  
 
 
2.2. Reform policies in early stages of transition (1976-1990) 
Under the socialist planning system the practice of hoarding inputs or self-production of 
necessary inputs was not an unusual among SOEs in the context of the lack or late 
delivery of materials through planning system. In addition, SOEs overused allocated 
inputs because their performance was assessed by the level of fulfilling the plan (Vu 
Quoc Ngu 2002: 3). 
 
Many important reforms affecting the management of SOEs during the period of 1979 
and 1990 can be divided into two types– those that reduced the autonomy of SOEs 
(recentralisation) and those that increased it (decentralisation) as summarised in Table 3 
(p. 45). The enterprise’s autonomy over the same period mainly refers to the rights of 
enterprise directors to set production plans, carry out recruitment, set selling prices and 
spend their profits. Hence, whether the autonomy is increased or decreased is dependent 
upon how many of these decisions can be made by directors of SOEs without the 
approval of higher-level governing organs. Autonomy is also a question of whether SOEs 
were considered to be independent entities by the state. 
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When the Vietnamese economy experienced difficulties in the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, the leadership tried to improve not only productivity but also the circulation of 
products within the planned economy. The political leadership believed that the economic 
problems were the result of the mismanagement of the economic system. Meanwhile, the 
lack of consumer goods and foodstuffs allocated through the planning system meant that 
more and more transactions were occurring outside the planning system (kinh te ngoai). 
Of course, profits in the transactions outside the planning system were higher because of 
the two-price system (official price versus market price). 
 
The government Resolution No. 279-CP promulgated in 1979 and the government 
Decision No. 25-CP promulgated in 1981 aimed to alleviate the problem of shortages in 
the planned sector by formalising activities of SOEs that had previously been conducted 
covertly but were already widespread business activities outside the planning system 
which are frequently referred to ‘fence-breaking’. Various method were used in fence-
breaking and they were not easy at all because revolutionary people would report to 
higher levels (Fforde 2007: 61). It, however, should be noted that some big figures in the 
CPV leadership engaged in fence-breaking. For example, Mr. Kim Ngoc, the Party 
Secretary of Vinh Phuc province, Mr. Bui Quang Tao, the Party Secretary of Hai Phong 
and Mr. Vo Van Kiet, the Party Secretary of Ho Chi Minh City who became the Prime 
Minister were engaged in fence-breaking and were able to persuade the CPV leadership 
to endorse new methods to improve productivity (see Rama 2008: 15-9). 
 
The government Resolution No. 279-CP was titled “On policies to stimulate and circulate 
goods not managed by the state and supply materials and goods produced from local 
materials and waste by-products”.48 It encouraged SOEs to increase market activities 
                                                     
48
 In Vietnamese, Nghị quyết số 279-CP về chính sách khuyến khích sản xuất và lưu 
thông những mặt hang khong do Nhà nước quản lý và cung ứng vật tư; những mặt hàng sản 
xuất bằng nguyên liệu địa phương và phế liệu phế phậm. 
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involving non-list goods. Denunciations of ‘fence-breaking’ activities coming from 
conservatives in the SOEs were thereafter ignored (Fforde 2007: 146).  
 
Table 3: Classification of SOEs policies between 1979 and 1990 
Year Policies Number Towards Main contents 
    
1979 279-CP Decentralisation Using non-public channels for distribution 
1981 25-CP Decentralisation Three Plan System 
1982 146-HDBT Recentralisation Emphasising the operation of the planned 
economy 
1984 156-HDBT Recentralisation Strengthened the role of the state plan 
1986 306-BBT Decentralisation Granting significant autonomy to SOEs 
1986 76-HDBT Decentralisation Action plan of 306-BBT 
1987 217-HDBT Decentralisation Production plans were no longer sent by the 
centre but set by individual SOE 
1989 93-HDBT Recentralisation Decreased retainable depreciation in SOEs; 
increased state budget revenue 
1990 143-HDBT Recentralisation Outside members sit on the Council of 
Management weakening the autonomy of the 
SOE director 
 
 
The government Decision No. 25-CP, titled “A number of policies and measures to 
continue to develop the rights in production and trade and to enhance the financial 
autonomy of SOEs”, introduced the so-called the ‘three plan system’.49 It also aimed at 
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 ‘Three Plan System’ (Government Decision No. 25-CP) defined three plans as 
follows: 
 Plan A: An enterprise produces planned products using state-supplied inputs and 
supplies the product to the state at low planned prices. Permission to carry out other 
activities was conditional on the fulfilment of the Part A. 
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legalising the commercialisation that already characterised most SOEs. After allowing 
state enterprise to engage in Plan B and Plan C which used to belong to the ‘economy 
outside planning’, the state again began to emphasise socialist economic management. 
Partly this was because the improved economic situation made the state feel that 
decentralisation was already effective in correcting the mismanagement. 
 
It is said that “if there had not been 25-CP then many ‘little crimes’ would have been 
exposed. One could say that 25-CP ‘muzzled’ many conservative people in the SOEs and 
saved various managers from the sack. According to the old system such activities were 
quite wrong, and should have led to losing not only one’s job but also membership of the 
Party” (quote from Fforde 2007: 61). 
 
Government Decision No. 25-CP on the SOEs reform in 1981 
As examined earlier in this section, the Sixth Plenum (the Fourth National Congress) 
issued a resolution on expanding the production of consumer goods and local small-scale 
household and handicraft activities. However, the lack of detailed supportive regulations 
caused confusion and made enterprises hesitant to adopt new ways. Under these 
circumstances, the government issued a series of policies, Government Decision No. 25, 
26 and 64 in January and February 1981, in order to improve the productivity of the 
industrial sector. The Government Decision No. 25-CP dealt with the continued 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Plan B: If it was freely disposing of products that it had been established to produce, 
these were now called the Second Part. The factory was now legally permitted to 
acquire resources by itself, quite free from planners’ instructions, and could then 
dispose of them as it wished, but only in order to acquire additional inputs for the 
fulfilment of Part A. 
 Plan C: Refers to activity concerning so-called ‘minor’ products that resulted from 
the enterprise’s own attempts at diversification. These were free from outside control, 
largely because they were not meant to be supplied to established consumers, so there 
was no demand within the planning system for their supply. However, state trading 
organs had to be given priority when the unit disposed of these products (de Vylder 
and Fforde 1988: 68-9). 
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development of initiatives in production and business and financial autonomy of the state 
enterprises. The Government Decision No. 26-CP dealt with the system of contractual 
quotas payment and piecework payment and system bonus in state production and 
business establishments. These decisions were supplemented by the Government 
Decision No. 64-CP on the remittance of products of state enterprises and the 
concentration of cash into the hands of the state (Vu Duy Hoang 1982). 
 
The Government Decision No. 25-CP50, promulgated on 21 January 1981, promoted the 
initiative of SOEs in production and management and extended their financial autonomy 
by introducing the ‘three plan system’. The government’s motivations were very similar 
to those that drove the new policies in the agricultural sector. The existence of the 
unorganised market and its higher prices had distorted the socialist industrial market, 
being called ‘bad’ activities by the state. The legalised free market was viewed as a 
double-edged weapon by the authority because the small scale traders, on the one hand, 
had helped to stimulate production and fulfil the high demand for consumer goods, but, 
on the other hand, the allurement of profits pushed them to engage in illicit activities at 
the same time (Vietnam Courier, No. 6, 1983: 11-13). Even SOEs commonly involved in 
these bad activities, which devastated the economic plan and supply-demand balance.  
 
The Government Decision No. 25-CP can be understood as a method of trying to bring 
the bad activities into the open and legalise them under state planning. According to the 
Government Decision No. 25-CP, the priority of meeting obligations under the plan were 
retained, but state enterprises could register their ‘unplanned’ activities and were allowed 
to manufacture those unplanned products when they were able to independently procure 
raw material and energy. It allowed SOEs to expand non-plan and above-plan output 
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 It was titled “on a number of policies and measures to continue to develop the rights 
in production and trade and to enhance the financial autonomy of state enterprises” (về một số 
chủ trương và biện pháp nhằm phát huy quyển chủ động sản xuất kinh doanh và quyền tự chủ 
về tái chính của các xí nghiệp quốc doanh). 
48 
 
(Beresford and Dang Phong 2000: 43) It is reported that a state enterprise in Hanoi 
recorded a five-fold increase in the plant’s revenue and 3.8 times rise in the workers’ 
income from its profit during the 1980-1982 period by applying the ‘three part system’ 
creatively.51 
 
Nevertheless, the two-price system was still cramping the development of the Vietnamese 
socialist economy as the price gap kept causing side effects. For example, it was highly 
likely that directors of state firms could appropriate materials, allocated by the state for 
the production of Plan A products, to use for the production of Plan B and Plan C 
products which gave bigger benefits to enterprises and workers. In addition, there were 
differences in the enterprises’ revenue which resulted from the price disparity in the two 
markets. An enterprise which produced tradable goods in free market could have higher 
revenue. 
 
Conservatism: Decision No. 146-HDBT and Resolution No. 156-HDBT
52
 
Decision No. 146-HDBT, promulgated on 25 August 1982, “On changing and 
supplementing 25-CP”, signalled the state’s intention to reduce (and ultimately remove) 
the production and trade that had been previously allowed in ‘the economy outside 
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 For example, the distribution of profits at Giai Phong Plant in Hanoi between 1980 
and 1982 was recorded as below. 
   (unit: VND) 
 1980 1981 1982 
State revenue 223,000 548,000 1,000,000 
Plant’s revenue 135,883 320,000 700,000 
Workers’ income 112,560 220,000 430,000 
Source: Vu Duy Hoang (1982). 
52
 To indicate the ‘government’ of Vietnam in legal documents, the Government 
Council (Hội đồng Chính phủ or CP in short) was used until 1980 and then the Council of 
Ministers (Hội đồng Bộ trưởng or HDBT in short) following the Soviet name was used since 
1981. After the collapse of the Soviet in 1992, Government Council, that is, Chính phủ (CP), 
was used again for the Government of Vietnam. For the full text of Decision No. 217, see 
SWB, FE/0033, C1/1-11, on 23 December 1987. 
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planning’. It confirmed the general intention to limited unplanned activities.53 This 
Decision was intended to reduce the opportunism of directors who were apt to use 
supplied materials to produce Plan C products, and also to increase central tax revenues. 
Three main points of Decision No. 146 were to improve the planning system and 
centralise sources of commodities in the hands of the state; to get rid of production and 
trade based upon the unorganised market – enterprises were strictly forbidden from 
purchasing on the free market those goods subject to the state’s monopoly; and to 
distribute enterprise profits in such a way as to ensure adequate budgetary receipts by the 
state (Fforde 2007: 164 and 166).  
 
Resolution No. 156-HDBT, promulgated on 30 November 1984, “On some matters for 
improving the management of state industry”,54 attempted to strengthen the central 
economic management organs. It stressed the need to utilise the state plan as a means for 
concentrating resources by stating that  
 
From the very beginning of 1985, the state plan must centralise 
principle production conditions for those key goods that serve 
production, exports, mass consumption, national defence, and goods 
that create important sources of income from the state budget, above 
all those enterprises that produce a lot and have high economic results 
(Fforde 2007: 179). 
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 A quoted interview in Fforde (2007: 170) describes the situation as follows. “… 
because of slackness in management during a situation where industry was very short of 
materials, energy, spares etc., a number of cadres have shown a strong tendency to run after 
profits and the market... Many bad methods continue and in some places things have 
deteriorated to dangerous levels – such as the use of various ruses, such as avoiding adequate 
deliveries of products to the state, not paying state incomes to the state, freely setting up 
bonus and ‘bringing-on’ systems in the unit, unprincipled increase in cost prices, violation of 
basic socialist economic management regulations. … To stop all this, it is necessary... to 
implement 146-HDBT”. 
54
 The title in Vietnamese is Nghị quyết số 156-HĐBT về một số vấn đề cải tiến quản lý 
công nghiệp quốc doanh. 
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Nonetheless, the basic idea of ‘three plan’ still remained. The SOE could retain output 
produced from own-procured resources but this had to be approved by its superior as part 
of the plan. Through the two conservative legislation of the government, it showed that 
“policy was conservative at a time when the basis for a commercialised state industry was 
being created, and point to major underlying political conflicts” (Fforde 2007: 23). 
 
In contrast to the conservative movement between 1982 and 1984, Resolution No. 306-
BCT “On ensuring the autonomy in production and trade of basic economic units”55, 
issued as a draft form in April 1986 aimed to increase the autonomy of SOEs. This was 
not a sudden U-turn but an urgent response to serious macroeconomic instability caused 
by the failed ‘price, salary and currency’ reform in 1985. 
 
Price, Salary and Currency reform in 1985 
The economic condition became difficult again from 1984. The two-price system kept 
creating shortages of necessary products and high inflation persisted.56 The authorities 
reacted with ‘prices, salaries and currency’ reform in June 1985. The Eighth Plenum (the 
Fifth National Congress) decided to abolish the subsidised and bureaucratised economy 
and move towards a cost account based economy. The breakthrough of the Eighth 
Plenum was the abandonment of subsidisation. It proposed that rationing should be 
abolished altogether, prices increased to market levels (and allowed to remain there) and 
a subsidy paid to wages in order to compensate workers for the price increases. It 
introduced the adjustment of price levels, cash payment of salaries and the inclusion of 
reasonable expenses in the cost-price of the products (Nguyen Thi Hien 2008). 
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 In Vietnamese, Nghị quyết (dự thảo) số 306-BCT về bảo đảm quyền tự chủ sản xuất, 
kinh doanh của các dơn vị kinh tế cơ sở. 
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 It was said that the consumer price index(CPI) grew 448 per cent over the period 
1982-1983 and 759 per cent over 1983-1984 apiece (Nguyen Thi Hien 2008: 272). 
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However, in contrast to the prediction, the result of those policies was miserable. It was 
apparently still not acceptable to the majority to switch to the market mechanism, so the 
new prices remained administered prices. In order to distribute the new prices to the trade 
organizations, 30 tonnes of paper had to be printed and transported to the various regional 
units. The organisations had to wait until they received these new prices before they could 
begin selling, with the result that inflationary pressure in free markets increased and the 
gap between new state prices and market prices expanded rapidly (Beresford and Fforde 
1997: 123).  
 
The budget revenue was far behind the soaring budget expenditure required by the reform 
measures. Pressure from the southern provinces, where the standard of living was much 
higher than in the north, ensured that wages in fact more than doubled. The government 
faced incredibly high demand for money during the implementation of the new policy 
because the ‘prices, salaries and currency’ reform was designed to change the economy 
into a monetised economy.  
 
This also made the operation of SOEs very difficult because they had to purchase input 
material at market prices which were far higher than the state prices. SOEs 
representatives argued that the SOEs could not survive if they were forced to purchase 
inputs at market prices since they would not be able to sell their products, even at cost 
price. Indeed, after subsidized input prices were finally abolished in 1989, many SOEs 
were forced to close down their operations, and this provided fuel for arguments against 
further hardening of SOE budget constraints. The result of their argument in 1985, 
however, was that state-subsidized inputs would continue to be supplied to SOEs at 70 
per cent of the market-price level. Pressure from these two groups, plus the unwillingness 
of the leadership to abolish the system of administered prices, ensured that the 
inflationary spiral intensified after the reform (Beresford and Fforde 1997: 124). 
 
52 
 
The government had to print more money to cover the budget deficit, which aggravated 
the situation. The vicious cycle of inflation appeared to be unstoppable. The inflation rate 
recorded a high of 875 per cent in 1986. The hyperinflation lasted until the Sixth Plenum 
(the Sixth National Congress) decided to carry out the one-price system based on market 
prices in 1989. Average monthly inflation rates were 2.6 per cent in 1989 and 4.5 per cent 
in 1990 compared to 19.9 per cent in 1986 and 14.5 per cent in 1988 (Do Hoai Nam 1994: 
117-8). 
 
U-turn to a reformist move: Resolution No. 306-BCT 
It was said that the purpose of the resolution was “to eliminate entirely the centralised 
bureaucratic structure of management and subsidies and to effect the materialisation of a 
democratic centralism, economic self-accountancy and socialist business” (Nhan dan, 23 
April 1986, reporting a speech by Vo Chi Cong, the secretary of the Central Committee 
of the party, quoted in Jerve et al. 2002: 210). The resolution established the central role 
of the SOE director, affirming the director’s power to take independent decisions with 
regard to the management of the enterprise. It stated that 
 
306-BBT57 was a re-loosening as far as the SOEs were concerned. … 
Confronted with a situation where the country was close to collapse 
and the people were deeply unsettled, the state had to continue with 
loosening up through 306-BBT. (Fforde 2007: 188) 
 
 
Decision No. 76-HDBT, promulgated in 1986, “On the promulgation of temporary rules 
ensuring the autonomy in production and trade of basic economic units”, was an 
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 Fforde recognises that the issuing organ of Resolution No. 306 was the Secretariat of 
the CPV which is abbreviated to BBT (Ban Bí thư) and wrote the number of legislation as 
“306-BBT” but many other sources identify the Politburo, abbreviated BCT (Bộ Chính trị) as 
the issuing organ of this resolution and generally written as Resolution No. 306-BTC. Both 
Resolution 306-BBT and 306-BCT refer the same legislation. 
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implementation document for Resolution No. 306-BCT of the party.58 It contained nine 
regulations over the basic business activities of state firms, such as autonomy in planning, 
financing, pricing, sales and services, signing and implementing economic contracts and 
the management of the banking system to ensure the autonomy of basic economic units. 
 
Both 306-BCT and 76-HDBT were strengthening the autonomy of SOEs just before doi 
moi was declared in December 1986, which we can interpret as the leadership was forced 
to take action to cope with growing discontent over the worsening economy associated 
with the central planning system. The leadership rightly feared that the CPV could be 
damaged. This may be why the party Resolution No. 306-BCT was announced quickly in 
a draft form and further reform, doi moi, was on its way. 
 
Enhanced autonomy to SOEs: Decision No. 217-HDBT 
After the declaration of doi moi in December 1986, more autonomy was given to SOEs 
through Decision No. 217-HDBT which was politically supported by central organs, such 
as the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Finance and the 
State Bank of Vietnam  followed (Fforde 2007: 199). It, issued on 14 November 1987, 
was titled to “Promulgate reform policies for socialist business planning and accounting 
in SOEs”. 59 Decision No. 217 was the extended version of the Government Decision No. 
25-CP in 1980 by which the ‘three part system’ was introduced. State enterprises now 
were able to take the initiative in preparing and implementing long term and short term 
plans for their production and business activities. 
 
According to Decision No. 217-HDBT, produced goods were grouped into three 
categories and ‘three legal targets’ were assigned to enterprises along with the product 
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 Fforde argues that the implementation decree did not follow the reformist intention 
of the resolution of the CPV. See Fforde (2007: 186-188) for further discussion. 
59
 The title in Vietnamese is Quyết định số 217-HĐBT, về các chính sách đổi mới kế 
hoạch hóa và hạch toán kinh doanh xã hội chủ nghĩa đối với xí nghiệp quốc doanh. 
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category. For products defined as primary and whose materials were supplied under state 
guarantee, enterprises had to fulfil the target of the quantity and quality of the products, 
the value of commodity production and the budgetary contribution to the state, that is, 
three legal targets. For products which did not fall under the list of primary goods whose 
materials were partially supplied by the state, enterprises were assigned to fulfil only the 
latter two targets – the value of the commodity and the contributions to the state. Finally, 
for production and repair services, if enterprises mainly used self-procured materials, they 
were required to fulfil only one target, that is, the contribution to the state. The autonomy 
of enterprises in the production plan as well as in recruitment was allowed and there 
would be a shift from the system of state organisation of employment to a system of 
labour contracts. 
 
The aim of this Decision was to create a new economic management system. As a result, 
the basis of planning became the firms’ plan rather than what their governing organs sent 
to the firms. It abolished direct budgetary support (Fforde and de Vylder 1996, Van 
Arkadie and Mallon 2003). Mandatory targets were reduced to no more than three. Any 
plan issued to SOEs was related directly to the ability of the state to supply the inputs to 
those enterprises. Furthermore, SOEs were granted 100 per cent of basic depreciation and 
full rights over their capital, including retained profits. 
 
Subsequently Decree No. 50-HDBT, promulgated on 22 March 1988, on “Regulations for 
state industrial enterprises”60 provided more details on the rights and responsibilities of 
SOEs. A wide range of autonomy in business operation was granted with some 
restrictions. For example, selling of assets (even if these had become surplus to 
requirement) and changes in allocated plans still required the approval of superior organs. 
However, directors could appoint deputy directors and the chief accountant with the 
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 The title in Vietnamese is Nghị định số 50-HĐBT về điều lệ xí nghiếp công nghiệp 
quốc doanh. 
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agreement of superior organs and wages were to be paid by the wage funds accumulated 
by individual SOEs  (Communist Party of Viet Nam 1991: 39-47). Decision No. 195-
HDBT formally abolished the two-price system in December 1989 by amending 217-
HDBT.61 The control over prices was largely removed. Non-price controlled products 
were priced based on the bargaining between buyers and firms. For price-controlled 
products, the price was set by the enterprise with reference to a price committee (Vu 
Quoc Ngu 2002: 7). The number of goods controlled by the price committee was reduced 
from 100 in 1987 to 8 in 1990 (Le Dang Doanh 1996: 65). The transitional model was 
over and central planning was effective ended (Beresford and Dang Phong 2000, Fforde 
2007).62 
 
The autonomy granted to SOEs by Decision No. 217-HDBT was somewhat modified 
several times in a way to strengthen the state control over SOEs again. For example, 
Decision No. 93-HDBT, promulgated on 24 July 198963, changed the system of basic 
depreciation of state economic units by amending 217-HDBT and 50-HDBT. As 
examined, SOEs were granted to keep 100 per cent of their basic depreciation through 
Decision No. 217. However, Decision No. 93-HDBT reduced the amount of retainable 
basic depreciation to seventy per cent for new projects for three years, which means the 
state was able to increase its budget revenue by an equivalent amount. 
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 Decision No. 195-HDBT, promulgated on 2 December 1989, was titled 
“Supplementing Decision No. 217-HDBT on business activities of SOEs” (Quyết định bổ 
sung Quyết định số 217-HĐBT về việc hoạt động của các xí nghiệp quốc doanh). 
62
 The pace of change in the Vietnamese economy after 1989 was extraordinary. Light 
manufacturing output increased, garments and footwear in particular, contributing to the 
export boom. Foreign direct investment rose steadily. Vietnam experienced strong economic 
growth combined with macroeconomic stability into the late 1990s (Van Arkadie and Mallon 
2003). 
63
 In Vietnamese, Quyết định số 93-HĐBT, sửa đổi chế độ nộp khấu hao cơ bản của 
các đơn vị xí nghiệp kinh tế quốc doanh. 
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Meanwhile, Decision No. 143-HDBT, promulgated on 10 May 1990, summarised the 
implementation of 217-HDBT, 50-HDBT and 98-HDBT.64 It stipulated the installation of 
a Council of Management (Hoi dong quan tri) as part of the management apparatus (bo 
may quan ly) of a state firm. One half of the members of the Council of Management 
were to be appointed by the directly superior state organ. The appointees could be 
representatives of the directly superior state organ sitting on behalf of the Chairman of the 
Council or an expert in finance appointed by the finance organ. The other half of the 
Council members was to be composed of insiders and workers. This reduced the 
autonomy of SOE directors because outsider members were appointed by the superior 
organs, showing the strong desire to regain influence over SOEs (Fforde 2007: 208).  
 
In addition, Decree No. 217-HDBT permitted lower levels of government to establish 
SOEs. The result was an explosion of small, often district-level state firms. It is 
impossible to determine the degree to which these firms engaged in arbitrage 
opportunities, but many of them did report losses and constituted a significant drain on 
the state budget (Painter 2003a, b, 2008, Porter 1993, Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003). 
 
Most of the loss making SOEs that drained state resources and 
contributed little to state budget revenues were smaller SOEs attached 
to departments of line ministries or lower levels of government over 
which the central government had little control. Transforming smaller 
SOEs was an attempt to improve economic performance and also a 
means through which the central government could break the power of 
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 The full title of Decision 143-HDBT was “summarising the implementation of 
Decision 217-HDBT and Decree No. 50-HDBT and 98-HDBT on reforming the management 
in SOEs and continuous piloting reform of the management in SOEs” (Quyết định số 143-
HĐBT, tổng kết thực hiện Quyết định 217-HĐBT, các Nghị định 50-HĐBT và 98-HĐBT về 
đổi mới quản lý xí nghiệp quốc doanh và làm thử việc tiếp tục đổi mới quản lý xí nghiệp quốc 
doanh). The Decree No. 98-HDBT, promulgated on 2 June 1988, was on “a ownership right 
of collective labour in SOEs” (về quyền làm chủ của tập thể lao động tại xí nghiệp quốc 
doanh). 
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lower levels of government that had used smaller SOEs as tools for 
asset stripping and rent distribution (Cheshier et al. 2006: 6) 
 
The increase in loss-making SOEs caught the attention of the state in the early 1990s and 
it promulgated Decree No. 388-HDBT
65
 in November 1991 to restructure SOEs by 
forcing them to apply for new operating licences, with re-registration approval predicated 
on business viability (Cheshier 2010: 123, Vu Quoc Ngu 2002) and roughly 3,000 SOEs 
were liquidated and 2,000 merged into other SOEs (Cheshier et al. 2006: 7). 
 
Summary: Were the budget constraints on SOE soft? 
The relations between the state and SOEs during the period 1976-90 can be summarised 
as the initial centralisation followed by decentralisation and then recentralisation in terms 
of the autonomy SOEs were granted. These swings were largely affected by the economic 
situation and corresponding reactions of the CPV leadership and the state. Economic 
hardship combined with poorly managed economic planning forced SOEs into engaging 
‘fence-breaking’ in order to either seek required cash incomes or mobilise required input 
for main production lines which should have been allocated by the state. The CPV 
leadership who at first were stubbornly refused to endorse these diversions had to admit 
them, and declared that there were errors in the implementation of socialist economic 
plan at the Sixth National Congress of the CPV in December 1986. 
 
How do we interpret fence-breaking in terms of budget constraints? Fence-breaking has 
largely been understood as a breakthrough experiment initiated by a local leadership to 
cope with economic difficulties through the reliance on ‘market mechanisms’ (Beresford 
and Dang Phong 2000, Fforde 2007, Rama 2008, Tran Dang 1994). The root cause of 
fence-breaking was “the chronic shortages of materials, power and fuels” (Dam Van 
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 It was promulgated on 20 November 1991 whose title was “Establishing and 
liquidating SOEs” (Nghị định số 388-HĐBT Quy chế về thành lập và giải thế doanh nghiệp 
nhà nước). 
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Nhue and Le Si Thiep, 1981: 24, recited in Fforde 2007: 132). Consequently, SOEs had 
been ‘turned loose’ and had to fend for themselves. While we do not have direct research 
on the matter of soft budget constraints on SOEs during the period 1976-1990, it would 
not be an exaggeration to conjecture that SOEs which were forced to do fence-breaking 
activities faced harsh budget constraints. 
 
Another fact supporting that SOEs did not face soft budget constraints over the same 
period is the transformation of the role of SOEs from productions units to a tax base. The 
state which chronically suffered from a weak tax base rediscovered the role of SOEs as an 
important tax base for the regime rather than production units in the decentralisation 
move which was ignited by No. 25-CP in 1981 and No. 215-HDBT in 1987 (Fforde 
2007). The transformation of the function of SOEs from a production unit to a tax base 
made the state seize the control over SOEs to establish financing to the state, which 
resulted in the recentralisation move from 1982-1985 and 1988-1991. It seemed not easy 
for the state to let go this important tax base and source of national development 
projects.66  
 
There was the issue of granting ‘autonomy’ to SOEs in order to resolve the matter of 
productivity at the centre of the SOEs reform in this period while the issue of changing 
the type of ownership kept intact. From the 1990s to present, the structure of SOEs and 
the type of ownership is at the centre of discourses on reforming SOEs, which is likely to 
cause a change in budget constraints. 
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 Those swings between centralisation and decentralisation do not necessarily mean 
one party gains power over the other. For example, SOEs can make a deal like as ‘we pay tax 
and do not touch us’ with the state. This is a likely outcome given that Vietnam has not had a 
competent Weberian bureaucracy. 
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2.3. Reform policies since 1990s 
Background 
In 1990 a Company Law was promulgated, providing a legal framework for private firms. 
The Law on Foreign Investment, originally issued in 1987, was amended in 1990 and 
1992. In 1992 the Constitution was amended, recognising a role for the private sector in 
the Vietnamese economy. In 1993 a Land Law and Bankruptcy Law were promulgated. 
That year also saw the return of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to Vietnam. In 1994 the U.S. trade embargo was lifted and relations with the United 
States were normalized in 1995. In 1995 Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The 
turnaround from international isolation and looming macroeconomic collapse in 1989 
was remarkable (Cheshier 2010: 118-9). 
 
The environment continued to improve in the 2000s. In 2000 the first stock market 
opened in Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam also signed the United States Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (USBTA) and the U.S. quickly became one of Vietnam’s top trading partners. 
In 2003 a revised Land Law was promulgated, along with a revised Law on State 
Enterprises. In 2005 a new Enterprise Law and a new Investment Law were issued, 
unifying the legal framework for domestic private and foreign enterprises, and governing 
the operations of transformed state enterprises. These laws took effect in July 2006. In 
2006 the formal domestic private share of industrial output for the first time was equal to 
that of the state sector. In January 2007, Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (ibid.: 139-40). 
 
Ironically the effective end of central planning in 1989 and movements towards a market 
economy in the early 1990s did not bring ‘hard’ budget constraints contrary to 
conventional wisdom that the introduction of market mechanisms are likely to harden 
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budget constraints on SOEs (Boycko et al. 1996, Kornai et al. 2003). Before doi moi all 
businesses officially belong to the state and they suffered from the shortage of resources 
including the support from the state budget. The abandoning of central planning 
combined with ‘unreformed’ politics led to a development strategy which relied on the 
leading role of SOEs (Beresford and Fforde 1997, Fforde 2007, Riedel and Turley 1999, 
Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003), which made resource allocation have been centred to the 
state sector. As a result, the private sector has relatively been treated unfavourably. 
 
It might be controversial to argue that the Vietnamese government has not been 
supportive of the private sector because it has implemented pro-market economic policies 
since doi moi. However, it is very difficult to find policies specifically benefiting the 
private sector. The pro-market economic policies of the Vietnamese government have 
been mainly applied to the state sector. The private sector, compared to the pre-doi moi 
period, is still not favoured by the authorities. For example, surveys on business 
environment in Vietnam conducted by Ronnas and Ramamurthy (2001) and Tenev et al. 
(2003) showed that the private enterprises feel the official’s attitude was not so friendly 
and the playing field of state enterprises and private enterprises are not levelled. It is said 
that this atmosphere has not been improved much until recently.67 SOEs, especially large 
ones, are the entities which have benefitted the most from the transition to a market 
economy in Vietnam. 
 
This politically conservative68 but economically reformist approach of Vietnam is called 
‘market-Leninism’ (London 2009).69 One of the remarkable result is the 
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 Some private business owners complain that the state still hates or is afraid of the 
behaviour of making money and getting rich in Vietnam could make themselves at risk. 
68
 There still were a group of people within the party who did not advocate the market 
mechanism after ten years of doi moi. For example, Khong Doan Hoi (1995) said that “even 
though we have achieved significant economic growth, ‘achieving political stability is not a 
simple matter. This requires correct understanding and vigilance, particularly in a situation in 
which the economy is operating based on market mechanisms and the enemy is carrying out a 
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commercialisation of the state sector which created largely blurred distinction between 
the state and the private sector (Beresford 2008, Beresford and Dang Phong 2000, Fforde 
2007, Gainsborough 2002, 2003b, Herno 1998). The banner of companies largely has no 
meaning in identifying a state company or a private company. They may be called a state-
related private company (Cheshier 2010, Gainsborough 2003c, 2010b), a disguised state 
company owned privately (Gainsborough 2003b), or a ‘virtual share company’ which 
“largely treated by their effective owners70 as private in nature, and so capable of 
performing under competitive conditions without economically destabilising state support” 
(Fforde 2007: 214). These blurred property rights in the state sector has created rent 
switching and resource appropriation over the transition period (Fforde 2002, 2007, 2009, 
2010). 
 
It is argued that the Vietnamese conservative politics or unreformed politics has been a 
drag on further economic reform (Fforde 2011, 2013). In particular, Fforde (2013) raises 
a question on the capacity of the CPV to serve as the driving force of economic growth. 
He argues that the role of the CPV is not deriving but following at best over the reform 
(see also Fforde and de Vylder 1996, Fforde and Paine 1987). The CPV “had not been the 
key driver of the transition from plan to market. Due to its internal 'structural' institutional 
practices, major insider interest groups were meant to be able to prevent change that they 
did not want, limiting the discretionary power of peak leaders” (Fforde 2013: 383). 
Consequently, in Vietnam, there has been “no domestic sovereignty” since doi moi and in 
                                                                                                                                                 
“peaceful revolution” plot against our country … but doesn’t the most inclusive factor start 
from money, from the good and evil of money? ... it will be difficult to maintain political 
stability in the face of the strength of money ... if money is allowed to do whatever it wants in 
our country, we will be committing suicide” (FBIS-EAS-95-159, 17 August 1995: 68-9). 
69
 Market-Leninism as one of types of market socialism is defined as “communist 
parties pursue their political imperatives through market institutions and market-based 
strategies of accumulation while maintaining Leninist principles and strategies of political 
organization” (London 2009: 376). 
70
 Fforde suggests ‘state bodies linking the SOE into the state apparatus’ such as the 
Ministry of Finance and ‘General Companies’ such as General Corporations and State 
Economic Groups as effective owners (Fforde 2007: 218).  
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2000s in particular (ibid..: 393).71 A less pessimistic view is found in Dixon (2004) and 
Gainsborough 2010b: ch. 7). They argue that the development of factions having different 
interests have direct and indirect inputs into policy formulation and implementation. 
Hence the enforcement has significantly been interrupted but it has not in chaos. 
 
The murkiness of property rights in Vietnam makes the matter of hardening budget 
constraints on SOEs more complicated because it is not clear who is the owner 
controlling the SOE effectively. Without asking who is the real owner of SOEs, changing 
ownership type from state-owned to privately-owned or applying strict lending rules does 
not automatically lead to hardening budget constraints (Fforde 2007). This approach 
coincides with the findings of Gainsborough (2005) and this dissertation that the softness 
of budget constraints which each individual SOE faces varies widely depending on what 
connections the SOE director has established. 
 
Return to the relationship between the state and SOEs. As examined Decision No. 143-
HDBT in 1990 was the move showing that the state desired to have more influence on 
SOEs. This tendency continued in the 1990s to 2000s during which equitisation (co phan 
hoa) of SOEs and forming big SOEs such as General Corporations (tong cong ty) and 
State Economic Groups (Tap doan nha nuoc) are significant changes. 
 
Equitisation 
Equitisation, a type of partial privatisation, means issuing and selling shares to both 
insiders (the state, directors and employees) and outsiders to turn an SOE into a joint-
stock company (JSC). This partial privatisation is not a unique in Vietnam but popular in 
many developing countries such as Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore and also in 
developed countries like the UK, Japan, France and Canada (Boardman and Vining 1989, 
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 Refer to, for example, Thayer (2009), Vasavakul (2003) and Vuving (2010) for the 
argument that the CPV has established decent domestic sovereignty. 
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Boubakri et al. 2004).72 For example, Taiwan started privatising in a serious way only in 
1996, relinquishing majority shares in SOEs in banking, insurance, petrochemicals, 
transportation, and a few other industries. However, Taiwan’s privatisation has been a 
very controlled one, as the government still has a controlling stake (average of 35.5%) 
and accounts for 60% of board members in the eighteen privatised state-owned 
enterprises. The Taiwanese government is allowed to own the “golden share” (i.e., the 
veto over important decisions) when privatizing SOEs in defence or public utilities 
(Chang 2007: 11). 
 
Equitisation in Vietnam began as a pilot programme under Resolution No. 2-NQ-
HNTW73 on 4 December 1991 followed by a number of government decisions such as 
Decision No. 202-CT, 8 June 1992 and Directive No. 84-TTg, 4 March 1993.74 The main 
purposes of equitisation were to mobilise capital and improve the efficiency of state firms 
as stated in Decree No. 44 as follows: 
 
Article 2. The transformation of SOEs into joint-stock companies 
(hereafter referred to as equitisation for short) aims to achieve the 
following objectives: 
1. Mobilising capital from the entire society, including domestic and 
foreign individuals, economic organisations and social organisations 
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 Jones et al. (1999) found that only 11.5% of the firms sold all of their capital and 
less than 30% sold more than half of their capital in the initial public offering in a sample of 
share-issue privatisations from 59 countries. 
73
 The title of Resolution No. 2-NQ-HNTW issued by the Central Committee (Ban 
Chấp hành trung ương) of the CPV was “on the tasks and solutions to stabilise and develop 
socio-economy between 1992-1995” (về nhiệm vụ và giải pháp ổn định, phát triển kinh tế-xã 
hội trong những năm 1992-1995). 
74
 Decision No. 202-CT issued by the Prime Minister (Chủ tịch Hội đồng bộ trưởng) 
was titled “on continuous a pilot programme on transforming SOEs into joint-stock 
companies” (về việc tiếp tục làm thí điểm chuyển một số doanh nghiệp Nhà nước thành Công 
ty cổ phần). Directive No. 84-TTg was titled “on stimulating the implementation of the pilot 
programme to equitise SOEs and solutions to the issue of various ownership form of SOEs” 
(về việc xúc tiến thực hiện thí điểm cổ phần hóa doanh nghiệp Nhà nước và các giải pháp đa 
dụng hóa hình thức sở hữu đối với các doanh nghiệp Nhà nước). 
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for investment in renewing technologies, creating more jobs, 
developing enterprises, raising the competitiveness and restructuring 
SOEs. 
2. Creating conditions for labourers in enterprises to have shares and 
for the capital contributors to be the real masters; changing the mode 
of management to create a motive force for enterprises to enhance 
their business efficiency, increase the State's assets and the labourers' 
incomes and thus contributing to the national economic growth. 
(Decree No. 44/1998/ND-CP75, promulgated on 29 June 1998) 
 
The equitisation began with the voluntarism and the number of SOEs turned into the form 
of JSCs reached only seventeen between 1992 and 1998. In 1996 the government issued 
Decree No. 28-CP to end the voluntarism and allocated the task of equitisation to relevant 
ministries and authorities in all localities. This decision was followed up in more detailed 
instructions in Decree No. 44/ND-CP in 1998 which led to the increase in the number of 
equitised SOEs. More than two thousand firms were equitised between 2001 and 2005  
(Cheshier et al. 2006: 6). 
 
It is not clear why the Vietnamese state initiated equitisation given that SOEs activities 
were growth-enhancing rather than growth-hampering. Fforde (2007, 2009, 2010) called 
this ‘Vietnam paradox’ in which macroeconomic stability combined with the dominating 
state sector, which is contrary to conventional arguments of mainstream neoclassical 
economics. The paradox is closely related to the role of SOEs as a tax base which we 
examined earlier – instead of aggravating the state budget, they contributed to it. 
 
The state enterprise reform in Vietnam aimed to change the ownership of state firms but 
equitisation created an interesting hybrid that was neither state nor private. In particular, 
employees had the priority in buying the shares that were available for private purchase. 
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 The title of Decree No. 44/1998/ND-CP was “on transforming SOEs into joint-stock 
companies” (về việc chuyển doanh nghiệp Nhà nước thành Công ty cổ phần). 
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It is said the priority given to employees is a product of the realisation of ‘communist 
ideology’ that workers (the proletariat) hold ownership of firm.76 
 
Multilateral organisations criticised the reform on the grounds that equitisation changed 
the state firm into a joint-stock company by creating and selling shares but the state 
generally holds on to fifty-one per cent of shares of the equitised SOE in order to act as a 
majority shareholder. Even this progressed quite slowly. Why? Was it because the 
government intentionally deter equitisation? 
 
Although there a limited number of equitised SOEs in the sample, this dissertation finds 
from the interview that SOEs experienced a different set of difficulties with the 
equitisation programme. These difficulties can be summarised under three heads. Firstly, 
progress with equitisation required the decisions of higher level authorities. Every single 
equitisation process was under the direct control of the Prime Minister and entirely 
depended upon his decision. This does not mean that the SOE would be equitised reports 
directly to the Prime Minister. There are quite complicated overlaps in decision-makings 
in Vietnam.77 
 
Secondly, it is because no evident results were revealed regarding the greater efficiency 
of state firms undergoing equitisation. Our interviews contained mixed opinions 
regarding the efficacy of equitisation. Interestingly, an empirical analysis of Vietnam’s 
equitised SOEs argued that profitability, efficiency, real sales, and employee income 
                                                     
76
 This is quoted from the speech of Dr. Le Dang Doanh, a well-known Vietnamese 
economist, which was delivered at one of EuroCham Hanoi Luncheon meetings in 2013. 
Hiebert gives a story of one the earliest privatisation as follows: “Some 42 percent of the 
company’s shares were purchased by the firm’s employees, 18 percent were retained by the 
ministry, and the rest were sold to ministry staff. No shares were left for sale to the general 
public” (Hiebert 1996: 70-1). 
77
 For an extensive analysis of the decision making process in Vietnam, see Dang 
Phong and Beresford (1998). 
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increased significantly after equitisation (Truong et al. 2004). However, when we 
conducted interviews in 2005, firm-level responses were mixed, with some firms unsure 
about the results of the process; others answering that efficiency had slightly improved. 
But it should be noted that they were equitised just for a couple of years at the time of the 
interview.  
 
Finally, there was an issue of redundant labour emerging as a result of the equitisation, 
which was a great burden to directors of state firms because many of them considered that 
providing stable jobs to workers and keeping them employed were their priorities (Besler 
and Rama 2001). A manager of an equitised central SOE (Firm P)78 said that: 
 
They are officially state employees. Equitisation, together with the 
restructuring of production processes created redundant workers. 
(L)abourers do not want to receive the lump sum retirement allowance 
because they still want to stay (as employees). However, many of 
them will not be able to stay on. We can say that the employees being 
state employees think that everything is being sponsored by the state. 
Now, with equitisation they risk losing their rights to employment. We 
have to communicate and talk to the state about this issue. Decree 
4179 only applies to firms which change their ownership type before the 
end of 2005. So, we hope the interview team could influence the 
government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to extend Decree 41 
for the employees in SOEs (to enable them to retain their jobs). 
 
However, not all of them had the same response. Another firm argues that their 
employees were happy to get a lump sum retirement allowance and employees’ shares 
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 Firm initial is from the interview. See Table 23 (p. 171) for the summary of 
interviewed firms. 
79
 Decree No. 41 refers No. 41/2002/ND-CP promulgated on 11 April 2002. Its title 
was “on policies for redundant labourers resulting from SOEs restructuring” (về chính sách 
đối với lao động dôi dư do sắp xếp lại doanh nghiệp Nhà nước). 
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when they retire because it was a huge amount of money. The director of an equitised 
local SOE (Firm G) said 
 
Those who have to retire according to Decree No. 41 are the labourers 
who have devoted enough time but have not reached the age of 
retirement. They are waiting for retirement. The state fills up the loss 
for the remaining years of employment with a sum of money according 
to the Decree. They calculate that there would be greater benefits if 
they voluntarily leave according to the Decree. When they reach the 
age of fifty-five they are still treated as a pensioner. In addition, when 
they leave the company, they are given forty-seventy million 
Vietnamese dongs (equivalent to USD 2,500 – 4,380).80 So they are 
willing to leave (because) they had never had such a big sum of 
money. In addition, they are eligible for buying the shares of the 
company. In other words, they can become shareholders at 
preferential prices. The incentive here means that when the shares are 
for sale the prices offered to them are forty per cent discounted. 
 
 
The pace of equitisation speeded up since 1997. In 1998 alone, over 100 , in 1999 around 
250 and in 2000 around 210 SOEs were equitised (Cheshier et al. 2006: 8) and also two 
years of tax break were provided as an incentive. The changes in government regulations 
do not explain all of this ‘speedy’ equitisation in the 1990s.  
 
There are few insightful analyses attempted to explain why the equitisation proceeded so 
slowly until the late 1990s. Just seventeen state firms were equitised between 1992 and 
1998. Gainsborough (2003a: 50) argues that a “key one (reason) was an unwillingness on 
the part of political and business interests associated with SOEs to do anything which 
would remove them from what they regarded as the ‘best space’ for doing business.” It is 
believed by the stakeholders of SOEs – such as managers, directors and workers – that 
                                                     
80
 GDP per capita in 2005 was USD 620 according to the World Development 
Indicator. 
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“remaining in the state sector afforded a company the best chance of receiving state 
budget support, accessing other forms of protection, or avoiding the discrimination faced 
by private firms in obtaining bank credit, land use rights, licenses or contracts” 
(Gainsborough 2003a: 51). During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8 and the followed 
state budget tightening or hard budget constraints made agents such as “enterprise 
managers, their controlling institutions and labour forces all recongize that in the absence 
of budget subsidies and cheap bank credit and amid dwindling levels of protection, there 
are now fewer advantages to be had from remaining in the state sector” (Gainsborough 
ibid.: 54; and also Fforde (2004: 45-7). 
 
On the other hand, state big businesses have remained in the state sector because they 
have not had any choice since the “government wants to keep them in public hands”81 
(Gainsborough 2003a: 54). Similarly it is argued that the equitisation has shown the 
bifurcation between the small sized (and locally managed in general) firms and large 
sized (and centrally managed in general) ones. The government has aimed to release the 
small-sized firms from state control but it has not meant any relinquishment of state 
control over the large-size firms Cheshier et al. (2006).  
 
General Corporations and State Economic Groups 
Together with equitisation, the Vietnamese state has implemented a set of policy to form 
big business groups via the General Corporation programme and State Economic Groups 
(SEG) programme.82 The basic thrust of this approach is to transform all SOEs into firms 
                                                     
81
 It is argued that equitisation does not necessarily mean the retreat of the presence of 
the state in Vietnam because even after the equitisation the state in many cases still remains as 
a controlling shareholder and it still sends its presentative in the supervisory board of 
equitised SOEs. Hence the equitisation in Vietnam might be understood as the state ‘advance’ 
(Gainsborough 2009a). 
82 
In contrast to a group of scholars emphasising the important role of town-village 
owned enterprise (TVEs) in Chinese economic growth, some scholars pay attention to the 
contribution of big businesses to the economic growth in China. Nolan and Zhang (2002), for 
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operating under the Enterprise Law by 2010. Strategic sectors have been designated as 
part of a commanding heights strategy, in which the state will retain full (100 percent) or 
majority (over 50 percent) ownership in large SOEs operating in these sectors. SOEs not 
operating in these sectors are to be released: equitised, transformed into limited liability 
companies or closed down (Cheshier 2010: 140). 
 
There are two types of General Corporations which are named GC-90 and GC-91 because 
they were established under Decision No. 90 and Decision No. 91 of the Prime Minster 
promulgated on 7 March 1994.83 The government established General Corporations in 
several strategic industrial sectors, such as (i) post, telecommunication and information 
technology, (ii) ship building and maintenance, (iii) generating, transmitting and 
distributing electricity, (iv) exploring, processing, and distributing gas and oil, (v) 
surveying, exploring, and processing coal and other minerals, (vi) garment and textiles, 
(vii) rubber planting and processing, (viii) fertilizer and other chemicals manufacturing, 
(ix) real estate investment, (x) construction and mechanics, (xi) finance, banking and 
insurance, (xii) other sectors in accordance with the decision of the Prime Minister.  
 
The General Corporation programme initially aimed at increasing efficiency and 
international competitiveness of SOEs. The Vietnamese government tries to achieve this 
                                                                                                                                                 
examples, argued that large SOEs were not the object of clearance from the very beginning of 
the economic reform in China and the Chinese government intentionally support and make 
grow large state firms, particularly in strategic industries, such as aerospace, oil and 
petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, power equipment and telecommunications. The introduction 
of contract system in China turned large SOEs towards profit seeking which led to increase 
the size of retained earnings and production capacity (Jefferson and Rawski 1994). As a result, 
many fast-growing and fast-modernising large state firms emerged under the contract system 
along with the reduction of soft budget constraints (Nolan and Wang 1998). 
83
 Decision No. 90-TTg was titled “on continuous SOEs restructuring” (về việc tiếp tục 
sắp xếp doanh nghiệp Nhà nước) and Decision No. 91-TTg was titled “on the pilot 
programme to set up business groups” (về việc thí điểm thành lập tập đoah kinh doanh). 
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goal by increasing the size of SOEs (World Bank 2012).84 Following this, the Prime 
Minister Directive No. 11/2004/CT-TTg in 2004 signalled a policy change and 
accelerated equitisation of General Corporations followed by Decree No. 153/2004/ND-
CP in 2004 on the conversion of General Corporations into holding companies, which 
known as the ‘mother company-children companies (cong ty me – cong ty con)’ format.85 
 
A holding company here does not mean large entities involved in a wide variety of 
industries. Instead, it refers to corporatisation of entities whose activities are largely 
restricted to one sector. The holding company can then exercise management control over 
its subsidiary companies which was not allowed in the General Corporations scheme. 
This policy created SEGs. As of 2013, there are eleven state economic groups established 
by the Prime Minister. Economic groups are comprised of legally independent companies 
forming a mother-subsidiary relationship. The group itself does not have a legal identity 
and therefore does not register under the Enterprise Law. In general, the mother 
companies of economic groups were established under the State-owned Enterprises Law 
of 2003 and their equity is 100 per cent held by the government (Kim et al. 2010: 3-4). 
 
  
                                                     
84
 It is frequently mentioned that the Vietnamese government referred to the model of 
Korean chaebols which developed under entirely different situation from that of Vietnam. 
85
 The Prime Minister Directive No. 11/2004/CT-TTg, promulgated on 30 March 2004, 
was titled “Strengthening arrangement and reform of SOEs following the spirit of decrees of 
the Third and the Ninth Plenum of the party (the Ninth National Congress of the CPV) and 
organising the implementation of the State Enterprise Law” (đẩy mạnh sắp xếp, đổi mới 
doanh nghiệp Nhà nước theo tinh thần Nghị quyết Trung ương 3, Nghị quyết Trung ương 9 
(Khóa IX) và tổ chức triển khai thực hiện Luật Doanh nghiệp Nhà nước). The government 
Decree No. 153/2004/NĐ-CP, promulgated on 9 August 2004, was titled “Organising and 
managing General Corporations and transforming General Corporations and independent 
SOEs following the model of mother-children company” (về tổ chức, quản lý Tổng Công ty 
Nhà nước và chuyển đổi Tổng Công ty Nhà nước, công ty Nhà nước độc lập theo mô hình 
Công ty mẹ - Công ty con). 
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Table 4: Forming state big businesses86 
Regulation Main Contents 
Seventh National 
Congress of the CPV  
(1991) 
 
“… to arrange enterprise group in consistent manner with production 
and business requirements of the new market mechanism … to build 
some big companies and enterprises with sufficient prestige and 
competitiveness to participate in international economic relations.” 
Decisions 91 and 94 of 
the Prime Minister 
(1994) 
 
 Eighteen General Corporations, so-called GC- 91, were 
established. 
 Aimed at reducing "the power of line agencies to interfere in 
business management and capture profits and rents of SOEs." 
Eighth National 
Congress of the CPV 
(1996) 
 
"To make a summary on state general corporations model, thereby, to 
build measures for developing general corporations as strong economic 
groups with good performance, high competitiveness, and acting as the 
backbone of the national economy ..."   
Third Plenum of the CPV  
(the Ninth National 
Congress of the CPV, 
2001) 
 
 
 
 
"... forming some strong economic groups consisting of state general 
corporations and others economic sectors, involving a multi-business 
model, in which a core business is defined for specialization, and the 
group plays dominating role in the national economy, holding large-
scale capital, … establishing, on a pilot basis, some economic groups 
in some industries, which will have significant advantages, and are of 
development capacity for international competitiveness and 
integration…."   
Establishment of pilot 
State Economic 
Groups87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2005: Vietnam Post and Telecommunications (VNPT), Vietnam 
National Coal-Mineral Industries (Vinacomin), and Vietnam National 
Textile and Garment (Vinatex). 
 2006: PetroVietnam, Vietnam Electricity, Vietnam Shipbuilding 
Industry88, Vietnam Rubber. 
 2007: Baoviet.89  
 2009: Vietnam National Chemical, Industrial Construction 
(Vinachem). 
 2010: Vietnam Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  
Adopted from (World Bank 2012: 36). 
 
 
                                                     
86
 See Table A1 (page 236) in Appendix for the list of GC 91 and SEGs. 
87
 Two additional SEGs, Viettel Group and Vietnam National Petroleum Group 
(Petrolimex), were formed in 2011. 
88
 Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry (Vinashin) was collapsed in 2012 and restructured to 
form the Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (SBIC) in 2013. See Appendix for the full list of 
GC-91 and SEGs. 
89
 Baoviet is the only SEC which is equitised as of 2014. 
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The big businesses programme, however, has not achieved what the state expected in 
terms of efficiency and international competitiveness. For example, during the period of 
1995 and 1997, Vietnam recorded an average of 8.8 per cent growth per year and invested 
an average of 27.8 per cent of GDP. Changing into a unit comparison, it required about 
3.2 units of investment to create one unit of growth. From 2000 to 2002, it consumed 4.5 
investment units to produce one unit of growth. Probably the higher unit consumption is 
able to be explained partly by the fact that the SOEs are involved into heavy industry 
which requires large capital input. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the state sector 
has factors explaining the inefficient operation (Dapice 2003). 
 
Harvard Kennedy School (2008) criticises that state investment was extremely inefficient 
reflected in Incremental Capital-Output Ratios (ICOR) above regional comparator 
counties at similar stages of development as stated in Table 5 below.90 
 
Table 5: Regional ICOR comparison 
    Period 
GDP Growth 
(% per year) 
Gross 
Investment/GDP 
(% per year) 
ICOR 
 South Korea   1961-80 7.9 23.3 3.0 
 Taiwan   1961-80 9.7 26.2 2.7 
 Indonesia   1981-95 6.9 25.7 3.7 
 Malaysia   1981-95 7.2 32.9 4.6 
 Thailand   1981-95 8.1 33.3 4.1 
 China   2001-06 9.7 38.8 4.0 
 Vietnam   2001-06 7.6 33.5 4.4 
Adopted from (Harvard Kennedy School 2008: 38, Table 3)  
 
                                                     
90
 We have to be careful in interpreting ICOR because it is based on the measure on 
average instead of on marginal. Hence it may mislead to draw a conclusion on the resource 
allocation. See World Bank (2008: 7) for more explanation. 
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Instead the cumbersome governance structure allowed many enterprises to behave in 
irresponsible ways. Many SOEs moved away from their main business operations and 
shifted to other business interests and products. The most commonly observed example 
was a shift from production to trading activities, transport and tourism services, or setting 
up sales counters as a means to create jobs and generate income. Some of those state 
firms with relatively large capital bases have shifted their investment into restaurants, 
hotels and other service businesses. For example,  
 
 
“SOEs in financial difficulties have sold their fixed capital such as 
machinery and equipment for cash in order to meet short-term working 
capital requirements. Others have leased out their land, at low rates, to 
employees, so that the latter can eke out a living independent of the 
companies, or even sold the land to other individuals and firms for a 
profit. … Many state retail commercial centres, transport companies 
and tourism firms are state business entities in name only with private 
persons operating the businesses, having rented the premises, 
equipment, facilities and even the legal status of state firms. These are 
misuses of state assets for the parochial benefit of certain units or 
groups of people” (Nguyen Ngoc Tuan et al. 1996: 24). 
 
 
The diversification of SOEs into non-related business areas has attracted criticism from 
the public on the grounds that the corporate governance of state firms remains limited and 
competitiveness is low, it would be better for them to concentrate on their main business 
fields. The state responded with a regulation limiting the maximum amount of capital the 
state firms could invest in non-related business fields. According to Decree No. 
09/2009/ND-CP on “financial management of state companies and management of state 
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capital invested in other enterprises”, promulgated on 5 February 200991, SOEs can invest 
no more than thirty per cent of their total investment capital in non-related fields. When 
SOEs invest in the banking, insurance and securities sector, the investment can be no 
greater than twenty per cent of the capital of the institutions that receive the capital 
contribution from the SOEs. 
 
SOEs, however, resisted these limitations because their diversification into non-related 
business fields was driven by their priority to make profits regardless of the fields they 
engaged in. For example, the Vietnam Post and Telecommunication Group (VNPT) 
invested in the Maritime Bank. As a state economic group, the VNPT has been requested 
to withdraw part of its investment capital to reduce the share of the VNPT in this bank. 
As a result, the VNPT could not buy more shares from the bank when the bank issued 
more shares to increase its charter capital and consequently VNPT lost its controlling 
power in the Board of Directors of the Maritime Bank. According to a representative of 
the VNPT, it “does not want to withdraw capital from the Maritime Bank, because the 
investment has been bringing big profits, which are even bigger than the profits made by 
some subsidiaries of the group” (VietNamNet news, “Policy on restricting investments in 
non-core fields faces strong opposition”, accessed on 4 November 2011). 
 
Similarly, the Vietnam National Petroleum Group (Petrolimx) invested in a joint venture 
bank with an Indian company and the Vietnam Cement Corporation contributed capital to 
set up its finance company with charter capital of VND 600 billion (equivalent to USD 30 
million). In addition to profit-seeking, there is a very interesting comment from a 
representative of the Petrolimex that “in some cases, state firms need to make investment 
in other enterprises, not to make a profit, but for other purposes”; the other purposes not 
being mentioned (VietNamNet news, ibid.). However, the fact that all three companies 
                                                     
91
 In Vietnamese, Nghị định số 9/2009/NĐ-CP, Quy chế quản lý tài chính của công ty 
Nhà nước va quản lý vốn Nhà nước đầu tư vảo doanh nghiệp khác. 
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referred to have invested in banks suggests what the other purposes hinted at by the 
representative could be.92 The reasons for state firms investing in the banking and finance 
sector are widely acknowledged in Vietnam: to mobilise capital for the holding company. 
As can be inferred from the case of the VNPT, the controlling power in the Board of 
Directors can critically influence the business operations of financial institutions, which is 
most likely to include the main business of banks – lending. 
 
The investments in the banking sector by SOEs can be interpreted as a response to hard 
budget constraints imposed by the state. The state has hardened the budget constraints 
faced by enterprises by strictly enforcing tax rules, reducing state budget support and 
tightening the lending conditions for state firms since the mid-1990s and these constraints 
became even more effective from the mid-2000s. Consequently, state firms had to find 
alternative sources for capital mobilisation and their investments in the banking sector 
have to be seen in this perspective.  
 
However, this strategy can be a potential threat to macroeconomic stability because the 
financial supervisory authorities lack devices to check the viability of the banks 
controlled by holding companies. Information on the soundness of the Vietnamese 
banking sector released in 2011 and 2012 suggests reasons to be worried about the 
stability of the Vietnamese banking system. The share of non-performing loans in the 
banking sector has reached 8.4 per cent as of March 2012, the debt-to-equity ratio of the 
state firms averaged 307 per cent and the total liabilities of SOEs exceed the 
government’s own debts (World Bank 2012). 
 
                                                     
92
 Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) invested in the HDBank;  the Vietnam Chemical 
Group (Vinachem) in Vietnam Commercial and Industrial Securities Company (VICS) and 
Vietnam Chemical Finance JS Company; and  Song Da Group in Vietnam Investment Fund 
and Vietcombank Member Fund. For more detail information, refer VietNamNet news ““Big 
cheeses” struggle to withdraw capital” (http://english.vietnamnet.vn/en/special-report/19984/-
big-cheeses--struggle-to-withdraw-capital.html, accessed on 28 March 2012). 
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The most update reform as of writing this dissertation is Decree No. 69/2014/ND-CP, 
promulgated on 15 July 2014, on “establishment, re-arrangement and operation of SEGs 
and General Corporations”.93 Some important points introduced are i) the group structure 
of SEGs and General Corporations can only extend to up to three levels including the 
highest level being the parent company of the SEG or General Corporation, ii) the parent 
company of an SEG now must have a charter capital of VND 10,000 billion (equivalent 
to USD 500 million), iii) at least 50% of the subsidiaries within an SEG must operate 
within its core business and must account for at least 60% of the capital invested by the 
parent company to all subsidiaries of an SEG and iv) a member of the Members’ Council 
of the parent company in an SEG or General Corporation must not be leaders within the 
state organs, political or social organisation or subsidiaries of the parent company. 
 
State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) 
The state also created the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC; Tong cong ty Dau 
tu va kinh doanh von nha nuoc) whose Chairman is the Minister of Finance, to deal with 
the issue of efficient allocation of state capital. The fund the SCIC operates originated 
from the Assistance Fund (Quy ho tro) for equitised SOEs established in 1999 by the 
Prime Minister’s Decision No. 177/1999/QD-TTg, whose detailed implementation rule 
was stipulated by the Ministry of Finance’s Decision No. 95/2000/QD-BTC in 2000.94 
The SCIC operates at three levels for centrally managed firms, locally managed firms and 
for firms belonging to General Corporations. By establishing the SCIC in 2005 based on 
                                                     
93
 The title in Vietnamese is Nghị định số 69/2014/NĐ-CP về tập đoàn kinh tế nhà 
nước và tổng công ty nhà nước. 
94
 The title of Decision No. 177/1999/QD-TTg, promulgated on 30 August 1999, was 
“on organising and operating of Assistance Fund for equitised SOEs” (về tổ chức va hoạt 
động của Quỹ hổ trợ sắp xếp và cổ phần hóa doanh nghiệp Nhà nước) and that of Decision 
No. 95/2000/QD-BTC by the Minister of Finance, promulgated on 9 June 2000, was 
“regulating, managing, paying in and using Assistance Fund for equitised SOEs” (về Quy chế 
quản lý, thu nộp và sử dụng Quỹ hỗ trợ sắp xếp và cổ phần hóa doanh nghiệp Nhà nước). 
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the decision of the Prime Minister (Decision No. 152/2005/QD-TTg)95, the ownership 
stakes in many state firms held by the Assistance Fund have been transferred from 
various line ministries and provincial governments to the SCIC. 
 
The establishment of the SCIC was aimed at improving the efficiency of state capital 
utilisation, by restructuring inefficient state firms and divesting state firms engaging in 
non-core business areas (Kim et al. 2010: 5). Since its operation in August 2006, it 
divested capital in nearly 520 state firms, including sales of the entire state stake in 466 
local firms, for over VND 2.7 trillion (equivalent to USD 140 million) as of 2010. As of 
2011, the size of state capital under the supervision of the SCIC was VND 15 trillion 
(equivalent to USD 750 million). 
 
However, the SCIC has not yet acquired stakes in General Corporations and state 
economic groups. It has stakes in one-member limited liability companies, joint ventures 
and limited liability companies of two or more members and joint stock companies 
(Article 8, Decision No. 152/2005/QD-TTg). This suggests that, even though the 
Chairman of the SCIC is the Minister of Finance, the SCIS does not have enough power 
to acquire stakes in and exert an influence over General Corporations and state economic 
groups whose ultimate line manager is the Prime Minister, who the Minister of Finance 
reports to. 
 
State big businesses as distributional coalitions 
Although the number of state firms declined to 3,239 as of 2012 which accounts for less 
than one per cent in terms of the number of enterprises, their position in the economy has 
not shrunk but it is ever increasing through widespread diversification. Instead of using 
                                                     
95
 The Prime Minister Decision No. 152/2005/QD-TTg, promulgated on 20 June 2005 
was titled “Approval of regulations on organising the State Capital Investment Corporation 
and its operation” (Phê duyệt Điều lệ tổ chức và hoạt động của Tổng Công ty Đầu tư và kinh 
doanh vốn Nhà nước). 
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resources in their core business areas to improve efficiency and technological progress in 
order to play the ‘leading’ role in nation’s economic growth, SOEs invest their resources 
into non-core business areas to make even more profits often at a cost to the national 
economy in terms of duplication and overcapacity in some areas. In other areas, like 
finance, investments and collusion between banks and holding companies have 
contributed to a growing problem of non-performing loans and financial vulnerability. To 
conclude with some caution, in the game of recentralisation and decentralisation played 
between the state and SOEs, the enterprises have been the victor in the first round in 
contemporary Vietnam. 
 
The behaviour of SOEs, particularly of big state businesses, recalls the characteristics of 
distributional coalitions explored by Olson (1965, 1982). The distributional coalitions are 
defined as “organizations for collective action within societies that (are) overwhelmingly 
oriented to struggles over the distribution of income and wealth rather than to the 
production of additional output” (Olson 1982: 44) by using lobbying for legislation or 
cartelisation, which can lower the efficiency of the national economy. As a result, 
distributional coalitions reduce aggregate income in the societies in which they operate 
and make political life more divisive (Olson ibid.: 47). 
 
We examined that SOEs before doi moi were quite dynamic given hard budget 
constraints and contributed to the state budgets. Why have these once dynamic business 
entities transformed into resource-wasting entities after market mechanisms were 
introduced? Why has this contrast happened? Fforde (2004, 2007) suggests a fancy idea 
that SOEs were in fact treated like as a private firm by their ‘virtual share owners’ who 
are not necessarily the state until the early 1990s. They were genuine business entities. 
However, in the 1990s and 2000s, the state tried to enhance the control over SOEs 
because of their significant role as a tax base. This recentralisation has made “the  centre 
of gravity of virtual share ownership moved ‘upwards’ and away from interests close to 
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and within SOEs. This was experienced as a reduction in SOE autonomy.” (emphasis in 
original; Fforde 2007: 214). What the state wanted in exchange for this autonomy was the 
strengthening of state management over state firms, so as to retain over state control and 
to increase state revenues. This is in line with the argument of Painter (2003b) that state 
enterprise reform policies were intended to enhance and improve state governance. SOEs 
have lost their business mind while they have had better business environment. 
 
Increasing influence over SOEs does not mean interrupting in daily operation. The 
analysis of the interview showed that there was no significant intervention by higher level 
governing organs in Hai Phong City. All firms answered that administrative intervention 
was not interruptive and governing organs do not interfere in daily business decision 
making, such as an annual production target and human resource management. In general, 
the directors and the representative of higher governing organs do not need to sit together 
regularly – quarterly meetings or submitting reports have become the normal form of 
contact between the two parties. 
 
It is doubtful that whether the recentralisation has been successful. It gets more and more 
difficult and complicated for the state to exert influence over far diversified SOEs not 
only in terms of business areas but also and more critically in terms of blurred property 
rights represented by the mixture of the state and the private sector. Meanwhile, during 
this period of commercialisation, the power of SOEs has grown quickly together with 
their size while the power of the state over SOEs, in particular, over big businesses has 
become increasingly attenuated because General Corporations and SEGs, which were set 
up by the order of the Prime Minster and under his direct supervision, have equal status to 
line ministers. Moreover, their access to economic resources through retained profits and 
through investments in financial institutions has further increased their leverage in local 
governance, and in making links with local politicians and state officials. As a result, the 
party-state has in practice become even less centralised, with a marked development of 
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localised economic and political structures and a proliferation of interests that have direct 
or indirect inputs into policy formulation and implementation (Dixon 2004: 20).   
 
Investment in non-core areas itself is not a problem. The problem is what these non-core 
areas are. For example, a petroleum company can establish a university which is 
specialised in inventing new techniques to search for oil and gas wells in deep water or it 
can construct a shipyard to construct oil tankers or drill ships. While establishing a 
university is not a core area of business of a petroleum company, investment in research 
and development is an essential part of operating businesses. 
 
These two investments, of course, are unlikely to bring this company profits in the short 
run. Hence, this company is likely to hesitate to invest in long term projects and be 
tempted to favour the business plans which can create short run profits, such as real estate, 
hotel, banking, tourism and transportation services. However, without these research and 
development investments the survival of this company in the long run is highly 
questionable. Moreover, investments in these quick return sectors can divert attention and 
resources from the core activities of the firm. To the extent that the long-term economic 
viability of the country depends on investing in and developing the core manufacturing 
sectors, these short-term strategies can potentially have damaging long-term 
consequences. 
 
Why do so many Vietnamese state firms opt for short-run profits instead of investing in 
long-run projects which are likely to bring healthier long-run profits? A director of a state 
company encounters several constraints: firstly, in Vietnam, if a state company records a 
loss for two consecutive years, the director of the company is dismissed; secondly, the 
director’s interests may not coincide with the owner’s – the state, as the director is not the 
residual claimant; and finally, the firm may have political constraints – sometimes the 
firm has to follow what is required by the state. For example, during our interviews, a 
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central state firm stated that it had to deliver food aid to Cuba from time to time upon the 
request of the state even if it did not create any profit for the company. 
 
The first constraint is likely to make directors of state firms seek immediate profits as 
they are otherwise threatened by dismissal. If this factor is combined with a weak 
financial capacity – most state firms are largely dependent upon bank loans, then 
directors will rationally avoid long gestation investment plans. Their first priority would 
be to maintain the current business without making a loss rather than in investing for the 
long run profits. The fact that the main source of capital is bank loans means that the 
firms have to repay interest and the principal from net profits. All this induces a search 
for quick profits even if the consequences for the future of these companies are not 
promising. 
 
The second constraint – conflicts of interests between directors and the state as an owner 
– also contributes to the short-termism. The interests of the state as an owner are not only 
to create profits (or not to lose state capital) but, more importantly, also to lead the 
national economy by developing critical fields that potentially have positive externalities 
for the whole economy. The state is both the residual claimant of individual state firms 
and also coordinator of activities across state firms to maximise the collective benefit. 
 
In principle, the state can therefore play a critical developmental role, but the problem is 
that the state as principal cannot get its agents in charge of enterprises to behave 
accordingly. The agents have an interest in short-term profits and moreover in activities 
that are individually lucrative for enterprise employees but which can reduce profits and 
long-term viability of state firms. 
 
The central state has adopted several steps to enhance its control over enterprises. The 
creation of big business groups can make sense in this perspective. A coordinated group 
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is in theory easier to manage from above, but in practice these steps resulted not in 
heightened control over agents, but even more autonomous behaviour by agents as 
discussed above. Unless the state provides a strong incentive system for directors, 
effectively making them joint residual claimants, they are not likely to engage in 
entrepreneurial long term investments. One of our interviewees explained that as a 
director of a state firm it was important for him not to “walk fast and get tired soon, but 
walk slowly and go longer” (a local SOE, Firm).  
 
On the other hand, embezzlement can be an important problem because the director’s 
interests are to maximise his/her revenue not the firm’s revenue. To prevent the 
embezzlement resulting from the principal-agent problem, there must be a well working 
supervising mechanism to detect wrongdoings committed by directors but the state audit 
and inspection system in Vietnam has not yet reached that standard. To summarise, in the 
current Vietnamese context, it is difficult to expect that directors of state firms will 
choose long term strategic investment plans. Directors, firms and the national economy 
appear to be locked in a vicious circle of short-termism. 
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3. Government-linked companies in Singapore and Malaysia 
This chapter examines the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in late-industrialising 
countries or more commonly called government-linked companies (GLCs) in two 
Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia and Singapore. While privatisation was introduced 
to improve the efficiency of GLCs, it has not meant to weaken the state dominance. The 
market capitalisation of the twenty largest GLCs in Malaysia, G20, is RM425 billion as 
of May 2014 which accounts 35 per cent of total market capitalisation and GLCs in 
Singapore account for 35 per cent in terms of market capitalisation between 2008 and 
2013 (Sim et al. 2014: 6). As mentioned briefly, both states keep the state share above 
fifty per cent in many of the privatised GLCs. Moreover, the private sector has been 
invited through privatisation but the invited private sector is not clearly distinguished 
from the public sector. The line between business and government has been blurred both 
in Singapore (Gainsborough 2009b, Hamilton-Hart 2000)96 and Malaysia (Adam and 
Cavendish 1995a, Jomo and Gomez 2000, Salleh and Meyanathan 1993, Tan 2008). 
 
The similarities have, however, not resulted in similar outcomes in industrialisation. 
Singaporean economy performance of Singaporean economy including that of GLCs has, 
however, outpaced that of Malaysian counterparts despite the similarities. It is interesting 
that the blurred private-public sector relationship has led to the efficient public sector in 
Singapore in spite of the potential for rent seeking and rent creation whereas a similar 
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 While there are plenty of studies explaining that the Singaporean government and the 
public sector operate efficiently, but few studies seek why by carefully examining the political 
economy of Singapore. Hamilton-Hart (2000) is one of available and nice studies and 
Gainsborough (2009b) conducted a comparative analysis with Vietnam in, another county 
showing a resemblance to the political economy of Singapore such as de facto a single ruling 
party, low level of freedom of criticism of the leaderships and a paternalist position against 
society and people. 
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political economic setting has largely resulted in rent-seeking and corruption and thus the 
inefficient public sector in Malaysia.97  
 
Albeit this chapter does not aim to explain the factors why the blurred business-
government relationship has led to different outcomes it might be explained by the fact 
that the two countries have deployed its GLCs for different targets. Singapore aims at 
efficiency whereas Malaysia aims at equality. There has been trade-off between equity 
and efficiency in Malaysia but not in Singapore. 
 
This chapter, at first, summarises Gerschenkron’s argument regarding the role of the 
public investment in late-industrialising countries which he induced from the analysis of 
the European late-industrialising countries in the nineteenth century. Then this 
dissertation summarises the discourses on the rationale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
which are actors of the public investment, followed by the study of Singaporean and 
Malaysian GLCs. 
 
3.1. The rationale of state-owned enterprises 
Gerschenkron’s propositions on backward economies 
The experience over the course of industrialisation in Japan and the first tier newly-
industrialising economies (NIEs) in East Asia – South Korea (hereafter Korea), Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong – and the second tier NIEs in Southeast Asia – Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam – evidences that the state can play a key role in 
                                                     
97
 Moreover it is said that the Singaporean government has not had any feature of so-
called sound or good government such as democracy, the rule of law, the autonomy of 
government, transparency and the elite bureaucracy (Hamilton-Hart 2000: 202-3). 
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shortening industrialisation albeit the ways of playing the role are not identical (Jomo 
2001, Shin 2002).98 
 
This does not mean that the state can replace the market but complements if there is 
insufficient or lack of private investment either because of low level of capital 
accumulation available to be allocated or the private sector does not have long-term 
commitment given the scarcity of capital because its return does not occur in the near 
term nor foreseeable. The scare capital, therefore, is apt to seek profit-making 
opportunities in short-term investment at the cost of the long-term investments (Chang 
2007: 6). 
 
Public investment by the state is supposed to an alternative to this failure. The role of the 
state in this discourse, contrary to the liberalist view point, is not limited to provide public 
goods and ensure the necessary rule of law for capitalist market transactions but also 
directly participate in capital mobilisation and risk-taking to catalyse investment in the 
areas which is essential for the long-term national economic growth but is likely to have 
very low level of or no investment at all if it left in the hands of the private sector such as 
transportation, postal and telecommunication services, health, education and scientific 
research capacity. 
 
The idea that the state can play a certain role in the course of industrialisation goes back 
to Gerschenkron’s analysis of the economic development in various advanced and 
‘backward’ European countries in the nineteenth century. He summarised observed 
development patterns in six propositions. Although these findings were drawn from the 
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 See Shin (2002) for an in-depth analysis of the catch-up strategies taken by Japan 
and the first tier East Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) – South Korea (hereafter 
Korea), Singapore and Taiwan – in which he juxtaposes Germany with Japan as moderately 
backward economies and Russia with the first tier East Asian NIEs as extremely backward 
economies. 
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experience of European economies two centuries before, many of these were found in 
Asian ‘backward’ economies such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan and 
other newly industrialising Southeast Asian economies including Thailand, Malaysia and 
Vietnam. 
  
This dissertation focuses on institutional factors among Gerschenkron’s six propositions99 
which pointed out the role of the state such that 
 
“the more backward a country’s economy, the greater was the part played by 
special institutional factors designed to increase supply of capital to the 
nascent industries and, in addition, to provide them with less decentralized 
and better informed entrepreneurial guidance, the more pronounced was the 
coerciveness and comprehensiveness of these factors” (emphasis added; 
Gerschenkron (1962: 354)). 
 
He proposed that institutional factors in less industrialised economies which have little 
similarity to those in established industrial countries result in the “differences in the speed 
and character of industrial development” to a considerable extent (Gerschenkron ibid., 7). 
One of the critical functions of those institutional factors is channelling capital to 
                                                     
99
 The rest five findings are the more backward a country’s economy,  
1) “the more likely was its industrialization to start discontinuously as a sudden 
great spurt proceeding at a relatively high rate of growth of manufacturing 
output”;  
2) “… the more pronounced was the stress in its industrialization on bigness of 
both plant and enterprise”; 
3) “… the greater was the stress upon producers’ goods as against consumers’ 
goods”; 
4) “ … the heavier was the pressure upon the levels of consumption of the 
population”; 
5) “… (and) the less likely was its agriculture to play any active role by offering 
to the growing industries the advantages of an expanding industrial market 
based in turn on the rising productivity of agricultural labor” (Gerschenkron 
1962: 353-4). 
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industrialisation (see also Patrick 1966). He concluded that mobilising scare capital 
required to implement industrialisation was carried out in different ways:  
 
“it is mobilised by factories in advanced area such as England; by factories 
and banks in the area of moderate backwardness such as Germany; and by 
the state, banks and factories in the area of extreme backwardness such as 
Russia” (Gerschenkron ibid., 355).  
 
One of the main arguments of Gerschenkron is that ‘relative backwardness’ of individual 
economies and therefore the so-called prerequisites100 for industrial development are not 
necessarily replicated in all less advanced economies exactly in the same pattern which 
advanced countries passed in order to achieve industrialisation (Gerschenkron ibid., 356-
7). Hence, we have to understand the actions by banks and governments in less advanced 
countries as “successful attempts to create in the course of industrialization conditions 
which had not been created in the “preindustrial” periods precisely because of the 
economic backwardness of the areas concerned” (emphasis in the original, Gerschenkron 
ibid, 358). Institutional factors channelling capital towards industrialisation can be 
replaced by the activities of the state and SOEs are agents executing public 
investments.101 
 
                                                     
100 
The idea there will be no industrialisation without having prerequisites was widely 
shared during the time of Gerschenkron. Rostow (1960) is an example whose opinion was 
summarised as the “abolition of an archaic framework in agricultural organization or an 
increase in the productivity of agriculture; creation of an influential modern elite which is 
materially or ideally interested in economic change; provision of what is called social-
overhead capital in physical form” (Gerschenkron ibid., 356).
 
101
 The key role of the state, according to Chang (2002), is not unique in the 
industrialisation of current less developed economies. He argued that the intervention of the 
state was an essential part of the industrialisation of now-developed countries and these now-
developed countries have kicked away the ladder for less-developed countries to become 
developed countries by forcing them to follow their advanced market-based institutional 
arrangements. 
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As public investors, what functions are supposed to be performed by SOEs? We 
frequently use the term of ‘state-owned enterprises’ to refer an entity run in public 
ownership. It is worth considering what features an SOE is supposed to hold. Gillis (1980: 
252-3) provides three conditions which an SOE must hold as follows: 
 
(1) The government is the principal stockholder in the enterprise or otherwise 
has the ability or the potential to exercise control … (2) The enterprise is 
engaged in the production of goods and services for sale to the public, or to 
other private or public enterprises. (3) … profit maximization is not the prime 
state objective, but which rather are expected to pursue profitability subject to 
constraints implicit or explicit in “social” functions assigned the enterprise by 
the state (emphases in the original). 
 
In brief, an SOE is a government-controlled business entity engaging in the production of 
goods and services which bring benefits to the public. 
  
Why SOEs are required while some private businesses can provide the same goods and 
services if the government contracts with private firms? Gillis (1980: 258-66) groups the 
rationale of establishing and running SOEs under three headings while it is not always 
easy to consider one reason separately from the others because decision making regarding 
setting up, running and liquidating SOEs require highly complicated socio-politico-
economic consideration.102 
 Primarily economic motives – savings mobilisation, employment, capital 
lumpiness, natural monopoly and risk bearing;  
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 We can consider a case of savings mobilisation as an example. By establishing a 
state organisation in charge of managing national pension funds would initially be based on 
the ‘economic’ motive to mobilise savings. This, however, will ultimately be grounded in a 
political motive because it also reflects a desire to shift reliance for savings mobilisation from 
the private to the public sector. 
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 Primarily socio-political motives – commanding heights, nationalisation after 
independence from colonialism103 and social goals such as income redistribution 
and correction of imbalances in regional growth; and 
 Mixed motives – anti-concentration of the private economy and aid donors’ 
preference to channel funds through SOEs. 
 
One motive drawing our attention is ‘aid donors’ preference’ to SOEs in channelling 
funds because it seems contradictory to present common knowledge of the disapproving 
position of international donors such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank on the state interventions and the presence of SOEs. According to Gillis (ibid.), 
however, there was a coincidence of interests between the World Bank and the national 
decision-makers, making the World Bank have used SOEs to channel the funds. 
 
“The World Bank saw significant advantages in fostering decentralized 
decision-making in areas involving the production and distribution of basic 
industrial and agricultural goods. At the same time, both the Bank and many 
officials in countries seeking Bank loans viewed existing governmental 
departments as either too inefficient or too corrupt to execute large-scale 
projects. As a result, SOEs became the preferred channel and many SOEs 
were established and expanded” (emphasis added; Gillis ibid., 265). 
    
Shipping companies, investment banks, fertilizer plants and SOEs in plantation 
agriculture in Indonesia are the examples. Nonetheless, this situation has changed. There 
was continuous growth of the private sector in these countries and the private sector is 
able to undertake large projects. The World Bank does no more prefer the SOEs channel 
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 Despite its recent insignificance, de-colonialisation motive was a popular and highly 
demanded reason to validate the nationalisation of the assets of colonial era during 1950s and 
1960s. This rationale accounted for three quarters of the nearly 200 central government-
owned enterprises in Indonesia primarily expropriated from Dutch interests in 1957 and 
British interests in 1962 and other nations such as Egypt, Ghana, Algeria, Peru, Mexico and 
Chile (Gillis 1980: 263). 
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and has paid negative comments on SOEs. In the publication, Bureaucrats in Business in 
1995, the World Bank evidently shows its stance on the matter of the public enterprises. 
 
On the other hand, Chang (2007: 12-3) and Perrotti (2004), without grouping, enumerate 
‘natural monopoly’, ‘capital market failure’, ‘positive externalities’ and ‘equity concerns’ 
as widely accepted reasons of the existence of SOEs. Firstly, the existence of a ‘natural 
monopoly’ is one of the most frequently cited reasons. This was explained by Gillis (ibid.) 
under the category of economic reasons together with capital lumpiness and risk sharing. 
  
Natural monopoly 
A natural monopoly refers to a situation in which the technical requirements, such as 
large capital cost and economies of scale, of an industry are such that only one supplier 
may exist. When a natural monopoly exists, the supplier is able to extract high monopoly 
profits by charging high prices because there is no competition from other firms which 
plays the role of forcing price down to the level where the company earns zero economic 
profit. Such positions result not only in unequal distribution of economic surpluses, but 
also in economic inefficiency, as the monopolistic firm produces less than the socially 
desirable amounts of output. 
  
Typical microeconomics text books explain that the government can intervene to control 
the price at which the average total cost of a monopolist firm is covered and leave the 
firm with the break-even status. Alternatively, under such circumstances, the government 
can establish an SOE and regulate to prevent abuse of market power by a natural 
monopolist firm. Similarly, public ownership of some industries such as natural resources 
(iron, mineral and crude oil and natural gas), chemicals, heavy engineering and postal 
services is justified because they are strategically important to provide essential input 
materials to the emerging manufacturing sector (Adhikari and Kirkpatrick 1990) whereas 
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Gillis (ibid.) explains this in terms of the ‘commanding heights’ under the category of 
socio-political reasons. 
 
Capital market failure 
Second justification for SOEs is capital market failure, where private sector investors 
refuse to finance projects that have high returns in the long run but carry high risks in the 
short term. For example, the Korean government set up the steel-maker Pohang Iron and 
Steel Company (POSCO) as an SOE, as the risk was considered too high by the private 
sector.104 If the venture subsequently proved so successful, why did the private sector fail 
to finance it? This is because capital markets have an inherent bias towards short-term 
gains and do not like risky, large-scale projects with long gestation periods. 
 
One of obvious solutions to capital market failure is to set up firms based on public 
ownership to undertake productive activities which were critical to the economy’s 
industrialisation process. Alternatively, the government can establish a development bank 
that finances risky, long-term ventures, rather than to set up and run productive SOEs 
itself. In most developing countries, however, it is likely that there is a shortage of 
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Chang (2007: 10-11) introduces a brief history of POSCO as follows: 
“In 1967, the Korean government applied for a loan to build the country’s first 
modern steel mill to an international consortium that included the World Bank. 
The application was rejected on the grounds that the project was not viable. 
This was not an unreasonable decision. The country’s biggest export items at 
the time were fish, cheap apparels, wigs, and plywood. The Republic of Korea 
didn’t possess deposits of either key raw material – iron ore and coking coal. 
Furthermore, the Cold War meant it could not even import them from nearby 
China. They had to be brought all the way from Australia. To cap it all, the 
Korean government proposed to run this as an SOE. There could not be a 
more perfect recipe for disaster, so it was thought. The Korean government 
borrowed from some Japanese banks and set up the steel mill as an SOE, 
called Pohang Steel Company (POSCO), in 1968. POSCO started production 
in 1973. The company remained an SOE until 2000”. 
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entrepreneurial talent in the private sector and the necessary venture may not be set up 
even with the assistance of the development banks. In this case, setting up SOEs may be a 
more effective way to address capital market failure than setting up a development bank 
(Chang ibid., 12). 
  
Gillis explains this in terms of ‘savings mobilisation’. Given that many under-developed 
countries on the one hand have low level of domestic savings and lack accumulated 
capital accessible and on the other hand these countries are unable to secure tax revenue 
sources, it would be an optimal choice for them to engage in business directly by setting 
up and running SOEs to generate investment finance. If successful, the generated capital 
can be relocated to finance physical and human capital formation instead of letting it be 
dissipated through unproductive consumption because it belongs to the state (Gillis ibid., 
260). This contrasts to the case of privately general capital which is likely to be used for 
the short-term profit creation. 
  
Externalities 
Third rationale, externalities, is related the size of SOEs and the specific industries where 
SOEs dominates such as natural resources, textiles, steel and iron and ship building. 
According to economic theory, the existence of externalities is likely to cause either over-
production when there are negative externalities or under-production when there are 
positive externalities because private firms do not take into account social costs or benefit 
when they decide their profit maximising output. Neoclassical theory suggests that this 
market failure can be solved if the government levies taxes or provides subsidies to 
producers and consumers. 
  
Nonetheless, if levying taxes and providing subsidies are costly, and the industries 
concerned have a high degree of spill-over effects on the economy via backward and 
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forward linkage, it would be a better option to set up SOEs to internalise externalities.105 
In particularly, if the industries have positive spill-over effects, they are likely to have 
high employment inducement coefficients. Thus they can contribute to maintain 
employment. 
  
The commanding heights argument is partly overlapped to the spill-over effects. In this 
discourse, it is argued that certain sectors of the economy are, due to their strategic 
position and the kind of linkages they generate, so significant to the development process 
that they should not be left in private hands but the state must control the industries via 
SOEs to guarantee socially responsible performance from these commanding heights of 
the economy (Gillis ibid., 262). 
  
Social goals 
Fourth rationale is that SOEs may be set up to address equity concerns or social goals. In 
most cases, SOEs are assigned responsibilities intended to promote social or equity goals 
of society such as balancing the regional growth, preserving employment and delivering 
necessary services including postal, health care and publication services when they are set 
up. In such cases, an SOE is an easy way to ensure universal access to essential services 
for all citizens including socially vulnerable class (Adhikari and Kirkpatrick 1990, Chang 
2007, Gillis 1980).106 The Vietnamese government keeps claiming that SOEs such as 
Vietnam Electricity Group (EVN) and Vietnam National Petroleum Group (Petrolimex) 
fulfil their social goals. This is confirmed that EVN, Petrolimex and Vietnam Expressway 
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 Internalisation of externalities can be achieved without government intervention if 
property rights are defined clearly and negotiation costs are fairly small – the Coase Theorem. 
106
 A similarity is found from a mixed reasons based on the ideology such that the 
governments of developing countries do not like the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a small number of families which were significant in Pakistan, Chile and Peru. The 
government reacted to the concentration by nationalising the private domestic firms (Gillies 
ibid., 264). 
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Corporation (VEC) have not earned a market return due to social mission by an IMF staff 
(Matheson 2013). 
 
The rational of SOEs we just examined raises a question: why private firms cannot 
provide the same goods and services if they operate under an appropriate regulatory 
regime? This question becomes more plausible if we consider criticism of public 
ownership and SOEs. 
 
It is widely argued that public ownership is likely to hamper economic growth because of 
a ‘tragedy of the commons’. There are several reasons why public ownership, compared 
to private ownership, tends to result in inefficiency. Researchers commonly rely on the 
principal-agent problem to explain the negative aspect of public ownership. Partly 
because of information asymmetry between managers and owners of state enterprises it is 
difficult to monitor managers of SOEs. Also partly because of lower level of incentive of 
owners to monitor the performance of SOEs which directly resulted from the fact that 
highly diffused ownership structure since all citizen are owners makes it unable for them 
to exclusively extract the benefit from monitoring the operation of SOEs (Alchian 1965).  
 
On the other hand, SOEs are frequently requested to fulfil political objectives which are 
in many cases neither profitable nor clearly measurable such as maintaining and 
generating employment, investing in unprofitable but strategic areas and improving the 
inequality in income distribution (Adhikari and Kirkpatrick 1990, Gillis 1980, Shleifer 
1998, Shleifer and Vishny 1994, World Bank 1995). 
 
Given the inefficiency of SOEs, what if private firms provide the goods and services? If 
the government make contracts with private firms to provide goods and services, such as 
research and development investment, postal, railway and water services and if it is able 
monitor the contracted private firms properly, it would overcome the problems from 
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public ownership. Will it be the case? It will be if we live in a world with zero 
‘transaction’ costs which incur in almost every economic activity. It is impossible to it is 
impossible to specify all contingencies for which the contents of a contract – for example, 
the level of the regulated price ceiling or the amount of subsidy, may need to be revised. 
Such contractual revisions usually involve a lot of negotiation and even legal disputes, all 
of which can incur substantial transaction costs. It is particularly relevant for developing 
countries whose governments lack legal capabilities even more than they lack 
administrative capabilities (Change ibid., 13-4). 
 
3.2. Government-linked companies in Singapore 
The public sector of Singapore is comprised of two main components – government-
linked companies (GLCs) and statutory boards. GLCs are entities in which the 
government holds a controlling share through Temasek Holdings (Temasek hereafter) 
whose sole owner is the Ministry of Finance. Temasek directly owns majority shares of 
large GLCs such as Singapore Power (electricity and gas) and PSA International (ports), 
Neptune Orient Lines (shipping), Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing (semi-
conductor), SingTel (telecommunications), SMRT (rail, bus, and taxi services), Singapore 
Technologies Engineering (engineering) and SemCorp Industries (engineering) and 
Singapore Airways Ltd. (Chang ibid.: 9). 
 
On the other hand, statutory boards are part of the government’s civil services. The 
statutory boards are created by special acts and ordinances of the parliament and are 
solely owned by the state. They are empowered to perform specific functions and are 
funded by government budget allocation, government loans and government guarantees 
(Pillai 1983, Sim 2011). They include Public Utilities Board, Economic Development 
Board, Housing and Development Board and Public Utilities Board. These are managed 
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by boards of directors with representation from government ministries, the private sector, 
profession and other interest groups.  
 
Temasek: overview 
Temasek was one of holding companies wholly-owned by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
The Singaporean government set up the MOF for the control of properties that were 
previously held by the British Chief Secretary during the colonial rule of Singapore. The 
MOF was empowered to acquire, purchase, hold, transfer, dispose, or otherwise deal with 
real assets. It wholly owned several operational holding companies such as Temasek 
Holdings for commercial entities, including GLCs, Ministry of National Development 
(MND) Holdings for certain remnant, but mainly dormant, company shares, Ministry of 
Health (MOH) Holdings for hospitals and the Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GIC), which invests Singapore’s reserves (Ang and Ding 2006: 67). 
 
When Temasek was formed, 36 companies were transferred to its control whose total 
amount of investment capital was SGD345 million. The government sends its 
representative to the Board of Directors (BOD) to monitor the performance of Temasek. 
The BOD of Temasek is composed of nine directors of which two seats are for official 
government representatives – Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI) and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).107  
 
A similar state organ – the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) – exists in 
Vietnam as we examined in Section 2.2 (p. 76). Its significance in the economy, however, 
is far less than that of Temasek in terms of the size of portfolio it runs. The size of 
portfolio run by Temasek is SGD 215 billion (equivalent to USD 173 billion) as of 31 
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 Vietnam also sends its representative to equitised firms as a member of the 
Supervisory Board but the supervising function does not work well. Further discussion is 
followed in Section 3.4 of this chapter. 
97 
 
March 2013 (Temasek Holdings Ltd. 2013: 3) while that run by the SCIC is VND 14,423 
billion (equivalent to USD 685 million as of 31 December 2013.108 
 
Temasek has GLCs and their subsidiaries as members. The way through which Temasek 
controls its member companies is to hold controlling share of GLCs which are called 
‘first-tier’ companies,109 and then these first-tier companies which have their own 
subsidiaries and affiliates hold controlling share of their own subsidiaries which are 
called ‘second-tier’ companies. Furthermore, there are cross-holdings among GLCs (Ang 
and Ding ibid.).110 Hence, Temasek can wield its strong influence over both first and 
second-tier companies without holding the shares of second-tier companies. 
 
Due to its aggressive investment plans including acquisitions and mergers, many of the 
GLCs such as Singapore Airlines, Keppel Corporation, Sembawang Holdings and 
Singapore Technologies, became blue-chips stock on the Singapore Stock Exchange with 
extensive international interests since the 1990s. At the same time, the government used 
GLCs to advance the policy of regionalisation by investing in ventures in Southeast Asia 
including China (Sim 2011: 62). 
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 Information is from the SCIC website at 
http://www.scic.vn/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id
=16&Itemid=8 ( accessed on 16 September 2014). 
 
109
 As of 31 May 1999, the market capitalisation of first-tier public listed GLCs was 
SGD88 billion or 25 per cent of total market capitalisation of the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore. The share of Temasek in these GLCs amounted to SGD47 billion (Yeung 2002: 
82). 
110
 This is how subsidiaries and affiliates of Korean chaebols are effectively controlled 
by a handful share portion of a single founder-owner family. For example, according to the 
information provided by Fair Trade Commission of Korea on 1 July 2012, the Chairman of 
Samsung group Kun-Hee Lee exerts his influence over 81 member companies by holding 
0.52 per cent of total capitalisation only. Even if we add the shares held by his children and 
relatives, it is still below one per cent of total capitalisation as of April 2012 
(http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr/index.jsp). 
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Temasek has consistently maintained its returns of nine per cent annually in total 
shareholder’s return from its investment portfolio. This can be explained by the fact that 
Temasek remains the controlling shareholder of the strategic GLCs which are mostly 
national monopolies such as Singapore Telecom, Keppel Corporation in shipbuilding, 
DBS Bank (formerly known as Development Bank of Singapore), SMRT (in public 
transportation services including train, bus, taxi and underground) and Singapore 
Technologies (Sim 2011: 71). Another interesting research on why listed GLCs have 
shown a higher market value relative to book value than is the case with private 
companies is that investors assign a premium to GLCs over private firms because the 
very fact that a company is linked to the government and potential belief that that the 
Singapore government protects GLCs from failure (Ramirez and Tan 2004: 17).111 
 
Development plan and GLCs in Singapore 
GLCs in Singapore have played an important role in industrial restructuring from factor-
induced industrialisation replying on its initial comparative advantages in terms of 
location and labour in 1970s to high-tech based industrialisation in 1990s to 
regionalisation after 2000 with a relatively strong presence of MNCs (Ghestquiere 2007, 
Low 2001, Shin 2002). 
 
The original purpose behind the government’s involvement was to accelerate Singapore’s 
economic development by initiating industrialisation in the early 1960s (Ang and Ding 
2006). As part of the effort for the industrialisation drive, the government took an active 
entrepreneurial role by investing in a wide range of companies in the manufacturing, 
                                                     
111
 The rapid growth of GLCs and statutory boards has led, however, to a different 
concern, namely that they encroach upon too many non-strategic industries, crowding-out 
smaller private companies and hindering the development of a critical mass of thriving local 
companies Ghestquiere (2007: 97). 
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financial, banking, trading, transportation, shipbuilding and other service sectors.112 GLCs 
and statutory boards are the agents of this entrepreneurial state. 
 
While GLCs have played key roles in industrialisation in Singapore, the role of industrial 
policy is not clearly observed because there is an equally heavy reliance on FDI by MNCs 
for capital, expertise, technology and markets (Low et al. 1993). As Singapore neither has 
a large domestic market nor sufficient resources, it chose ‘complementing’ catch-up 
strategy instead of ‘substituting’ one which Japan and Korea pursued to industrialise 
(Shin 2002).113  The Singaporean government wisely utilises the dominating MNCs by 
creating the environment through incentives and market-supporting facilities, which has 
induced MNCs and FDI to invest in Singapore (Low 2001: 113). The GLCs in Singapore 
have filled the areas which the government regarded as strategic to the country’s 
development such as shipbuilding, steel-making and telecommunication.114 
 
In the initial phases of Singapore industrialisation between 1960s and 1980s, the state and 
GLCs helped to restructure and diversify the entrepôt economy into labour-intensive, 
low-value added manufacturing mainly set up by FDI and MNCs. Since the late 1970s, a 
transition was to be made to higher-value added manufacturing, substituting capital, 
technology and skilled labour for low-valued added activities. At the same time, 
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 In addition, the government commands the use of large amounts of Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) savings which is an individual mandatory savings scheme originally 
meant as retirement income (Ghestquiere 2007: 3, 93).  
113
 The substituting catch-up refers to a strategy which a less-developed country in 
order to compete with developed countries chooses some alternatives to overcome the lack of 
the prerequisites of development such as capital, technologies or efficient financial 
intermediaries. On the other hand the complementing catch-up refers to a strategy that without 
competing with its forerunners providing MNCs with ‘complementary assets’ such as 
infrastructure, human capital and fiscal incentives in order to achieve industrialisation (Shin 
ibid., p. 4 and p. 20). 
114
 Some of GLCs were set up with the withdrawal of the British army. Left with the 
naval based and its full complement of infrastructure, equipment and trained human resources, 
the state promoted thriving ship-repair and build GLCs which extended to oil rig construction 
later (Low 2001: 115) 
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horizontal industrial expansion shifted to greater vertical integration as MNCs began to 
weave webs of linkages involving transnational production. Since 1990s, Singapore has 
chosen a clustering-based regionalisation development strategy.115 Instead of relationship 
based on dependence or patronage, a more mutual beneficial basis, with Singapore as an 
effective partner to the MNCs, has been adopted. This became more obvious when the 
regionalisation policy was launched in 1993. As MNCs moved operations elsewhere in 
the region as Singapore developed a new strategy to build up complementary and 
supplementary linkages (Low 2001: 115-7). 
 
The state-business relations in Singapore 
It is well known that the Singaporean public sector has not suffered inefficiency. It is said 
that policy is rigorously enforced, the government is efficient and corruption is rare in 
Singapore. This assessment originates from early studies on the political economy of 
Singapore. For example, Chan (1975) argues that Singapore was an administrative state, 
one in which the bureaucracy had become the real locus of politics and popular politics 
began to disappear and lobbying decrease dramatically in 1960s (Chan 1987). Majority of 
studies on Singapore's political economy have emphasised the independence of 
government and the separate, subordinate standing of local business class (Deyo 1981, 
Rodan 1989). 
 
Singapore, however, does not have attributes of Anglo-American good government such 
as democracy, the rule of law and transparency, government independency and isolated 
bureaucratic institutions (Evans 1995, Haggard et al. 1997, Johnson 1982). Its power 
structure is essentially monolithic and the private sector influence over the government is 
not large (Chalmers 1992, Rodan 1989). Legal institutions are not independent of the 
                                                     
115
 In the 1980s especially after the 1985 recession, the government emphasised the 
importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as they began to feel alienated by 
the nature of the overall growth process in Singapore in which they mainly served as sub-
contractors for MNCs and GLCs (Low ibid., 116). 
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government while they work efficiently (Jayasuriya et al. 2000). Despite its transparency 
in business environment, Domestic and foreign news media are effectively prevented 
from investigative reporting on areas the government considers sensitive, which includes 
the government itself (Seow 1998). The government owns extensive commercial assets 
(Lim 1983, Rodan 1989). Furthermore, the governing elite is not free of ties with 
economic actors and does not contain within it an insulated, bureaucratic core with the 
independence to resist particularistic demands from member of this elite (Hamilton-Hart 
2000: 203). The state in Singapore is less autonomous, in the sense of clear separation of 
business and government and less bureaucratic than is generally supposed. Non-state and 
government actors have become entwined in terms of their interests, roles and career 
paths. Individual bureaucrats occupy important roles but they are integrated into a wider 
system of government which does not support bureaucratic centres of power (Hamilton-
Hart ibid.: 198). 
 
Economic rents from lucrative monopolies and concessions, as were granted to relatives 
and associates elsewhere, are avoided and opportunities for rent-seeking minimised, but 
why? Hamilton-Hart summarises the discourses on this issue into two lines. 
 
One line is that Singapore is simply an oddity: small, peculiarly depoliticized 
and governed by a dominant individual whose aspirations and talents explain 
the country’s successes. …Complementing this picture, studies of 
Singapore’s political economy have emphasized the independence of 
government and the separate, subordinate standing of the local business 
class, particularly in the early years of independence (Hamilton-Hart 2000: 
196) 
 
Alternatively, it is explained that there has been a key awareness of the need to run public 
enterprises on commercial and market-based principles (Ghestquiere 2007: 64). GLCs in 
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Singapore are intended to be instruments by which the state justifies to its shareholders – 
citizens – the active role it is playing in the economy. This desire has affected the way 
GLCs are structured, their incorporation of strict corporate governance, their investment 
decisions and their transparency (Sim 2011). They are professionally managed by private 
executives and operate on a commercial basis with a focus on bottom-line performance 
(Ramirez and Tan 2004). Private investment in the GLCs also provides a concrete 
foundation for a direct stake in the state. By engaging a substantial portion of private 
sector equity, the risk borne by government is reduced, as is the incentive for the private 
sector to see the GLSc simply as piggy banks (Hamilton-Hart 2000: 207). 
 
The Singaporean government and the public sector, in contrast to general perception, are 
not independent of and separated from businesses. The senior civil servants and 
politicians in Singapore are never completely isolated from business (Sim 2011:75). For 
example, the directors and top managers of GLCs were heavily drawn from retired 
politicians and civil servants including brigadier-generals from the defence ministry in 
Singapore which gave rise to complex interlocking directorships within the government 
itself. As a result, the line between business and government has been more 
systematically blurred as the government incorporated privates sector individuals through 
directorships (emphasis added; Hamilton-Hart 2000: 199).  
 
In Singapore, like in many other countries, public enterprises have been progressively 
privatised. The line between business and government has been more systemically 
blurred as private sector individuals moved into state bodies and public sector personnel 
have acquired private sector business interests and positions. The statutory boards and 
GLCs have been used for amalgamation between public and private spheres. The 
governing elite span both public and private spheres, with the two sectors linked by 
shared interests, personal ties and overlapping career paths (Hamilton-Hart ibid..: 199-
201). Often, however, public enterprises elsewhere failed to display the profitability, 
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budgetary discipline and dynamism found in Singapore, where GLCs have not been used 
for social or employment generation purposes (Ghestquiere 2007: 93-4). Low (1998: 23) 
explained this that “self-interest is guided by the strong visible arm of the government 
through benevolent state involvement”. However, why has still not been answered. 
 
Singapore’s strict corporate governance expectations compared to the case of Malaysia 
(Anwar and Sam 2006). Vietnam is not an exception of the poorly-governed public sector. 
The corruption of government officials including the police are widely acknowledged 
(World Bank 2013) and the trust of people on SOEs is undermined due to the lack of 
transparency and limited access to the information on SOEs (Tran Huu Huynh et al. 2012, 
World Bank 2012). People answer that the most effective solution for SOE reform is 
improving transparency and that the least effective solution for SOE reform is no 
government guarantees (Tran Huu Huynh et al. 2012: 43, Figure 25). Smith et al. (2014) 
argues that the performance and governance of Malaysian GLCs has improved when they 
release more information to the public but the Vietnamese General Corporations and 
State Economic Groups (SEGs) are far behind of Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
3.3. Government-linked companies in Malaysia 
The Malaysian economy has shown stable economic growth for the last fifty years since 
its independence from the British in 1957 (see Figure 2, p. 138). It is the twenty-eighth 
largest economy in the world and the third largest in Southeast Asia as of 2012 in terms 
of GDP measured by the World Bank and its average annual growth rate for the last fifty 
years is 6.5 per cent.116  
 
While the Malaysian economy has perceived as largely a market-based economy, there 
was a period in which explosive growth of state enterprises was implemented in the 
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 GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. 
The World Bank data,were accessed on 11 August 2013 at data.worldbank.org. 
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1970s. Briefly speaking, there were three phases in the development of GLCs and the 
state intervention: a laissez-faire period from 1957 to 1967, followed by a state 
intervention period with massive growth of GLCs from 1967 to 1982 and then a 
privatisation period which began from 1983 and it has been under reform through the 
GLC Transformation Programme (GLCT) launched in 2004 and planned to finish in 2015. 
Amid of these three stages, the rapid expansion of the state sector in Malaysia was closely 
related to politics which try to reconcile the conflict between Bumiputras and non-
Bumiputras. The New Economic Policy (NEP) is a critical factor we have to consider in 
the examination of the development of the Malaysian economy after liberation from 
British colonialism. There has been a consistent policy in Malaysia over the three phases 
– strengthening Bumiputras’ economic base, which has produced a skewed outcome and 
made the public sector inefficient. 
 
Significance of GLCs in the economy: Overview 
It is perceived as being a fundamentally market-oriented but it has relatively large number 
of state-owned enterprises or government-linked companies (GLCs). There, however, 
were over 1,100 SOEs which are not only engaged in core utilities such as transport, 
communications, water supply, energy and finance but also in non-traditional sectors 
such as services, construction and manufacturing by the mid-1980s through nationwide 
state intervention (Adam and Cavendish 1995a: 15). The number of GLCs has reduced 
through active privatisation move which began in 1983 and the following GLCs 
Transformation Programme launched in July 2005. The number of GLCs listed on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia) is 57 as of July 2005 of which 15 
largest GLCs called G-15 accounts for about 65 per cent of the market capitalisation of 
listed GLCs (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance 2006: 38).  
 
The Malaysian government defines the G-15 as “a selection of 15 GLCs held by the 
Government-linked Investment Company (GLIC) constituents of the Putrajaya 
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Committee on GLC High Performance (PCG) and includes Maybank, Telekom Malaysia 
Berhard, Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad, Golden Hope 
Plantations Berhad, Malaysian Airline System, Proton Holdings Berhad, Kumpulan 
Guthrie Berhad, Affin Holding Berhad, UEM World Berhad, Boustead Holding Berhad, 
BIMB Holdings Berhad, Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad and Malaysia 
Building Society Berhad” (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance 2006: 38). 
 
According to the information provided by the PCG, this G-15 has been transformed to the 
G-17 as of February 2013 after merges, demerges and other corporate exercises. Many of 
G-15 companies still remain in the G-17 (see Table 6, p. 106).117 GLCs revenue as a 
percentage of GDP was 17.4 per cent as of 2010. This was much lower than what 
Singapore recorded, 48 per cent, but similar to that of China and Thailand (14.5 per cent) 
and much larger compared to India (6.5 per cent), the US (1.68 per cent) and Australia (3 
per cent) (Chakravarty and Ghee 2012: 54-5).118 
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 Two companies removed from the G-15 are Golden Hope Plantation Berhad and 
Proton Holdings Berhad while Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad was acquired by Sime Darby 
Berhad and Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Berhad turns into CIMB Group Berhad which is 
newly added to the G-17. Three other companies newly added are Axiata Group Berhad, 
Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad and TH Plantation Berhad. Information was collected 
from the PCG website at http://www.pcg.gov.my (accessed on 3
rd 
July 2014) 
118
 Chakravarty and Ghee included GLCs in which the respective government had a 
stake of fifty per cent or more. Although those numbers cited do not precisely map out the 
exact contribution of GLCs, private players and multinational corporations in each country, as 
revenue of GLCs includes contribution from overseas, they can be proxies for how big the 
GLCs are relative to the size of domestic economies (ibid.) 
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Table 6: Large 17 GLCs in Malaysia as of 2010 (unit: RM million) 
Name Main business area Market capitalisation 
Sime Darby Bhd Plantations 52,883 
Axiata Group Berhad Telecommunications 40,114 
MISC Bhd Shipyard/Shipping 38,701 
Tenaga Nasional Bhd Utilities 36,498 
Petronas Gas Bhd Utilities 21,449 
Plus Expressways Bhd Construction 21,000 
Telekom Malaysia Bhd Telecommunications 12,557 
Petronas Dagangan Bhd Utilities 10,908 
UEM Land Holdings Bhd Property 8,377 
Malaysian Airline System Bhd Transport 6,985 
Malaysian Airports Holdings Bhd Construction 6,908 
KLCC Property Holdings Bhd Property 3,082 
Malaysian Resources Corporation Bhd Property 2,750 
Proton Holdings Bhd Industry 2,471 
POS Malaysia Bhd Utilities 1,804 
TH Plantations Bhd Plantations 1,016 
Chemical Company of Malaysia Bhd Industry 733 
Source: Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance (2011)  
 
 
Laissez-faire Period (1957-1969) 
The state sector was not large when Malaysia achieved independence from the British in 
1957 and the minimal market intervention was continued until the outbreak of the May 
1969 riots.119 The Malaysian leadership, at the early stage of independence, chose the 
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The 13th May 1969 incident refers to the Sino-Malay sectarian violence in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, in which many Malaysians died. Officially the number of deaths was 
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policy in which Malays retain political control while non-Malays, mainly Chinese and 
Indians, were allowed to pursue their commercial interests.120 This was called as the 
“Bargain of 1957” which was acknowledged as laissez-faire policy (Adam and 
Cavendish 1995a: 14). The Bargain of 1957 led to the resentment of Malays towards the 
Chinese domination of the economy which ultimately caused the May 1969 riots.121 
  
This laissez-faire policy was influenced by the British. Between 1957 and 1960, public 
expenditure was mainly on infrastructural development (50 per cent) and agricultural and 
rural development (23 per cent), with only 1.4 per cent allocated to commerce and 
industry development (Lim 1985: 41). The Merdeka (Independence) Constitution 
preserved the colonial legal and administrative framework, especially protection of the 
property rights of British business interests (Rasiah and Shari 2001). A business-friendly 
environment was assured. Thus, the post-colonial Malaysian government continued to 
promote private enterprise, while the economic interests of the ex-colonial power were 
protected and greater foreign investment inflows encouraged (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 
284). As a result, the foreign sector, with 62 per cent of share of corporate assets, 
dominated the Malaysian economy when the NEP was launched in 1971. 
                                                                                                                                                 
played down, but Western diplomatic sources put the toll at close to 600, with most of the 
victims Chinese. The racial riots led to a declaration of a state of national emergency or 
Darurat by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the Head of state of Malaysia) resulting in the 
suspension of the Parliament by the Malaysian government, while the National Operation 
Council was established as a caretaker government to temporarily govern the country between 
1969 and 1971 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/13_May_incident_%28Malaysia%2, accessed on 
16 September 2013). 
120
 A political group which began the campaign of independence of Malaya was a 
coalition of the leading Malay (United Malay National Organisation – UMNO), Chines 
(Malayan Chinese Association – MCA) and Indian (Malayan Indian Congress – MIC) 
political parties, and it has remained in government ever since. As a result, the equitable 
growth for all three groups is inevitable value in Malaysia’s political economy. 
121
 In fact, what dominated the Malaysian economy after independence was British 
capital but economic inequalities were wrongly perceived along ethnic lines partly because 
Chinese businesses were conspicuous in the countryside where they took over rural 
transportation and rice milling, and acted as intermediaries between British capital and the 
Malay peasantry (Bowie 1991, Lim 1985, Tan 2008: 42).  
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At the time of the outbreak of the May 1969 riots, the Bumiputras’ share in total 
corporate wealth remained at 2.4 per cent (Jomo and Tan 2003: 5). Similarly, Adam and 
Cavendish (1995a) reported that foreigners owned 62 per cent, non-Bumiputra 
Malaysians 34 per cent and the Bumiputras four per cent out of all corporate assets in 
1970. Also an analysis of poverty among ethnicities estimated that 56 per cent of 
Bumiputras households had a monthly income of less than RM120, compared with 13 per 
cent for the Chinese and 20 per cent for the Indians (Snodgrass 1980, recited in Salleh 
and Meyanathan 1993: 3). 
 
The New Economic Policy and the State Intervention Period (1969-1983) 
To respond to the May 1969 riots, the Malaysian government announced the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) whose main target was to strengthen the economic foundation of 
Bumiputras. One of its announced targets was to reach the Bumiputras share of corporate 
wealth up to 30 per cent by 1990s.122 We may interpret the setting up of the NEP as the 
Malaysian government accepted the failure of the laissez-faire economic policy 
implemented the first decade after independence to achieve a socially acceptable wealth 
and income distribution among ethnic groups, especially to disadvantaged Bumiputras.123  
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 One of the NEP objectives was the promotion of overall economic growth and the 
“economic objective of national unity may be expressed as the improvement of economic 
balances between the races or the reduction of racial economic disparities” (Adam and 
Cavendish 1995a: 14). 
123
 But it is argued that Bumiputras actively requested their economic share through 
mass organisations. For example, the Bumiputra Economics Congress (BEC) was introduced 
in 1965 and delegates at the second BEC in 1968 threatened to cause political instability if 
Malays were not given their share of the economy. The demand made here was subsequently 
incorporated in the NEP (Lim 1985: 44-5). 
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Table 7: Ownership of share capital of limited companies, 1969-2008 (per cent) 
Year Bumiputras’ share Non-Bumiputras’ share Foreign share 
1970 2.4 28.3 63.4 
1975 9.2 n.a (34)* 53.3 
1980 12.5 n.a. (45)* 42.9 
1985 19.1 34.6 (57)* 26.0 
1990 19.2 46.5 25.4 
1995 20.6 42.4 27.7 
1999 19.1 39.4 32.7 
2004 18.9 40.2 32.5 
2006 19.4 43.5 30.1 
2008 21.9 36.5 37.9 
NEP target by 1990 30 40 30 
* The data for these three years are adopted from Adam and Cavendish (1995a) 
Sources: Gomez (2013:89), Table 3.1 and Adam and Cavendish (1995a). 
 
The NEP was implemented through Malaysian five-year plans and incorporated firstly 
into the Second Malaysian Plan which lasted from 1971 to 1975.124 Active government 
intervention began to achieve the targets, including the compulsory transfer of shares to 
the Bumiputras and the creation of specialised financial institution who worked as 
holding companies for Bumiputras. As Table 7 shows, the share of Bumiputras steadily 
increased from four to eighteen per cent over fifteen years and during the same period 
non-Bumiputra Malaysian share rose from 34 to 45 and 57 per cent while foreign share 
decreased sharply from 62 to 25 per cent. 
 
                                                     
124
 The Second Malaysian Plan (1971-1975) is a part of New Economic Policy (NEP) 
announced in 1970 whose purpose was to create the conditions for national unity by reducing 
poverty and reducing inter-ethnic disparities, especially between the indigenous, mainly 
ethnic Malay Bumiputras and the mainly ethnic Chinese non-Bumiputras (Jomo and Tan 2003: 
1) 
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Increasing the share of Bumiputras by 7.5 times in twenty years, however, was not an 
easy task at all. Even after thirty years of the commencement of the NEP, the share of 
Bumiputras was still below the target. A government report documents that the 
Bumiputras’ equity share was 19 per cent by 2005 and it increased up to 21.9 per cent as 
of 2008 (Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance 2011: 20). While the growth of 
Bumiputras’ share has stalled the foreigners’ share has recovered over the period of 
privatisation during which the government intervention has weakened and various 
strategies have been implemented to attract foreign capital.  
 
How did the Malaysian government increase the share of Bumiputras? 
As we examined, the economic base of Bumiputras was significantly weak while 
foreigners and non-Bumiputras dominated the economy when the Malaysian government 
began the NEP in 1971. Under this situation, the Malaysian government had very few 
alternatives available for them to choose other than to use public investment to achieve 
the triumphant goal and this resulted in an explosive increase in the number of GLCs. 
Bumiputra participation in government-approved manufacturing projects began to grow 
rapidly between 1975 and 1985, with equity participation always above 40 per cent (Jomo 
and Gomez 2000: 290). 
 
The growth of GLCs in Malaysia is described in Table 8 (p. 112). It demonstrates that 
there were 88 GLCs during the era of laissez-faire followed by rapid growth together 
with the launch of the NEP in the 1970s.125 The number of GLCs soared up to 547 by the 
end of 1980. Establishment of GLCs occurred in almost every area with the highest 
growth in the manufacturing and the services sector from five to 314 and to 293 
                                                     
125
 Three types of enterprises were classified as public: i) Departmental enterprises that 
were required by law to maintain their financial accounts in accordance with commercial 
standards; ii) Public corporations and bodies established by state and federal statutes; and iii) 
State-owned companies established under the 1965 Companies Act. The difference between 
the second and third group was that the former were 100 per cent government-owned while 
the latter either wholly or partly owned by the government (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993: 15). 
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respectively which accounted for around 55 per cent of the newly created GLCs. The 
reasons of this sharp increase in these two sectors were because they were the sectors 
dominated by Bumiputras but also the government attempted to reduce regional income 
inequalities by focusing on these sectors. Unfortunately, however, they fared badly in 
terms of profitability (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993: 21). Among these newly established 
GLCs, 556 belonged to the Federal government and 553 to the State government (Adam 
and Cavendish 1995a: 21, TABLE 1.7). 
 
The public investment became as an important tool to increase the share of Bumiputras. 
Public spending escalated sharply in the 1970s while the Malaysian government 
implemented the NEP and the growth of public enterprises was one aspect of a general 
widening scope of the public sector. One of the main roles of public enterprises was 
declared in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) as one of the instruments for 
redistributing wealth and creating a Bumiputra commercial and industrial community. 
This tendency of creating public enterprises started to be weakened when then Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared the privatisation of public enterprises (Jomo and 
Tan 2003). 
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Table 8: Growth of GLCs in Malaysia as of 1990 
Sector Before 1960 1960-1970 1971-1980 1981 onwards Total 
Agriculture 4 6 73 59 142 
Building & 
construction 
2 7 56 65 130 
Extraction 
industry 
0 3 22 6 31 
Finance 3 14 61 44 122 
Manufacturing 5 35 172 102 314 
Other industrial 0 0 0 10 10 
Services 5 10 135 143 293 
Transportation 5 13 28 23 69 
Total 24 88 547 452 1111 
Source: Central Information Collection Unit (CICU), Permodalan Nasional Berhad126; 
(Adopted from Salleh and Meyanathan 1993: 20), Table 4. 
 
 
Laws and regulations 
Various laws and regulations were promulgated to increase Bumiputras’ capital share. 
One of examples is the 1975 Industrial Coordination Act. The Act mainly alarmed 
Chinese investors who perceived the Act as an attempt to advance Malay interests in the 
manufacturing sector at their expense. For example, the Act gave the government 
increased authority over the establishment and growth of manufacturing firms and most 
importantly manufacturing licences from the Ministry of Trade and Industry could be 
revoked if requirements for Bumiputra ownership and employment were not met. Also 
the Act had a mandatory clause that foreign and Chinese companies should ensure a 
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 The Central Information Collection Unit (CICU) was formed and jointly operated 
by the Treasury and the National Equity Corporation (Permodalan Nasional Berhad) of 
Malaysia to monitor and analyse public enterprises in which the government equity 
participated (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993: 20). Another reason why the Malaysian 
government contracted the CICU was there was lack of a comprehensive database on the 
performance of GLCs (Adam and Cavendish 1995a: 16). 
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minimum 30 per cent Bumiputra ownership in all firms beyond a certain size.127 The 
bureaucracy developed the means to try to induce manufacturing companies to sell stock, 
usually at discounted prices, to Bumiputras to achieve the Bumiputra ownership 
requirements set by the Act (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 289-90). 
 
Another example is the 1968 Investment Incentive Act which was used by the 
government to increase the equity participation and employment of Bumiputras in foreign 
companies. The Capital Issues Committed, set up to regulate the growth of the capital 
market in 1968, put much more pressure to advance Bumiputra ownership of corporate 
stock. In addition, the Foreign Investment Committee was established to oversee foreign 
investments particularly to ensure conformity with the NEP (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 
290).128 
 
Public financial institutions  
Like Temasek in Singapore, the Malaysian government set up public holding 
corporations to increase Bumiputras’ share. One of the main tools the Malaysian 
government used to increase the share of Bumiputras was to use public financial 
institutions such as Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB; National Equity Corporation) 
and Perbadanan Nasional Berhand (PERNAS; National Corporation). Especially, the role 
of PNB which was set up to accumulate and manage capital on behalf of Bumiputras was 
very unique in redistributing wealth. In addition to these public holding corporations, low 
interest rates, easy credit and preferential lending aimed to assist Bumiputra businesses 
and the state made larger funds available despite the poor track record of Bumiputra 
businesses (Jesudason 1989, recited in Tan 2008). 
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 This thirty per cent Bumiputra share regulation was removed in April 2009 when 
Mr. Najib Tun Razak replaced Mr. Abadullah Ahmad Badawi as Prime Minister to attract 
foreign capital as Malaysia experienced steep decline in FDI since 2000 (Gomez 2012: 71).  
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 The reactions taken by Chinese and foreign businesses were, for example, to 
diversify investment into overseas (Gomez 1991) or sought tight ties with politically 
influential but cooperative Malays (Bowie 1991). 
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As we examined, early initiatives of the NEP in pursuit of increasing Bumiputras’ share 
involved direct compulsory share transfers to Bumiputra individuals and companies and 
the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA; the Council of Trust for the Bumiputra) and the 
Bumiputra Stock Exchange were created over the course. This method, however, did not 
work well because of the resale of Bumiputra equity to non-Bumiputras and the 
government invented the concept of “ownership-in-trust” by establishing an investment 
trust dedicated to Bumiputras. As a consequence, the Yayasan Pelaburan Bumiputra 
(YPB; Bumiputra Investment Trust) was established in January 1978 under a Board of 
Trustees chaired by the Prime Minister and the PNB was created as an executive 
institution in March 1978. 
 
PNB was able to borrow interest-free and non-collateral loans from the Malaysian 
government and it was able to increase its stockholding rapidly. It used its borrowed 
government capital to make investments. The investment into plantations was aimed 
primarily at buying up British enterprises while most of that going into the financial 
sector was for buying up Chinese banks and enterprises (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993: 22, 
Saruwatari 1991).  
 
PNB evaluates, selects and purchases shares in public and private-sector firms and 
distributes selected shares to Bumiputra individuals through the Amanah Saham Nasional 
(ASN; National Shares Trust) which was set up by PNB in May 1979 as a subsidiary 
company to administer and market a unit trust scheme directed towards equity 
participation of Bumiputras. Shares in profitable GLCs were transferred to the PNB at par 
value and then some of these shares were transferred to the ASN, which then issued par-
value units against the ASN share portfolio as a whole (Adam and Cavendish 1995a: 28). 
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The NEP and the budget burden 
The main source of the state budget revenue of Malaysia is crude oil. In the mid-1970s, 
petroleum production began in Malaysia and the federal government captured the lion’s 
share of oil rents instead of the state governments. The oil rents sustained much of the 
public sector expansion from the mid-1970s until the early 1980s, they have also been 
used since the mid-1980s to GLCs and finance prestige projects. Such fiscal 
irresponsibility seemed to increase with greater state intervention and the availability of 
enhanced oil revenues from the mid-1970s, until the economic and political crises of the 
mid-1980s brought about greater fiscal discipline and harder budget constraints for public 
enterprises, besides providing a rationale for privatisation (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 282). 
 
The rapid increase in the number of GLCs resulted in rapid increase in the development 
expenditure which led to a budget deficit in 1970s and 1980s (see Table 9, p. 116). Total 
expenditure increased from 29.2 per cent in 1970 to 39.2 per cent in 1979 and peaked at 
58.4 per cent in 1981 with the highest budget deficit of 20.4 per cent in the same year.129 
The public spending started to decline since 1983 when the Malaysian government could 
not run the budget deficit any more. 
 
Public sector expansion under the NEP, however, was accompanied by other 
interventions which had a cumulative crowding-out effect, reflected in significant capital 
flight and declining private investment from the mid-1970s, and especially in the early 
1980s (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 286). The eagerness to promote redistribution created 
distortions for the efficient functioning of GLCs, subsequently adversely affecting both 
efficiency and distributive equity (Gouri et al. 1991). 
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 The expansion of public expenditure was not entirely due to the growth of GLCs but 
coincided with a severe world recession. The Malaysian government ran expansionary fiscal 
policy to weaken the recessionary business cycle. 
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As a result, the public sector’s share of GNP rose from 29.2 per cent in 1970 to a peak of 
58.4 per cent in 1981, before falling to 25.3 per cent in 1993. The growth of GLCs was 
accompanied by declining capital productivity in the economy. The average incremental 
capital-output ratio rose from 2-3 in the 1970s to 5-6 in the early 1980s, while the public 
sector incremental capital-output ratio rose from 6-7 to 15-16 over the same period, 
though part of this aggravation might be attributed to setting-up GLCs in the heavy 
industry in the early 1980s (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 289). 
 
Table 9: Consolidated public sector finance (percentage of GNP) 
Year Revenue Development expenditure Total expenditure Overall surplus 
1970 24.6 8.3 29.2 -3.7 
1979 30.7 13.1 39.2 -8.1 
1981 32.9 27.3 58.4 -20.4 
1983 33.2 26.2 56.8 -17 
1985 36.5 18.3 52.4 -4.7 
1987 32.6 11.3 42.4 -5.1 
1989 31.5 13.4 41.4 -6 
1990 30.4 14.8 42.6 -8.3 
Source: Salleh and Meyanathan (1993: 17) 
 
 
 
Privatisation Period (After 1983) 
As we examined briefly, the massive creation of GLCs over the state intervention period 
(1971-1983), contributed to improve the matter of poverty and ethnic inequality in wealth 
distribution. Nevertheless, it entailed criticism of a budget deficit and inefficient running 
of GLCs. This ultimately led to the discourse on privatisation of GLCs from the early 
1980s. 
 
The privatisation began when then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad made an 
announcement that Malaysia would carry forward privatisation in 1983, which was a 
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dramatic reversal of preceding state-led economic policy. It is claimed that the 
privatisation wave was affected not only by internal factors such as inefficient running of 
GLCs and a budget deficit but also by external factors such as liberalist and conservative 
reforms in the U.K. and in the U.S. (Jomo and Tan 2003: 1).130 
 
The government announced five objectives which it would achieve through privatisation 
in sought through privatisation in the 1985 Guidelines on Privatization issued by the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) under the Prime Minister. The five objectives were 1) to 
relieve the government’s financial and administrative burden; 2) to improve efficiency 
and productivity through competition and employee incentives; 3) to facilitate economic 
growth by increasing the role of the private sector in development; 4) to reduce the size 
and presence of the public sector; and 5) to contribute to the NEP which sought the 
reduction of poverty and inter-ethnic disparity in wealth (Jomo and Tan 2003:12 and Tan 
2008: 52-3). 
 
The Guideline clearly stated that “privatization will be implemented within the context of 
the NEP, indeed, privatization is expected to open up new opportunities for furthering the 
progress of the NEP.” In addition, while the Guideline declared that privatisation aimed 
at increasing the role of the private sector, it did not mean that the government would let 
the economy operate by itself. There were regulations which enabled the government to 
wield its economic leverage. For example, the government used the “special rights” or 
“golden share” which allowed the holder powers of veto over fundamental decisions of 
company. This is likely to be effective when relevant firms are strategic or socially 
important. Also there was a restriction that no one shareholder can hold more than 10 per 
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 It is claimed that the privatisation wave was very much consistent with Mr. 
Mahathir’s own persona ideological and political preferences (Gomez 2002a, Jomo and Tan 
2003). Even it is argued that privatisation had benefitted then Finance Minister Daim 
Zainuddin while then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and then Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim were more likely to were politically motivated to secure political foundation 
by rewarding their supporters (Gomez 2002b, Tan 2008) 
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cent of the stock when state firms were privatised following the intention of the 
government (Adam and Cavendish 1995b: 128-9). 
 
In Malaysia the term privatisation is often understood to include cases where less than 
half of the assets or shares of SOEs are sold to private shareholders and it also includes 
cases of “partial divestiture where less than half of the assets or shares of SOEs are sold 
to private shareholders, with the government retaining control through majority 
ownership” and if widely applied, it includes cases where “private enterprises are 
awarded licenses to participate in activities previously the exclusive preserve of the 
public sector, as in the case of television broadcasting from 1984” (Jomo and Tan 2003: 
11). Thus, the forms which privatisation took were sales of assets, licensing and build-
operate-transfer (BOT) contracting. 
 
Let us recall that the share of Bumiputras were around 12.5 per cent when privatisation 
began (see Table 7, p. 109). There was 10 per cent point increase compared to the level in 
1970 but Bumiputras’ share was still far below the target (30 per cent) of the NEP. It was 
not an available option to terminate the NEP for the government. The method of pursuing 
the NEP, however, must have changed not only because of the increasing government 
debt but more importantly because of a growing internal tension. 
 
By the mid-1980s there was growing dissatisfaction with the government among some of 
the more capable Bumiputra, both in the public and private sectors. By this point, large 
Malay-controlled business groups had already emerged on the corporate scene, and some 
were calling for a less regulated economy. Most of them grew since the early 1970 
through protection, assistance and acquisition. As a result, they were either created by the 
state or at the least with crucial state support (Jomo 1993, recited in Tan 2008) and were 
heavily dependent upon the state over the implementation of the NEP which aimed at 
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creating Malay capitalists. Some of them viewed excessive intervention as having slowed 
economic growth, and hence counter-productive to their interests (Khoo Khay Jin 1992). 
 
Private sector inefficiency 
So far we pointed out that the inefficient public sector which resulted from the 
overwhelmed state intervention to enhance Bumiputra economic power caused 
privatisation. There was, however, another important factor we have to consider as a 
cause of the privatisation in Malaya. That was the inefficient private sector caused by 
unregulated government support to Bumiputra private businesses. 
 
One of the main methods the Malaysian government used to enhance Bumiputra 
economic base was to take over established firms and provide new owners with ready-
made companies. This quick control of profitable firms by state agencies increased 
Bumiputra ownership. This insulation from market competition and easy access to 
finance, however, undermined the possible disciplining experience of business 
management. (Gomez and Jomo 1997, Jesudason 1989, Tan 2008). 
 
This consequently made Bumiputra private businesses rely heavily on the state and 
created a subsidy mentality among businesses. By the end of 1970, many private 
businesses failed despite significant support and demands grew for more protection and 
assistance in the form of easier credit, lengthier grace periods for loan repayment, more 
training, better businesses premises (Bruton et al. 1992: 295). This group of businesses, 
so-called pro-‘distribution’ faction or ‘bureaucratic class’, was tended to oppose 
privatisation and they were in fact most affected when the government tightened credit 
and adopted austerity measures in the mid-1980s (Tan 2008: 51). 
 
There was, however, a group of businesses so-called pro-‘growth’ faction which involved 
a coalition of political and business elites. This faction had grown independent of state 
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sponsorship and patronage and viewed the NEP and state intervention as causing market 
distortions and obstructions to growth and new business opportunities (Crouch 1992, 
Khoo Khay Jin 1992). This group, therefore, preferred less state intervention and 
demanded privatisation. Privatisation thus  
 
“represented a change in the way of resources were controlled and allocated 
… and supported by an emerging group of big businessmen which stood to 
benefit from the sale of state assets at the expense of those who continued to 
reply on NEP-style assistance and hand-outs” (Tan 2008: 45). 
 
 
Early privatisation (1983 – 1990) 
There were 24 major privatisation initiatives handled by the Economic Planning Unit 
(EPU) by the first half of 1990 and forty non-financial public enterprises were taken over 
by the private sector as of 1994 among which the Malaysian Airline System was the first 
one sold (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993: 23).  
 
After eight years of privatisation, the number of GLCs was 1,158 of which 556 belonged 
to the federal government, 553 to the state government and 49 to regional government as 
of 1990. The number of GLCs in operation was 903 (78 per cent) and 255 firm were 
either in dormant, in liquidation or inactive. The government hold 100 per cent of shares 
in 396 firms and a majority of shares in 429 firms, which summed up around 71 per cent 
(see Table 10, p. 122). 
 
Federal GLCs tend to be fairly larger than those held by state or regional agencies both in 
terms of debt and equity capital which were much less likely to raise capital from sources 
other than the government. Foreign loans and domestic loans of federal GLCs stood 
around 79 per cent of their total borrowing while the majority of debt for state and 
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regional GLCs was to the government. Especially the capacity of regional GLCs to attract 
foreign capital was limited – only 12 per cent was mobilised from oversea. Nevertheless, 
the overall debt-equity ratio of 180 per cent was significantly higher compared to the 
private sector which was estimated around 100 per cent (Adam and Cavendish 1995a: 22). 
  
Another indicator commonly quoted in evaluating the performance of GLCs after 
privatisation is the share performance of privatised firms compared to the overall Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) composite index. In general, privatised firms’ share 
prices outperformed the market average between 1985 and 1989. For example, the share 
price of Malaysian Airline System outperformed the market index by 100 per cent over 
the same period since its listing (Adam and Cavendish 1995b: 126). 
 
Notwithstanding that the early privatisation had positive impacts, there was evidence 
showing that the privatisation had not entirely growth enhancing as the government 
anticipated. The total debt of GLCs, if it compared before and after privatisation, did not 
change much but remained incessantly around 20 per cent of GDP over the period 
between 1980 and 1988 as Table 11 (p. 123) shows. While the turnover of GLCs 
increased continuously up to 56 per cent, after-tax profits did not move in the same 
direction. 
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Table 11: GLCs performance, 1980-88 (% of GDP) 
 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Turnover 45.3 39.8 36.5 37.4 41.3 44.4 47.9 54.5 56.2 
After-tax 
Profit 
13.8 9.2 7.1 4.6 6.4 6.1 5.0 4.1 5.6 
Capital 
expenditure 
0 6.3 7.4 8.3 6.8 3.5 3.1 10.3 1.8 
Overall 
balance 
13.0 2.0 -3.6 -7.6 -3.5 -1.3 -2.5 -10.0 -0.1 
Total debt 19.2 23.9 25.8 24.8 22.0 24.1 26.6 29.9 24.8 
Source: Adam and Cavendish (1995a: 24), TABLE 1.9.     
 
 
Table 12: Pre and Post-privatisation share distribution for three GLCs (per cent) 
Pre-sale 
Federal 
government 
State 
government 
Bumiputra 
Interests 
Other 
Interests 
Employees 
Other 
private 
MASa 90.0 10.0 0 0 0 0 
MISCb 36.8 20.0 8.0 5.2 0 30.0 
Sports Toto 30.0 0 0 0 0 70.0 
Post-sale 
Federal 
government 
State 
government 
Bumiputra 
Interests 
Other 
Interests 
Employees 
Other 
private 
MAS 60.0 10.0 11.0 0 5.0 14.0 
MISC 29.4 16.0 14.8 4.2 0.6 35.0 
Sports Toto 30.0 0 3.8 0 5.0 61.3 
a MAS: Malaysian Airlines System 
b MISC: Malaysian International Shipping Corporation 
 
Source: Adam and Cavendish (1995b: 134) 
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The Malaysian economy coincidently experienced economic recession from 1985 after 
privatisation implemented actively. It is hard to say this recession was caused by 
privatisation because there was a worldwide recession resulted from the oil shock which 
had a negative impact upon the Malaysian economy which largely depended upon exports 
(Jomo and Tan 2003, Salleh and Meyanathan 1993). External factors can explain better 
why the Malaysian economy experienced recession. 
  
Assessing privatisation 
One of striking features of the early privatisation in Malaysia is that the proceeds from 
privatisation were surprisingly small. Total proceeds from asset sales amounted to only 
0.2 per cent of GDP, while the cumulative proceeds from all asset sales from 1984 to 
1989 were equivalent to less than 0.1 per cent of GDP (Adam and Cavendish 1995b: 
121).131 The under-valuation probably had a positive role to attracted investors. 
Nonetheless, it is argued that argued that this deliberate under-valuation which reduced 
the one-off revenues accruing from the sale of government assets as well as lease 
payments was made to “sell or lease to the politically influential and to secure public 
support for the program.” (Jomo and Tan 2003: 14). 
  
This might be a reason why only a relatively modest transfer of equity ownership to the 
private sector. The Malaysian government disposed only a small fraction of the public 
sector during the first ten years of privatisation with only a little proportion of shares 
went to private hands (Adam and Cavendish 1995b, Galal et al. 1994). Table 12 (p. 123) 
shows how the distribution of ownership changed before and after three major 
privatisation projects of Malaysian Airlines System, Malaysian International Shipping 
Corporation and Sports Toto. It shows that the federal government’s share decreased 
                                                     
131
 In the early privatisation, there was lack of consistent legal system. For example, the 
lands had been granted to GLCs were not in fact owned by them. A constitutional amendment 
was required to make it possible to transfer the lands to private firms, which was done in 1989 
(Adam and Cavendish 1995b: 123). 
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from 90 per cent to 60 per cent through privatisation of which 11 per cent moved to 
Bumiputra interests, five per cent to employees and the rest 14 per cent to other private. 
There was, however, an around 8 per cent decrease in the share of private after the 
privatisation of Sports Toto. 
  
We can assess the Malaysian privatisation whether it has achieved what it aimed for. The 
five aims were i) relieving the government financial burden, ii) improving efficiency and 
productivity, iii) facilitating economic growth, iv) reduce the presence of the public sector 
and v) meeting NEP targets (see p. 116). 
 
Firstly, relieving the government financial burden: The government estimated that 
privatisation saved the government RM122-132.2 billion in capital expenditure which 
stood around 25 per cent of total development expenditure between 1981 and 2000, and 
RM7 billion in operating expenditure which represented less than one per cent of total 
operating expenditure (Malaysia 1996b, 2001a).  
 
The associated costs of privatisation were RM5.1 billion in soft loans for privatisation 
projects and RM4.8 billion for projects with a high social component (Malaysia 1996b). 
On top of this there were around RM20-30 billion contingent liabilities. Furthermore, 
under-valued asset prices over the course of privatisation crowded out private investment 
(Jomo 2002: 14). The government earnings from the sale of equity and assets were 
RM12.7 billion and RM21.2-23.1 billion respectively (Malaysia 1996b, 2001a). 
 
Nonetheless, the costs of government bail-outs, takeovers and renationalisation in 
assessing the performance of privatisation were not taken into account. If we consider the 
purchase of non-performing loans from privatised firms which amounts to RM47 billion 
by 2000 (Tan 2008: 60), it becomes unclear whether privatisation has relieved the 
government financial burden. 
126 
 
 
Secondly, improving efficiency and productivity: One of the features observed was that 
the majority were in sectors such as utilities, transportation, roads and 
telecommunications which are in general not the areas initiate privatisation in other 
countries (Adam and Cavendish 1995b: 99).132 For example, the establishment of TV3 
introduced competition into the television broadcasting industry in which two 
government channels dominated. After the privatisation of the Kelang Container 
Terminal (KCT) in 1986, average turn-around time per vessel reduced from 11.7 to 8.9 
hours. Telekom Malaysia introduced new services and improved existing services since 
its corporatisation in 1987 (Jomo and Tan 2003). It was reported that other two privatised 
ports – Penang Port and Johor Port – performed well with improved productivity and 
profits (Malaysia 1996b, Salleh and Lee 1990). 
 
It also was accepted that the efficiency of GLCs improved through the early privatisation 
by which the dependence of GLCs upon government funding reduced and this gave 
privatised firms greater financial flexibility. At the same time, the process of asset sales 
tended to impose an external discipline on the balance sheet which enabled the privatised 
firms to improve their debt-equity ratio. For example, Malaysian International Shipping 
Corporation reduced its debt-equity ratio from 22:1 in 1984 to 1.5:1 in 1989 (Adam and 
Cavendish 1995b: 125). 
 
Nevertheless, it was argued that much of this improvement was due to output growth 
which resulted from exogenous demand shifts and additional services (Tan 2008). In 
addition, the corporatisation of Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), the national power 
company, saw a reduction in system losses and improvements in average fuel conversion 
                                                     
132
 An in-depth analysis of major privatisation projects such as Port Klang Container 
Terminal (1983-6), Sports Toto Malaysia (1985-7), Malaysian Airline System Berhad (1985) 
and Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (1987) was done by Adam and Cavendish 
(1995b).  
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efficiency, and significantly improved infrastructure and strategic investment which 
reduced power outages (Leary 1998, cited in Tan 2008). 
 
Thirdly, facilitating economic growth: The Malaysian government anticipated that 
privatisation was likely to promote economic growth through encouraging private 
investment and allowing private entrepreneurship in sector previously monopolised 
(Malaysia 1991b). It is true that the level of private investment increased and the growth 
rate exceeded GDP growth rates after 1986. The proportion of private investment, 
however, was over 60 per cent out of total investment even before privatisation launched 
and instead maintained at around 50 per cent out of total investment during the 1980s (see 
Table 13, p. 128). 
 
In regard to promotion of entrepreneurship, we need to take into account the fact that 
many privatised firms enjoyed benefits from their monopoly status. If they are privatised, 
this monopoly powers will be handed over to private interests who are likely to use them 
to maximise profits (Jomo and Tan 2003: 11). Aa a result, many of build-operate-transfer 
(BOT) projects and licensed activities merely involve the private sector ‘substitution’ for 
what the public sector would otherwise have undertaken at lower cost to users (Tan 2008: 
62). It is uncertain whether privatisation in particular contributed to economic growth in 
Malaysia (recall that Malaysia experienced recession in 1985-6 after the launch of 
privatisation). 
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Table 13: Private investment in Malaysia (1970-2000) 
 
Year 
Private investment 
(RM billion) 
Share of total 
investment (%) 
Share of GNP 
(%) 
1970 1.5 67.9 12.1 
1975 2.5 62.3 14.1 
1980 10.4 62.6 20.1 
1981 11.5 55.2 20.5 
1982 11.4 50.0 19.0 
1983 12.0 49.0 18.3 
1984 13.3 52.6 18.0 
1985 12.3 53.0 17.1 
1990 24.2 64.7 21.9 
1995 57.7 71.6 28.5 
1997 87.9 73.8 39.2 
1998 n.a. 57.9 18.5 
2000 42.9 49.2 13.8 
Adapted from Tan (2008: 62).   
 
Fourthly, reducing the presence of the public sector: The presence of the public sector is 
reflected in public sector development expenditure (Tan 2008: 63). Both the level and the 
proportion of public expenditure decreased during the period 1986-1990 to RM57.7 
billion compared to the period 1981-1985. In the following period, however, the level of 
expenditure increased again while its share out of GDP remained without big change at 
14.8 per cent. We have to note the bulk of privatisation took place between 1986 and 
1995 and the presence of the public sector did not become weak over the same period. 
Rather the public development expenditure began to increase again from 1996 in terms of 
both the level and the proportion (see Table 9, p. 116 and Table 14, p. 129). It is worth 
mentioning that the number of public firms created from 1981 to 1990 was 452, which 
amounted to 1,111 in total (see Table 8, p. 112). The presence of the public sector was 
not weakened following privatisation. 
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Table 14: Public development expenditure (1981-2005) 
 
1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 
Total (RM billion) 80.3 57.7 117.7 222.9 339.8 
Share of GDP (%) 24.1 14.2 14.8 16.3 16.2 
Sources: Malaysia (1986, 1991a, 1996a, 2001b, 2006)    
 
Fifthly, meeting NEP redistributive targets: As we examined, privatisation contributed to 
achieve this goal. Bumiputras’ capital share increased from 2.4 per cent in 1970 to 20.6 
per cent in 1995 and then slightly fell to 18.9 per cent in 2004 but recovered and reached 
the highest at 21.9 per cent in 2008. This continuous improvement of Bumiputras’ share, 
however, still below the initial target of the NEP – 30 per cent by 1990. On the other hand, 
individual Bumiputra share of capital increased from 5.8 per cent in 1975 to 18.6 per cent 
in 1995 (Tan 2008: 64). The concentration of individual Bumiputra share also increased 
from 39 per cent in 1975 to 41 per cent in 1983 to 67 per cent in 1988 (Jomo 1990: 476). 
   
Government-business ties over the privatisation  
In fact, in all the public share issues over the early privatisation projects, a trench of the 
issue was reserved specifically for Bumiputra institutions, while the open sale was subject 
to the requirement that a further one-third of shares are taken up by Bumiputra 
individuals and institutions. Therefore, the privatisation was in fact “a second phase in the 
NEP, through which the asset accumulation by the government on behalf of the 
Bumiputras is redistributed to individual Bumiputeras and Bumiputera institutions” 
(Adam and Cavendish 1995b: 129). 
 
Whereas this goal was sought through state intervention in the 1970s, the same goal has 
been sought during the era of privatisation based on the accusation that GLCs 
accumulated losses which wasted investment resources, increased the government’s 
financial burden and slowed down economic growth (Jomo and Gomez 2000). 
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Privatisation was not been accompanied by a strong commitment to promoting 
competition, allowing once-public monopolies to be taken over by private interests, thus 
essentially becoming private monopolies. Instead, privatisation was implemented through 
non-transparent procedures to a relatively small group of capitalist133, both Bumiputra and 
non-Bumiputra, and to politically favoured state institutional investors and nominee 
companies (Barraclough 2000, Goh and Jomo 1995, Gomez 2002b, Jomo 1990). Hence, 
market processes and mechanism to reduce and eliminate rents hardly exist, while there is 
greater control over resources in the hands of a United Malays Nasional Organisation 
(UMNO)-dominated executive and a corporate sector dominated by politically linked 
companies and businesses. 
  
Consultation between state and business was neglected in favour of inter-ethnic political 
bargains that benefited an unproductive rentier bourgeoisie beholden to a political 
patronage system legitimated by ethnic chauvinism and thus hostile to the discipline of 
market competition (Lubeck 1992). 
  
Much of the rent obtained by this selected group has been secured by non-transparent 
means, sometimes even avoiding the semblance of market competition. These include the 
award of government contracts, the privatisation of state enterprises, subsidies from the 
state in the form of discounted loans and other privileges, and the appropriation of other 
rents created by state intervention, for example through business concessions carried out 
with government-issued licences (Jomo and Gomez 2000: 294-5). 
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 It is claimed that the bulk of major privatisation projects were awarded to close 
associates and even to family members of Mr. Mahathir and Mr. Daim. Mr. Daim also 
allegedly profited personally from some of the biggest privatisation projects such as the 
Malaysian Airline System and North-South Highway (Tan 2008: 72). 
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It is argued that privatisation was not successful because the government failed to address 
inherited inefficiencies and promote learning and commercial viability due to constraints 
posed by patron-client networks. As a result, by 2001, the government began scaling back 
privatisation programmes which gave a signal that its ‘owner-manager’ model was going 
to be replaced by the private owners with professional state managers (Tan 2008: 53). A 
new ten-year reform policy, GLC Transformation Programme, was launched in 2004. 
  
Whereas the NEP aimed to increase Bumiputras’ economic share, a group of non-
Bumiputra businesses became beneficiary over privatisation. Following a severe 
recession in the mid-1980s, Mr. Mahathir had come to realised the importance of Chinese 
capital to sustain growth and promote industrialisation. In the early 1990s, he saw the 
opening up of China’s economy as potentially lucrative for Bumiputra capital (Gomez 
2012: 66). Furthermore, Tan (2008: 57), through an example that some private owners 
reported directly to then Prime Minister Mahathir, argued that privatisation regulation 
was personalised rather than formalised and the government intervened on ad hoc basis. 
  
The Malaysian government has historically lacked disciplinary capacity, failing to 
withdraw subsidies or protection, which is contrasting to the case of South Korean 
government which delicately used the carrot-and-stick approach in enforcing its industrial 
and trade policy. Failure in the end was due to the state’s inability to correct mistakes that 
were made based on ethnically or politically motivated decisions. 
  
State’s credible threat that there will be no bail-outs is essential for privatisation to be 
successful. This credible threat, however, may be compromised if privatisation projects 
involve public services because this public nature is likely to make the government 
unable and unwilling to allow such privatised enterprises to fail. Therefore, improving 
efficiency through privatisation depends not only on the quality of regulation but also on 
its effectiveness in delivering credible threats (Jomo and Tan 2003: 38). 
132 
 
  
The four cases of the renationalisation in Malaysia are good examples. Indah Water 
Konsortium (IWK, the national sewerage company), the light rail transit (LRT) system, 
Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) and Proton (the national car project)134 evidenced that 
the government’s credible threats can be influenced by the nature of privatisation projects. 
  
While these projects suffered due to high capital costs necessitated some form of state 
subsidy, which in turn required an effective regulatory framework to ensure that the state 
did not subsidise inefficiency. The government neither offered a credible promise not to 
intervene nor increase the threat of state sanctions where performance targets were not 
met because of both ex ante and ex post reasons. 
  
At the beginning of privatisation projects, the government had to choose candidates who 
would be in charge of doing project. Selected candidates in all four cases, however, were 
closely connected to sections of the ruling party, United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO). Furthermore, the selection criteria could not but be biased because of the 
political objective which to create a group of Bumiputra industrialist. 
  
Over the course of privatisation, required monitoring was not implemented properly due 
to weak government capacity. More importantly, however, there were political reasons. 
Electoral support required affordable sewerage charges and low LRT and domestic 
airfares, while Proton was central in the government’s plans to promote Malay SMEs and 
employment opportunities. This meant that privatisation did not bring about a credible 
threat of bankruptcy (Jomo and Tan 2003: 38-42). 
  
As a result, the process of capital accumulation was channelled to serve political and 
ethnic imperatives. Increasing intra-ethnic, rather than inter-ethnic, conflict has been the 
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 Proton is a subsidiary of the Heavy Industries Corporation  (HICOM). 
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main cause of political instability since the May 1969 riots, and central to how resources 
have been allocated (Tan 2008: 65-6). Privatisation was a response to changes in social 
relations within the Malay community, specifically the emergence of the new Malay 
middle and business class pushing for a shift in resource allocation in its favour (Tan 
2008: 66). 
  
Privatisation beneficiaries were not competent enough because their selections were not 
based on strict economic criteria as political consideration outweighed economic 
optimality (Wedeman 2002). Furthermore, the Malaysian government’s disciplinary 
capacity has been constrained since the 1970s and the state’s failure to direct domestic 
capital into strategic manufacturing industries adversely affected industrialisation (Bruton 
et al. 1992, Jesudason 1989, Tan 2008). 
 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
This chapter reviews how GLCs have developed and what role they have played over the 
economic growth in Singapore and Malaysia to answer the question how the observed 
similarity such as that the public sector is dominant and the state is a controlling 
shareholder and the border between the public and the private sector is obscure has 
resulted in a different outcome in terms of efficiency of SOEs or GLCs (SOEs hereafter) 
in Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.  
 
In Chapter 1, this dissertation argues that if the state seeks a political goal other than 
business profits by using SOEs, it is likely that those SOEs involved face soft budget 
constraints because the state is bound to help to achieve the political goal. From this 
viewpoint, Singapore in which not an explicit political goal has been pursed is different 
from Malaysia and Vietnam. Strengthening Bumiputras’ economic foundation has been 
pushed ahead with in Malaysia and keeping the dominant state sector has been sought in 
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Vietnam. Consequently, the state-business relations have developed in a different way, 
which in turn makes the budget constraints which SOEs face either harder or softer.  
 
For example, privatisation in Malaysia was not so successful because the political goal 
deterred rational selection of beneficiary private companies which were not competent 
but had close connections with politicians. Poor management of GLCs made the 
Malaysian government provide financial support or renationalise some of them. Similarly, 
the Vietnamese state supports big SOEs either explicitly and implicitly to keep the goal 
that the state sector plays the leading role, which has made budget constraints on them 
softer. 
 
Another example is found in running public holding corporations. All the three countries 
set up a state-owned holding corporation – Temasek in Singapore, PNB and PERNAS in 
Malaysia and the SCIC in Vietnam – but supervising the running of state capital is not 
tight both in Malaysia and Vietnam. We examine that the government sends two 
ministers as representatives of the state to Temasek to monitor the running of state capital, 
which contributes to improve the portfolio performance of Temasek. Similarly, the 
Vietnamese state sends its representatives to equitised SOEs and they sit in the 
Supervisory Board which has the task of ensuring that the state’s assets are being used in 
a proper way and according to the charter of the firm.135  
 
Nonetheless, the analysis of the interview suggests that the actual operation of the 
Supervisory Board suggests that it is relatively powerless and plays a passive role in 
monitoring the enterprise. If we look at how outside members become members of the 
Supervisory Board, this increases the doubt that the Board can be an effective monitoring 
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 The Supervisory Board operates independently of the Board of Management and the 
Board of Directors. Generally, the Supervisory Board is composed of three members 
including members from outside the firm. In principle, a member from outside is sent by the 
governing organs of the firm such as local People’s Committees or General Corporations. 
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body. The outside members are not appointed by the governing organ but are elected at a 
shareholders’ meeting after being nominated by the governing organ. As an official from 
the Department of Finance of Hai Phong told, “the nominated person must be qualified. 
Otherwise, the nominee cannot be elected. If the company does not accept a nominated 
person then there will be further negotiation with the firm to get the vote for a new 
nominee”. Thus, the outside nominees generally have to be acceptable to the directors and 
senior executives of the enterprise, and this close relationship is unlikely to lead to strict 
monitoring that can embarrass the enterprise. 
 
While a close relationship between the state and businesses deterred monitoring function 
in Vietnam and Malaysia, close connections between the state and the private sector have 
not resulted in a similarly outcome in Singapore. Frequent movements of personnel from 
the government to private businesses and GLCs and vice versa have resulted in holding 
multiple positions, which in turn has created an unclear border between the two sectors. It 
is assumed to have a non-positive effect on the monitoring problem and make vulnerable 
to corruption but it has not in Singapore, but why? Explanations mentioned in this 
dissertation are ‘Singapore is simply an oddity’, ‘the independence of government and the 
business class’, or ‘people aware the need of running public enterprises on commercial 
and market-based principles’. The second argument is criticised by Hamilton-Hart (2000) 
that actually the distinction between the two sectors are systemically blurred and the third 
argument is not unique to Singapore. People know what is good, but knowing is different 
from doing. One hint suggested by Ghestquiere (2007) is that GLCs have not been used 
for social or employment generation purposes in Singapore. This is still an unanswered 
question. 
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4. State-owned enterprises in Vietnam 
Vietnam has been one of the most dynamic economies in the world for the last two 
decades. It has recorded around seven per cent average annual growth rate in real GDP 
since the economic reform campaign, known as doi moi, was launched in 1986. This is a 
very impressive economic performance given that Vietnam was one of the poorest 
countries in the world in 1990 with 98 US dollars per capita GDP (World Bank 2012: 10). 
Twenty years later, Vietnam became a low-middle-income country in 2009 when it 
earned 1,020 US dollars (USD) per capita income and recorded USD 1,550 Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita in 2012 according to the World Development 
Indicators 2013 (viewed at http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1).136  
 
The economic growth has led to a significant improvement in poverty reduction. 
According to the World Bank and the Human Development Report of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the number of population living on less than one US 
dollar per day decreased from 63 to 13.1 per cent during the period of 1993 and 2008 
(UNDP 2011: 144).137 
 
Vietnam has recorded around 7.8 per cent annual average growth rate over the last twenty 
years (see Figure 1 on p. 138). Only China has shown better performance than Vietnam 
with stability. Some countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR and Malaysia recorded higher 
economic growth rate than Vietnam but they are volatile (see Figure 2 on p. 138). 
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 The World Bank uses gross national income (GNI) which was formerly known as 
gross national product (GNP) to calculate GNI per capita and to group countries based on 
incomes of 2010 measured in US dollars (USD). The figure of a low income country is USD 
1,005 or below, USD 1,006 to USD 3,975 for a lower middle income country, USD 3,976 to 
USD 12,275 for an upper middle income country and USD 12,276 or more for a high income 
country (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications).  
137
 In fact, the criterion the UNDP used is not one US dollar but 1.25 US dollars per 
day. 
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Vietnam’s economic system changed from a planned to a market based type, and this 
change has apparently contributed substantially to its economic growth.138 For 
mainstream neoclassical economists and international organisations following the so-
called Washing Consensus, Vietnam is one of the greatest examples showing that the free 
market mechanism and economic liberalisation are the most critical conditions for 
economic growth. 
 
It is not reasonable to reject the argument of the World Bank and mainstream neoclassical 
economists that the introduction of market mechanism and the economic liberalisation are 
the key factors of the economic growth. As can be seen from Figure 1 (p. 138), important 
economic events related to the economic liberalisation are positively related to the 
economic growth rates. Doi moi was launched in 1986; the price control was abolished in 
1989; the USA lifted its embargo in 1994; and Vietnam became the 150th member country 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 2007. Around these events the 
economic growth rate of Vietnam consistently showed upward movement except after 
accession to the WTO. This does not imply that joining the WTO has negatively affected 
Vietnam’s economy because there were a series of global crises since 2007. 
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 According to the Constitution, Vietnam officially calls its economic system as a 
“socialist-oriented market economy” (Article 15, 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam). 
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Figure 1: Annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product of Vietnam (1985-2012) 
 
Source: World Development Index 2013, accessed at http://data.worldank.org. 
 
Figure 2: Growth rate of selected Southeast Asian economies, 1990-2012 (% per annum) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2013, accessed at http://data.worldank.org.139 
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 The economic growth rate is measured at market prices based on constant local 
currency (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). 
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Over the economic growth, the GDP share of agriculture, forestry and fishery calculated 
based on the amount of value added decreased from 34.7 to 18.4 per cent, that of industry 
and construction increased from 26.8 to 38.3 per cent and that of services increased from 
38.4 to 43.1 per cent between 1986 and 2011. While the industrial sector has grown, its 
GDP share is relatively small compared to that of the service sector. This implies that the 
firms operate in low value-added areas (see Figure 3 on p. 140). The value of exports 
increased annually by an average of twenty-one per cent. The main export items are 
natural resources including crude oil, agro-fishery products and low value-added labour 
intensive products such as shoes, clothes and furniture. 
 
Furthermore, there is no robust evidence that Vietnam has run strategic industrial policy 
such as technology substitution or complementary strategy to catch up with advanced 
technologies and reduce the technology gap. There are many joint-venture companies in 
the automobile, motorbikes and electronics sectors and the Vietnamese parties, in most 
cases, provide land and labour, and deal with legal and administrative issues instead of 
utilising the foreign partners as a channel of technology learning and diffusion (Le Quoc 
Hoi and Pomfret 2011, Nguyen Phuong 2011). 
 
The World Bank emphasises that the exemplary performance of Vietnam is largely 
attributable to the changes in incentives for people since the implementation of doi moi, 
growth of the private sector, devolution of the state and integration into the world 
economy (World Bank 2009: 132-6). Similarly, it is argued that the introduction of the 
market mechanism (Dollar 2002, Vu Quoc Ngu 2003), engagement in international trade 
(including foreign direct investment) (Auffret 2003, Gates 2000, Heo and Nguyen Khanh 
Doanh 2009, Nguyen Tien Dung and Ezaki 2005, Schmidt 2004) and public sector 
reforms (Leung 2010, Thoburn 2009, Tran Thi Bich et al. 2009) are the main sources of 
the success and further market oriented reforms should be followed to achieve sustainable 
economic growth. Vu Quoc Ngu (2002, 2003) argue that SOE reform which aimed at 
140 
 
liberalising SOEs and enhancing the incentive system had positive effects on enhancing 
SOEs’ economic performance by estimating total factor productivity of SOEs which 
accounted for 40.9 per cent of the change in the industrial SOEs output between 1976 and 
1998. 
 
Figure 3: Share of GDP by economic sector in Vietnam, 1986-2012 (per cent share at 1994 
constant price*) 
 
* Statistical Yearbook 2012 uses 2010 price as a base year for the calculation. For the consistency, 
the author converts the data for 2011 based on the 1994 constant price. 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2001, 2005-2013). Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2001b). Vietnam’s Economy during the years of 
doi moi. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
 
 
Whereas the abovementioned studies accept that market mechanism is the most critical 
factor explaining the fast growth of Vietnam, they commonly suggest further reform is 
required to achieve sustainable growth. Their recommendations are to enhance the market 
mechanism further; to reduce the dominance of SOEs; to reform public administration 
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and improve state governance; to increase transparency in the budget system, policy 
decision making and property rights system. 
 
The state sector in Vietnam: small or large? 
Behind of this economic success which seemingly has resulted from economic 
liberalisation, we encounter a contradictory fact that the state sector dominates Vietnam’s 
economy. Since the mid-1980s the share of the non-state sector increased and remained 
stable at around 50 per cent, of which the share of private sector has continuously 
increased up to 25 per cent (see Figure 4, p. 143).140 Meanwhile, the share of the state 
sector has been lowered slightly from 40 to 37 per cent during the period of 1995 and 
2010.141 The Vietnamese economy is still dominated by the state sector. 
 
By the end of 1989, there were 12,297 state firms in operation in Vietnam. Thousands of 
loss making and inefficient SOEs were closed or merged reducing their numbers which 
dropped to 6,264 by the end of 1994. By 2000 this number was down to 5,759 state firms 
of which 3,692 were owned by the local governments and 2,067 were owned by the 
central government. The state restructured 3,183 state firms between 2001 and 2005. 
Among them 2,056 firms were equitised (as defined below); 252 were listed on the stock 
market; 416 were merged with other firms; 181 were dissolved or declared bankrupt. 
These figures account for 82.6 per cent of the total number of state firms targeted by the 
government for restructuring and 74.5 per cent of total state firms planned for equitisation. 
However, the trend towards rationalisation was partially reversed and 175 new SOEs 
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 The proportion of the private businesses within the non-state sector increased from 
18 per cent to 25 per cent during the period of 2002 and 2010. During the same period, the 
share of the household businesses slightly declined from 66 per cent to 63 per cent. 
141
 The slight decline of the state sector’s share in the national economy will be 
questionable if we take into account the fact that the foreign invested sector. Because foreign 
invested sector is composed of 100 per cent foreign invested firms and joint ventures of which 
the domestic partners are mostly SOEs. It implies that the state sector roughly has maintained 
its proportion in the economy despite various economic reform policies. 
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were added at the central level between 2010 and 2011 (VietNamNet news on 14 
November 2005, Dixon 2003, World Bank 2012). 
 
To understand better what the state and the non-state sector refer, it may be worth 
explaining terms used in the official statistics data of Vietnam. The official data published 
by the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam distinguish three types of ownership: 
state, non-state and foreign invested area. 
 
Firms belong to the state sector (Doanh nghiep Nha nuoc) are 1) enterprises with 100 per 
cent of state capital operating according the Enterprise Law and under the control of 
central and local governments; 2) limited companies (cong ty trach nhiem huu han Nha 
nuoc) under the management of central or local governments and 3) joint stock 
companies (cong ty co phan) with domestic capital, of which the state shares more than 
fifty per cent of charter capital. 
 
The non-state sector is often used to refer the ‘private sector’ (kinh te tu nhan), but 
according to the national accounting system of Vietnam the non-state sector actually 
consists of three sub-sectors: collective (kinh te tap the), private (kinh te tu nhan) and 
household (kinh te ca the). 
 
Firms belong to the non-state sector (Doanh nghiep ngoai Nha nuoc) are 1) cooperatives 
(hop tac xa), 2) private enterprises (doanh nghiep tu nhan), 3) collective name companies 
(cong ty hop danh), 4) private limited companies (cong ty trach nhiem huu han tu nhan), 
5) joint stock companies which the state does not hold any charter capital and 6) joint 
stock companies which the state holds less than fifty per cent of charter capital. 
Cooperatives were not include in the category of the non-state sector and recorded in the 
separate section from Statistical Yearbook 2012. 
 
143 
 
The household sector represents businesses which are not recognised as ‘enterprise’ by 
laws and regulations. The GSO of Vietnam defines ‘enterprises’ as “the economic units 
that independently keep business account and acquire its own legal status. They may be 
set up by State Enterprise Law, Cooperative Law, Enterprise Law, Foreign Investment 
Law or by agreements between the government of Viet Nam and foreign countries” 
(Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2011: 190). Finally, the foreign-invested sector includes 
both joint venture enterprises between Vietnam and foreign-invested enterprises and 100 
per cent foreign-invested enterprises. 
 
Figure 4: Share of GDP by type of ownership in Vietnam, 1986-2012 (at 1994 constant price) 
 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2001, 2005-2013), Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2001). Statistical Data of Vietnam, Socio-Economy 
1975-2000. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
3. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2007). Statistical Data of Vietnam, Doi moi 20 
Years. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, the state sector in Vietnam has accounted for around 38 per cent of 
real GDP with little variation for the last two decades.142 Is this big or small? The World 
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 The General Statistics Office calculates GDP based on value-added, but also it 
publishes GDP data calculated based on the final expenditure approach. See, for example, 
pages 138-140 of Statistical Yearbook 2012. 
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Bank in its 1995 report, Bureaucrats in Business, measured that the weighted average 
share of the SOEs in economic activity in the then forty developing countries was 10.7 
per cent and that of Asian countries in the sample was 10.5 per cent (World Bank 1995: 
268, Table A.1). 
 
For instance, South Korea recorded 9.9 per cent, Indonesia 14.8 per cent, Malaysia 17 per 
cent, Thailand 12.1 per cent and Philippines 1.7 per cent. The state sector in Vietnam is 
quite large compared to those Asian developing countries. Even a comparison with 
Taiwan, a country which achieved economic growth with an active state intervention 
confirms that the state sector in Vietnam is large. The state sector’s share in Taiwan was 
14.7 per cent in 1951, 15.9 per cent in 1961, 16.7 per cent in 1971 and 16 per cent in 
1981 (Chang 2007: 11) and the weighted average was 12.1 per cent between 1978 and 
1991 (World Bank ibid., 269. Table A.1). 
 
Singapore, a country which is known as has a large state sector, was likely to have a 
larger state sector than Vietnam does. Unfortunately, the World Bank report cited above 
did not include the measurement of Singapore but the Ministry of Finance of Singapore 
estimated that the public sector and government-linked companies (GLC’s) account for 
about 60% of Singaporean GDP in 1993 (Singapore Ministry of Finance 1993). The share 
of the public sector declines in 1990s in Singapore. In 2001, the Department of Statistics 
of Singapore estimated that GLCs accounted for 12.9% of GDP in 1998 and the non-GLC 
public sector accounted for another 8.9% (Singapore Department of Statistics 2001). 
Therefore, the present share of the SOEs sector in the Vietnamese economy is highest in 
the region. 
 
On the other hand, the comparison with the former Soviet bloc countries and China 
returns a very different result. The state sector in Vietnam has not been large. Before the 
official reunification in 1976, Vietnam ran the socialist economic system in North 
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Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) only and the state sector, called socialist 
sector (see Table 15, p. 145), accounted for 90 per cent. After the war against French 
ended in 1954, the development plan was implemented and by the end of 1960, 100 per 
cent of industrial establishments, 99.4 per cent of commercial establishments and 99 per 
cent of transportation facilities were nationalised and transformed into SOEs (Vu Quoc 
Ngu 2002: 3). 
 
The size of the state sector, however, plunged to 27 per cent when South Vietnam’s 
economy was incorporated and it increased up to 40 per cent in the mid-1990s and has 
remained stable (see Table 16, p. 146). The state sector in China was significantly large 
compared to Vietnam when doi moi launched (see Table 17, p. 146). Nonetheless, 
following the significant decline of the state sector in both in China and Vietnam over the 
course of reform, the two countries have shown a similar level of the state sector share. 
 
Table 15: Structure of economic sectors in North Vietnam, 1957-1975 (per cent) 
 
Socialist sector  
Private, 
individual sector 
Year 
State-owned and 
state-capitalist 
Collectivised and 
cooperative 
Total 
 
1957 17.9 0.2 18.1 71.9 
1960 37.8 28.6 66.4 33.6 
1965 44.6 45.4 90.0 10.0 
1970 40.3 51.1 91.4 8.6 
1975 51.7 39.9 91.6 8.4 
Source: Tran Van Tho et al. (2000), cited in Le Dang Doanh (2009: 169). 
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Table 16: Structure of economic sectors in unified Vietnam, 1976-1995 (per cent) 
Year State sector Non-state sector 
1976 27.7 72.3 
1980 19.8 80.2 
1985 28.0 72.0 
1990 31.8 68.2 
1995 40.2 59.8 
Source: Dang Phong (2004), cited in Le Dang Doanh (2009: 174). 
 
 
Table 17: GDP share by ownership in China, 1978-2001 (per cent) 
Year State Collective enterprises Private 
1978 77.6 22.4 0.0 
1980 76.0 23.5 0.5 
1985 64.9 32.1 3.0 
1990 47.7 18.5 33.8 
1995 42.1 20.2 37.7 
1997 38.4 22.1 39.5 
2000 37.3 16.5 46.2 
2001 37.9 14.6 47.5 
Source: Wu (2009: 35, 39)   
 
 
Are SOEs inefficient? Input to and output of SOEs 
Like SOEs in other countries, SOEs in Vietnam run their businesses and also fulfil some 
social goals. What we often hear is that they make a loss and operate inefficiently. Can 
poorly performing SOEs be compatible with 6.5 per cent average annual economic 
growth for more than twenty years? The largest contributors to the last twenty-year’s 
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economic growth in Vietnam were SOEs although the share of their number in the 
economy decreased rapidly from 13.6 per cent to 0.9 per cent over the last ten years. In 
spite of this fact, the World Bank attributes the economic growth of Vietnam to the 
introduction of market mechanism and economic liberalisation. Therefore, it recommends 
the Vietnamese government to reduce the significance of the state sector to achieve 
‘sustainable’ economic growth in its Vietnam Development Report 2012, subtitled 
‘Market economy for a middle-income Vietnam’ (World Bank 2012). 
 
The experience of the former socialist economies in Eastern Europe makes us question 
back whether the dominance of the state sector is really a matter (see Figure 5, p. 148). 
The examination of the economic performance of the former Eastern European transition 
countries in which the introduction of market mechanism and economic liberalisation 
were implemented much more intensively compared to Vietnam and China make the 
logic of the World Bank become unconvincing. The collapse of the former Soviet bloc 
has naturally given rise to the question of a mode of transition. Orthodox economists 
suggested ‘shock therapy’ with the belief that the transition should be completed as quick 
as possible to benefit from the market economy and democratic political system143.  
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 These are summarised as “… emphasizes fiscal rectitude, competitive exchange 
rates, privatization, undistorted market prices, and limited intervention (save for encouraging 
exports, education and infrastructure)” (Rodrik 1996: 9). 
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Figure 5: The growth rate in selected transition economies, 1990-2012 (per cent per annum) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2013, accessed at http://data.worldank.org. 
 
 
As Figure 5 shows the economic performances of the former Easter European countries 
have significantly different from those of China and Vietnam between 1990 and 2012, 
especially for the first ten years after the reform. According to Popov (2007), until 1999 
no Eastern European country in his twenty-four sample countries recovered the level of 
GDP they recorded in 1989 and eleven countries were managed to reach this level in 
2004.144 
 
According to the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam, the number of SOEs has declined by 43 
per cent from 5,759 to 3,239 between 2000 and 2012 of which that the number of central 
                                                     
144 The sample countries in Popov (2007) are Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Uzbekistan, 
Czech Republic, Turkmenistan, Estonia, Belarus, ,Kazakhstan, Romania, Armenia, Croatia, 
Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova. 
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SOEs declined 13 per cent while that of local SOEs 60 per cent (see Table 18, p. 151).145 
If we look at the number of SOEs in the context of the whole Vietnamese economy, the 
share of SOEs declined from 13.6 to 0.93 per cent during the same period. On the other 
hand, the share of domestic non-state enterprises increased from 82.9 to 96.2 per cent and 
that of foreign invested firms declined from 3.6 to 2.8 per cent during the same period 
because of the rapid decline in the number of joint venture companies (see Table 19, p. 
152). 
 
What is the significance of this less-than-one per cent-sharing state sector in the economy? 
The GDP share of the state sector has consistently maintained around 40 per cent over the 
last thirty years although it fell to 35 per cent recently (see Figure 4, p. 143). Also the 
increase of the number of non-state enterprises does not necessarily mean the non-state 
sector has grown significantly. The GDP share of the non-state sector steadily remains 
around 50 per cent. The sector showing a significant change is the foreign-invested sector. 
The GDP share of this sector increase nearly zero to 13 per cent. While the number of 
SOEs dramatically decreased their dominance has not changed. SOEs are large in terms 
of the size of employees and capital (see Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8, p. 150). 
  
                                                     
145
 Many of enterprises data displayed in this chapter available from 2000 only. Some 
enterprise data available before 2000 are number of enterprises by ownership type, by 
province etc. in Vietnam Statistical Data in the 20
th
 Century published by the General Statistic 
Office of Vietnam in 2004. This is why the time span of many of demonstrated data is last 12 
years. 
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Figure 6: Number of employees in the state sector (biennial, 2001-2011) 
 
Figure 7: Number of employees in the non-state sector (biennial, 2001-2011) 
 
 
Figure 8: Number of employees in the foreign-invested sector (biennial, 2001-2011) 
 
Sources: 
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2013). Development of Vietnam Enterprises in the 
period of 2006-2011. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010). Enterprises in Vietnam at the Beginning of 
Century 21. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
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We may argue that the partial privatisation of SOEs, called equitisation (co phan hoa) in 
Vietnam, can explain the decrease in the number of SOEs. It is true that the number of 
joint-stock companies (JSCs) having state capital increased by 1,256 from 305 to 1761 
between 2000 and 2012. During the same period, the number of SOEs decreased by 2,494 
(see Table 18 below). Reminding that SOEs include JSCs having state capital more than 
50 per cent, the rest 1,238 SOEs have been restructured from 100 per cent state-owned to 
more than 50 per cent state-owned enterprises through the equitisation. 
 
Table 18: Number of SOEs in Vietnam, 2000-2012 
Year State enterprise (total) Central Local 
2000 5,759 2,067 3,692 
2001 5,355 1,997 3,358 
2002 5,363 2,052 3,311 
2003 4,845 1,898 2,947 
2004 4,597 1,968 2,629 
2005 4,086 1,825 2,261 
2006 3,706 1,744 1,962 
2007 3,494 1,719 1,775 
2008 3,328 1,669 1,659 
2009 3,364 1,805 1,559 
2010 3,283 1,777 1,506 
2011 3,265 1,797 1,468 
2012 3,239 1,792 1,447 
Change -2,494 (43.3%) -270 (13.1%) -2,224 (60.2%) 
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
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Figure 9: Share of employees of enterprises by ownership (2000-2012) 
 
Sources: General Statistics Office Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
 
How much resources these SOEs have consumed in their business operation while the 
number of SOEs declined largely and the share of its number fell below 1 per cent over 
the reform and equitisation? 
 
Labour 
Figure 9 above shows that share of workers employed in SOEs has largely decreased 
from 59 per cent in 2000 to 14.5 per cent in 2012 due to the state sector reform, which 
decreased the number of employees by 23 per cent from 2 million in 2000 to 1.6 million 
in 2012. This sharp decrease of the share of employees is due to surge of the number of 
workers employed in the non-state sector. It increased by 570 per cent from one million 
in 2000 to 6.7 million in 2012. The majority of them were hired by private limited 
liabilities and JSCs having no state capital. In 2012, for example, while the non-state 
sector’s employment accounted for 60.97 per cent as a while, the number workers 
employed in the two groups recorded 51.7 per cent which was equivalent to 84.8 per cent 
of total non-state sector employment. 
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It is frequently attacked that the share of employees in SOEs is small compared to its size 
(for example, Matheson 2013, World Bank 2012). However, this criticism is unfair. First 
of all, the organisations which criticise that the growth of employment in the state sector 
is slower than the private sector have recommended reforming SOEs by decreasing their 
dominance. This is no fair. Secondly, given that the number of SOEs accounts for just 
below one per cent in the economy, nearly 15 per cent of employment cannot be 
considered as an indicator showing the weakness of SOEs in maintain employment. If we 
calculate the number of workers per enterprise, SOEs hire the largest number of workers 
per enterprise while the non-state sector hires incomparably small number of workers 
except JSCs having state capital (see Table 20 below). Pham Quang Ngoc and Mohnen 
(2012: 22) argue that the privatisation has not contributed to increase welfare in terms of 
creating more jobs but state sector has contributed to maintain employment. 
 
Table 20: Number of employees per enterprise (biennial, 2000-2012) 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
TOTAL   84 74 63 51 40 35 32 
SOEs 363 421 490 513 518 514 496 
Central 630 704 771 787 780 733 665 
Local 213 246 279 268 255 257 287 
Non-state 30 31 29 27 24 22 20 
Private 12 14 14 13 12 13 11 
Private Limited Co. 49 39 34 27 22 19 16 
JSCs having state capital 203 259 226 270 276 295 270 
JSCs having no state capital 96 62 44 41 36 32 31 
Foreign invested 267 299 331 343 325 297 303 
Sources: General Statistics Office Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
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Capital 
A similar pattern to the number of employees is found in regard to both working capital 
and fixed capital and long-term investment (see Figure 10 and Figure 11, p. 156). The 
share of working capital used by SOEs in the economy decreased from 67 per cent in 
2000 to 32 per cent in 2012 while that used by the enterprises in the non-state sector 
increased from 9.8 per cent to 50.8 during the same period. The majority of increase of 
working capital used in the non-state sector occurred in both private limited companies 
and JSCs having no state capital. 
 
While the proportion absorbed by the state sector has declined, the amount of 
government-subsidised credit to SOEs which includes ODA on-lending via Vietnam 
Development Bank, other credit of Vietnam Development Bank and external borrowing 
has risen sharply from VND 40 trillion in 2001 to VND 275 trillion in 2011 which 
accounts from 6 per cent and 11 per cent of GDP respectively (Matheson 2013). 
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Figure 10: Share of working capital of enterprises by ownership (2000-2012)146 
 
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
 
Figure 11: Share of fixed assets and long-term investment of enterprises by ownership 
(2000-2012) 
 
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
 
                                                     
146
 The Vietnamese term for this data is “vốn sản xuất kinh doanh” and its translation 
in English in the Statistical Year Book is just “capital” (see page 133 of the Statistical Year 
Book 2005 for example). The literal translation of “vốn sản xuất kinh doanh” is business 
capital which is used to refer to ‘working capital’ in Vietnam. In international context, this 
refers short-term financial capital which is used for the running of business. Accordingly, 
there is a separate section showing “long-term investment” statistics in the Statistical Year 
Book. 
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The fixed of asset held by SOEs and their long-term investment account for 55.8 per cent 
in 2000 while those of the non-state sector recorded 8.2 per cent only. The decline in this 
indicator is not as discernible as in the case of working capital but the share of SOEs 
declined to 41 per cent in 2012 while that of the non-state sector increased to 40 per cent 
in the same year after it reached the peak at 47.6 per cent in 2010. The size of the fixed 
asset and long-term investment in the state sector and in the foreign-invested sector 
increased by 10 times and by 8 times each between 2010 and 2012 while it surged 71.5 
times in the non-state sector during the same period. Particularly, JSCs having no state 
capital recorded 376 times increase for this indicator. 
 
Table 21: Amount of working capital used per enterprise (biennial, 2000-2012, billion VND) 
 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
TOTAL   23.6 21.5 21.4 23.1 29.8 36.7 43.8 
SOEs 116.4 160.1 245.6 425.2 824.2 1,063.8 1,515.4 
Central 279.6 357.7 492.3 796.3 1,469.5 1,795.7 2,491.1 
Local 25.0 37.6 60.9 95.4 175.0 200.3 307.0 
Non-state 2.8 3.7 5.0 6.9 12.2 19.6 23.1 
Private 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.2 3.2 6.7 6.2 
Private Limited Co. 4.3 4.2 5.0 5.7 7.7 12.7 12.6 
JSCs having state 
capital 
34.2 70.2 94.5 120.5 259.7 474.6 582.0 
JSCs having no state 
capital 
43.6 11.8 12.3 15.5 29.6 40.5 51.0 
Foreign invested 150.7 126.1 131.4 143.3 176.6 232.6 286.3 
Sources: General Statistics Office Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
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Table 22: Amount of fixed capital and long-term investment per enterprise (biennial, 2000-
2012, billion VND) 
 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
TOTAL   9.7 8.8 8.1 10.9 13.7 15.5 17.6 
SOEs 39.9 57.6 78.3 214.3 402.8 487.9 770.9 
Central 89.7 121.8 143.6 399.2 718.7 813.3 1,269.8 
Local 12.0 17.9 29.4 49.9 84.9 103.9 152.9 
Non-state 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.4 4.9 7.7 7.2 
Private 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.2 3.2 6.7 6.2 
Private Limited Co. 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.1 3.1 5.4 4.0 
JSCs having state 
capital 
9.7 17.8 26.0 34.1 84.5 104.9 136.3 
JSCs having no state 
capital 
7.4 3.6 3.7 5.8 13.0 17.0 17.2 
Foreign invested 97.0 73.9 75.2 79.9 91.6 106.2 131.0 
Sources: General Statistics Office Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
 
Per enterprise data show that SOEs heavily use capital or they operate in capital-intensive 
businesses (see Table 21 and Table 22 above). Working capital spent by an SOE was 
VND 1,515 billion while a non-state enterprise spent VND 23 billion in 2012, and the 
amount of fixed capital and long-term investment of an SOE was 1,269 billion whereas a 
non-state enterprises’ fixed capital and long-term investment reached just 7.2 billion. One 
of remarkable note is that the amount of fixed capital consumed by a JSC having state 
capital was very large given that the number of JSCs having state capital is handful (see 
Table 19, p. 152). It was VND 136 billion in 2012 which was even larger than the amount 
consumed by a local SOE. This implies that the dominance of state capital still continues 
even after partial privatisation.  
 
159 
 
The capital equipment ratio also confirms that the state sector is highly capital-intensive 
compared to other sectors including the foreign-invested sector (see Figure 12 below). 
The capital equipment ratio in the state sector outpaced since 2005. Particularly, the 
capitation equipment ratio in central SOEs recorded 1.9 in 2012 while that in local SOEs 
was just 0.53 in the same year which was very close to the average of the economy. 
 
However, the productivity of this capital intensive state sector has been questioned. For 
example, Dapice (2003: 5) argues that “there has been a growing share of total investment 
being directed by the public sector. If relatively inefficient infrastructure and poorly 
chosen heavy industry account for a larger share of capital formation, it would not be 
surprising if this were reflected in higher capital “requirements” to produce an equal 
increment of growth”. 
 
Figure 12: Capital equipment ratio per work (2000-2012) 
 
Sources: General Statistics Office Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
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Net turnover 
We have examined that the state sector consumes large amount of resources. Does it 
output commensurate with its input consumption? Net turnover and profit rate data 
indicate that we may have exaggerated the inefficiency of the Vietnamese state. 
 
The share of net turnover recorded by SOEs declined from 55 per cent to 26.3 per cent 
between 2000 and 2012 and that of the non-state enterprises increased from 25 per cent to 
52 per cent during the same period (see Figure 13, p. 161). Nonetheless, the amount of 
net turnover per work reveals that the state sector outperforms both the non-state and the 
foreign-invested sector. While each worker contributes VND 1.8 billion in the state sector, 
a worker in the non-state sector and in the foreign-invested sector does VND 0.85 billion 
and VND 0.9 billion each (see Figure 14, p. 161). 
 
Profit 
How many SOEs have performed badly? There has also been a bad perception that SOEs 
are not profitable. For examples, it was reported that statistics from Ministry of Finance 
shows that three fifths of SOEs were unprofitable as of the end of 1997 (World Bank 
1998: 9); for 1999 only 40 per cent of SOEs can make profits (Lao Dong newspaper 23 
May 2000 (cited in Vu Quoc Ngu 2002: 9).  
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Figure 13: Share of net turnover of enterprises by ownership (2000-2012)147 
 
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
 
Figure 14: Net turnover per worker (2000-2012, billion VND) 
 
Sources: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
 
                                                     
147
 Net turnover is defined as the “total income of enterprise gained by selling its 
products or services after subtracting taxes (special selling tax, export tax, value added tax by 
method of payable direct) and other reduction (discounting, reducing selling price, returning 
goods). Net turnover does not include: (1) Turnover gaining by financial activity (except 
lending asset with its controller); (2) Turnover gaining by special activity such as: selling off 
asset, getting money due to partner violates contract, getting money from bad debt that was 
processed…” (Statistical Yearbook 2005: 114). 
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Nonetheless, the profitability has improved since 2000. The number of gainers and losers 
reveals that the proportion of SOEs making a profit has been around 80 per cent.148 The 
performance of the non-state enterprises has worsened over the last twelve years (see 
Figure 15, p. 163). It may be useful to calculate the ratio of the gross amount of gain to 
that of loss because it can measure whether the profit which SOEs make is sensibly large 
or negligible compared to the amount of loss (see Figure 16, p. 163). The ratios ranged 
from 6 to 13 if we ignore the two years (2007 and 2009) in which the ratio was extremely 
high. The ratios in the non-state sector recorded below 5 except 2007 and those in the 
foreign-invested sector varied from 3 to 10. The size of profits in the state sector has 
fairly been large compared to the non-state and the foreign-invested sector. 
 
However, the ratio of ‘average’ gain to ‘average’ loss which is calculated by diving total 
gain (loss) by the number of gainers (losers) indicates a different trend (see Figure 17, p. 
164). The ratios in the foreign-invested sector which ranged between 2.5 to 9 have 
outperformed the other two sectors. The ratios in the state sector varied from 1 to 2.3 if 
we ignore the extremely high ratio in 2007 and 2009. The data implies that the size of 
loss made by the 20 per cent loss-making SOEs is significantly large compared to loss-
making enterprises in the non-state and the foreign-invested sector. It is an exaggeration 
to say that SOEs are inefficient in general, but it also true that the loss-making SOEs in 
Vietnam had made a large amount of loss. Matheson (2013) demonstrates that SOEs 
exhibit a wide range of profitability. Viettel (telecommunication), Vinarubber (rubber), 
Vinacomin (coal and mining) are highly profitable with low debt while EVN (electricity), 
Saigon Construction and Water Construction suffer loss after loss. 
  
                                                     
148
 See Table A3 (p. 238) in Appendix for full information of gainers and losers for the 
period 2000-2002 and 2005-2011. 
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Figure 15: Proportion of profit making enterprises (2000-2002, 2005-2011, per cent) 
 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2013), Development of Vietnam Enterprises in the 
Period of 2006-2011. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2009), The Situation of Enterprises through the 
Results of Surveys Conducted in 2006, 2007, 2008. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
3. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2004), Industrial Complete Survey 2001-2003. Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
 
Figure 16: Ratio of gross gain to gross loss (2000-2002, 2005-2011) 
 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2013), Development of Vietnam Enterprises in the 
Period of 2006-2011. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2009), The Situation of Enterprises through the 
Results of Surveys Conducted in 2006, 2007, 2008. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
3. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2004), Industrial Complete Survey 2001-2003. Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
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Figure 17: Ratio of average gain to average loss (2000-2002, 2005-2011) 
 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2013), Development of Vietnam Enterprises in the 
Period of 2006-2011. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2009), The Situation of Enterprises through the 
Results of Surveys Conducted in 2006, 2007, 2008. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
3. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2004), Industrial Complete Survey 2001-2003. Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
 
 
In regard to profit before tax, the foreign-invested sector outperformed until 2008 but the 
state sector took over the place from 2009 and the gap between of the two sectors has 
widened (see Figure 18, p. 165). In 2012, each worker in the state sector created the profit 
of VND 106 million while each worker in the non-state sector and in the foreign-invested 
sector did VND 10 million and VND 44 million respectively. 
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Figure 18: Profit before tax per worker (2000-2012, billion VND) 
 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2012 and 2013). Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010), Enterprises in Vietnam at the Beginning of 
Century 21. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
 
Figure 19: Rate of profit of enterprises by ownership (2000-2012)149 
 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2012 and 2013). Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010), Enterprises in Vietnam at the Beginning of 
Century 21. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
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 The profit rate used here is ‘profit rate per net turnover’, which is the ratio “between 
total profit before tax gained by production, financial activities and other activities of 
enterprises during a year and total turnover gained by selling goods, service and other income 
of enterprises during a year” (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2010: 26). 
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The rate of profit per net turnover confirms that the state sector has improved. The rate 
profit was considerably high in the foreign-invested sector compared to the domestic 
sector. In 2000 the profit rate in the foreign-invested sector was 13.3 per cent while that 
in the state sector was around 4 per cent only. However, the rate of profit in the foreign-
invested sector aggravated continuously whereas that in the state sector gradually 
improved. Finally they switched their position in 2012 when the state sector recorded 5.6 
per cent of profit rate and the foreign-invested sector did 4.8 per cent of profit rate. The 
rate of profit in the non-state sector has been sluggish with some variation. It fluctuated 
between 2007 and 2010 but shows a tendency of decline over the last two years. The rate 
of profit was 1.15 per cent in 2012 while it was one per cent in 2000. 
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5. Methodology 
The majority of qualitative primary data used in this dissertation were collected by the 
author during his stay in Vietnam from April to November 2005. The field interviews 
with SOEs and local officials were conducted twice in Hai Phong City150, the largest 
northern seaport city, in August 2005 and October 2005.151 The interview trips were 
funded and organised by UNDP Vietnam. 
 
The interviews were conducted to confirm the result of Gainsborough (2005). In order to 
collect the information from SOEs operating in a local area, we had to pick a city which 
shows decent economic dynamism and also has enough number of SOEs. Hai Phong City 
met these conditions. Furthermore, it was the closet and the largest local city near Hanoi 
where the working station of the research team, UNDP Vietnam, was located. It was 
relatively easier not only for the research team but also for UNDP Vietnam to arrange 
several-days interview trips to Hai Phong City which is in two and a half hours driving 
distance from Hanoi.152 
 
While the interviews were conducted in two trips, the number of interviewed SOEs was 
twenty-two which might look small and the location was limited to one city. One problem 
                                                     
150
 Hai Phong City is about 120 km away from Hanoi towards Eastern coast line of 
Vietnam. It has around 1.8 million people within the area of 1,526 km
2
 with its fourteen 
districts. It is one of the most dynamic economic zones in northern Vietnam following the 
Hanoi region. GDP per capita was USD962.2 in 2004 while that of the national average was 
USD514 in the same year. The average annual growth rate between 2000 and 2004 was 10 
per cent. Over the same period, the industrial sector contributed 36.2 per cent to GDP, the 
service sector 49.5 per cent and the agriculture, forest and fishery 14.2 per cent. The state 
sector shares 38 per cent of output whereas the non-state sector and the foreign sector 44 per 
cent and 16 per cent of output share respectively (Hai Phong Statistics Office 2005). 
151
 The research team was comprised of Scott Cheshier and Jago Penrose and the 
author himself with Vietnamese researchers, Mr. Bui Truong Giang and Ms. Nguyen Thi 
Thanh Nga. 
152
 It also might be easier for UNDP Vietnam to arrange visits to SOEs in Hai Phong 
City because of its friend relationship to the Vietnam Association of Social Science (VASS) 
which is an implicit helper of the interview trips. 
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which is common in every research project was that the team encountered financial and 
time constraints. Second difficulty resulted from the fact that the interviews were 
conducted with ‘state-owned’ enterprises. SOEs are government organs and the 
arrangement of visits entailed considerable difficulty. These two facts can explain why 
the interview was conducted in one local city with limited number of SOEs. 
 
Data collection 
The interviews were conducted in English by the research team with the help of a 
Vietnamese researcher who took the role of an interpreter. Some interviewees were able 
to speak English or bring their own interpreters. The questionnaire which drew on the set 
used in Gainsborough (2005) was sent to listed SOEs in advance and collected on actual 
visits. Returned questionnaires were translated into English. 
 
The questionnaire for SOEs was designed to capture the information on five areas.153 
i) the general business environment (section A and B); 
ii) the relationship between SOEs and the local authorities and how it evolved 
(section C); 
iii) the finance such as access to bank loans and sources of investment (section D); 
iv) the autonomy of SOEs in decision makings and the perception of bailouts by the 
state (section E); and 
v) closing questions about the personal background of the interviewees (section F). 
 
The questionnaire for local officials was sent in advance as well. It was structured in such 
a way as to gain an understanding of the relationship between the local authorities and 
SOEs. Questions asked whether the local authorities were entwined with daily 
management of SOEs including business plans and personnel issues and how the relations 
                                                     
153
 For a sample questionnaire see Table A5 (page 240) in Appendix. 
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have changed along with economic reform.154 The research team had interviews with 
several officials from three local departments (the Department of Industry, the 
Department of Planning and Investment and the Department of Finance) during the same 
fieldwork trips. 
 
In addition to the qualitative data from the interviews, the author collected Vietnamese 
legal documents translated into English with the help of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Vietnam. Some of them are barely accessible from abroad. 
 
Apart from the data collected in Vietnam, the author gathered secondary data from the 
translated Vietnamese media which was held in the library of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS). These include the BBC Summary of World Broadcast (BBC 
SWB), Foreign Broadcast Information Services Daily Report (FBIS), Joint Publications 
Research Services Report (JPRS) and Vietnam Couriers. 
 
Selection of SOEs 
There were 4,596 SOEs of which 1,967 were centrally-managed SOEs and 2,629 were 
locally-managed SOEs at the national level as of 2004. In Hai Phong, there were 199 
SOEs of which 84 were centrally-managed SOEs and 115 were locally-managed SOEs. 
The number of SOEs accounts for around 4 per cent The state sector in Hai Phong 
contributed 50 per cent of local domestic output, hired 14 per cent of employees and its 
contribution to the local budget was 32.3 per cent of domestic revenue as of 2004 (Hai 
Phong Statistics Office 2005). The twenty-two SOEs were selected from the Enterprise 
Survey 2004 published by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) in consultation 
with local officials because it was required to get a kind of approval in advance from the 
local authority before commencing the interviews. The consultation was done with local 
                                                     
154
 For a sample questionnaire, see Table A6 (page 247) in Appendix. 
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officials from the Department of Planning and Investment of Hai Phong City. However, 
this does not necessarily lead to a presumption that the local government intentional 
picked up sample SOEs. 
 
Among these twenty-two SOEs, thirteen firms were locally managed SOEs (doanh 
nghiep nha nuoc tai dia phuong) of which three were equitised to become joint stock 
companies (cong ty co phan); nine firms were centrally managed SOEs (doanh nghiep 
nha nuoc trung uong) of which one was equitised SOE. Interviewed SOEs were scattered 
in various sectors but no firm conducted business in the agriculture, forestry or fishery 
sector (see Table 23, p. 171). Most of the interviewees were either the director or the vice 
director or a member of the board of management of interviewed SOEs. As of June 2014, 
none of the interviewed SOEs closed and seven of them were equitised of which three 
were locally-managed SOEs and four were centrally managed SOEs (see Table 26, p. 173 
for more detail information on interviewed SOEs). 
 
The national average pattern that central SOEs are bigger than local SOEs, which we 
examined in Chapter 4 found in Hai Phong as well. Average size of capital was VND 
306.2 billion (equivalent to USD 19.6 million), average turnover was VND 342.3 billion 
(equivalent to USD 21.9 million) and average number of workers employed was 1,650. In 
terms of capital size and the number of workers most of them belong to the category of 
‘large’ firms. In general, central SOEs are bigger than local SOEs on average in terms of 
size of capital and the number of workers. Nonetheless, two local SOEs producing 
footwear hired 2,500 and 9,972 worker each. 
 
Following the Vietnamese regulation, four SOEs fall into small enterprises, seven into 
medium and nine into large in terms of the size of capital as shown in Table 24 (p. 172). 
While only one central SOE was an SME, ten local SOEs were SMEs. In terms of the 
number of employees, two SOEs fall into small enterprises, one into medium and 
171 
 
eighteen into large. No central SOE was in SME but three local SOEs were SMEs in 
terms of the number of workers. 
 
Table 23: Summary of interviewed SOEs 
Company Local / Central* Business area 
Capital 
(bil. VND) 
Turnover 
(bil. VND) 
No. of 
workers 
A Local Utility 473 105.4 785 
B Local/JSC Construction 45 18 395 
C Local Steel 70 0.2 70 
D Local Design and construction 40 89 205 
E Local Tobacco 91 453 134 
F Local Export/Import 307 559 856 
G Local/JSC Engineering 85 90 203 
H Local Construction 5 30 315 
I Local/JSC Construction 20 100 300 
J Local/JSC Construction 19.9 90 800 
K Local Utility 49 35 203 
L Local Footwear 62 70 2,500 
M Local Footwear 112.8 160 9,972 
N Central Shipbuilding 118.9 320 550 
O Central Shipbuilding 76.8 652.7 2,144 
P Central/JSC Machinery assembly 9 50 450 
Q Central Transportation 550 600 434 
R Central Waterway maintenance 383.3 80 570 
S Central Construction 1,370 783 4,412 
T Central Shipping 779 1,375 1,879 
U Central Port 927 509 5,666 
  Average (Local) 85.7 138.4 1287.5 
  Average (Central) 526.7 546.2 2013.1 
  Average 306.2 342.3 1650.3 
* Local / central denotes locally or centrally-managed SOEs, and JSC does equitised SOEs. 
  
172 
 
Equitised firms were relatively small compared to the sample average both in terms of the 
size of capital and turnover. The former ranged from VND 9 billion to 35 and the latter 
ranged from VND 18 billion to 90. The number of workers hired in equitised firms 
ranged from 203 to 800, which was below the sample average as well. We may interpret 
that this observation is consistent with Vietnam’s policy in which the state keeps big 
businesses and let go small businesses. 
 
Table 24: Size of interviewed SOEs in terms of capital and employment* 
 Capital (K): billion VND  Labour (L): person 
Small 
(K ≤ 20) 
Central 1 Small 
(10 < L ≤ 200) 
Central 0 
Local 3 Local 2 
Medium 
(20 < K ≤ 100) 
Central 0 Medium 
(200 < L ≤ 300) 
Central 0 
Local 7 Local 1 
Large 
K > 100 
Central 7 Large 
(L > 300) 
Central 8 
Local 2 Local 10 
* The category of small, medium and large is based on the Vietnamese regulation, Decree No. 
56/2009/ND-CP on “assistance to the development of small - and medium-sized enterprises” dated 
30 June 2009. See Table A2 (p. 237) in Appendix for full criteria.155 
 
Table 25: Main sources of investment of interviewed SOEs* 
Source Total Central SOEs Local SOEs 
State budget 5 1 4 
Bank loans 12 5 7 
Own equity 10 5 5 
Employees mobilisation 4 1 3 
Investment Development Fund 4 3 1 
Others** 3 2 1 
* SOEs could choose multiple sources. 
** Including domestic investors and FDI. 
  
 
                                                     
155
 The title in Vietnamese is Nghị định số 56/2009/ND-CP về trợ giúp phát triển 
doanh nghiệp nhỏ và vừa. In fact, Decree No. 56 defines three categories only – micro, small 
and medium. However, the General Statistic Office of Vietnam added the category of a ‘large’ 
firm. 
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Table 26: Information of interviewed SOEs 
Company 
Local / 
Central* 
Ownership 
Change** 
Interviewed 
Questionnaire 
returned 
Business area 
A Local X √ √ Utility 
B Local/JSC X √ √ Construction 
C Local JSC √ √ Steel 
D Local JSC √ 
 
Design and 
construction 
E Local X √ 
 
Tobacco 
F Local JSC √ 
 
Export/Import 
G Local/JSC X √ √ Engineering 
H Local X √ √ Construction 
I Local/JSC X √ √ Construction 
J Local/JSC X √ √ Construction 
K Local X √ √ Utility 
L Local X √ √ Footwear 
M Local X √ √ Footwear 
N Central JSC √ √ Shipbuilding 
O Central X √ √ Shipbuilding 
P Central JSC √ √ 
Machinery 
assembly 
Q Central JSC √ √ Transportation 
R Central X √ √ 
Waterway 
maintenance 
S Central X √ √ Construction 
T Central JSC √ √ Shipping 
U Central JSC √ 
 
Port 
 
*Local / central indicates locally-managed and centrally-managed SOE, JSC means an equitised 
SOE. 
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Table 26: Information of interviewed SOEs (continued; unit: billion VND) 
Company Capital Own equity Bank loans Turnover 
Average 
Investment**** 
No. of 
workers 
A 473 226 n.a.*** 105.4 14 785 
B 45 3.5 40 18 300 395 
C 70 58 n.a. 0.2 35 70 
D 40 3 n.a. 89 n.a. 205 
E 91 30 n.a. 453 n.a. 134 
F 307 75 n.a. 559 n.a. 856 
G 85 4 74 90 4 203 
H 5 1.5 0 30 1 315 
I 20 3 12 100 n.a. 300 
J 19.9 9.9 10 90 n.a. 800 
K 49 26 n.a. 35 n.a. 203 
L 62 0.6 14.2 70 35 2,500 
M 112.8 17.7 62 160 25 9,972 
N 118.9 64.2 35.4 320 15 550 
O 76.8 6.24 0 652.7 207 2,144 
P 9 4.4 18 50 3 450 
Q 550 73 n.a. 600 110 434 
R 383.3 2.7 370 80 13 570 
S 1,370 50.4 725.7 783 n.a. 4,412 
T 779 545 218 1,375 350 1,879 
U 927 594 n.a 509 n.a. 5,666 
Average 
(Local) 
85.7 35.2  138.4  1287.5 
Average 
(Central) 
526.7 167.5  546.2  2013.1 
Average 306.2 101.3  342.3  1650.3 
 
*** Information was not provided by the interviewed firms. 
**** Average annual investment from 2000 to the time of the interview (May or October 2005). 
  
175 
 
6. Budget constraints on state-owned enterprises in Hai Phong 
The analysis in this chapter relies mainly on the data collected from the interviews 
conducted during the fieldwork research. The interviewees from SOEs were mainly 
personnel at the director or vice-director level. We refer to these personnel as ‘directors’. 
The analysis of the interviews produces three findings. Firstly, the method of financial 
support has changed from the direct state budget support to utilise the banks. Secondly, it 
is not evident whether the budget constraints on SOEs have been hardened. Lastly, not all 
firms encountered the same softness of budget constraints: the greater the power of the 
firms, the softer the budget constraints they face. 
 
This dissertation uses the most commonly accepted criteria in the studies on the soft 
budget constraints syndrome to measure the softness of budget constraints on SOEs 
(Gainsborough 2005, Kornai 1998, Kornai et al. 2003). The three criteria are i) whether 
the state provides fiscal subsidies from the budget, ii) whether the state exercises leverage 
to pressure state commercial banks to lend money to SOEs and iii) whether the state 
applies loose taxation rules to SOEs. 
 
6.1. Fiscal subsidies from the state budget 
This is the most direct method of supporting loss-making SOEs. We at first need to 
clarify that the fiscal support means the state bails loss-making SOEs out by paying the 
loss on behalf of SOEs. It is disclosed that support from both central and local state 
budget to loss-making SOEs was suspended de jure as well as de facto in Hai Phong. 
According to an interviewed official from the Department of Finance (DOF) of Hai 
Phong, any support for loss-making SOEs from the state budget ceased formally in 2004. 
Some SOE directors asserted that the support from the state budget stopped even earlier. 
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This observation, however, is not compatible with some of the collected answers from the 
interview. For instance, five SOEs pointed out the state budget as one of main sources of 
investment (see Table 25, p. 172). Also there is a continuous claim that SOEs have 
enjoyed significant support from the state budget. How can we explain this contradiction? 
 
The analysis of the interviews reveals that many SOE directors use the term of ‘fiscal 
support’ to refer to not only bailouts but also public investment expenditures allocated to 
SOEs. The latter, however, is a legitimate payment made to SOEs ‘contracted’ to provide 
products and services. As soon as we view fiscal support broadly by including both 
bailouts and the public investment budget, it becomes complicated whether fiscal support 
has ceased. SOEs in general carry public investment projects as contractors. 
Consequently, budget allocations used to be one of main financial sources while it does 
not necessarily mean bailouts. 
 
Viewing fiscal support broadly make is easier to understand why some criticise that there 
has been a large support from the state budget while others argue that given a limited 
state budget support it was impossible for the state to provide SOEs with sufficient capital 
in order to raise production volumes, strive for higher quality and improve their 
competitiveness (Beresford 2008, Phan Van Tiem and Nguyen Van Thanh 1996). There 
have been allocated public investment expenditures and in many cases SOEs have 
favoured by the state as contractors. In that sense, we cannot deny that SOEs are 
supported by the state by and large. On the other hand, the amount of fiscal support which 
mainly was used for fixed capital formation had decreased dramatically decreased. SOEs 
and some scholar argue that the state has not provided enough support to upgrade the 
facility of SOEs. 
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Lack of state budget and forced hard budget constraints 
The lack of resources in the state budget led to piecemeal injections of small amounts of 
capital across the entire state sector in Vietnam. For instance, the state budget was 
supposed to provide SOEs with thirty per cent of their working capital for implementing 
the business goals assigned to them in accordance with regulations but most SOEs were 
given only five to ten per cent of the required capital (Nguyen Ngoc Tuan et al. 1996). 
 
The analysis of the interviews reaffirms that SOEs face far less support from the state 
budget whose amount becomes smaller. SOE directors felt that the state budget support 
was terminated even earlier than 2004 in which the termination of state budget support 
was formally declared. This suggests that many Western researchers have a 
misperception of the formal support enjoyed by the state sector particularly in the 2000s. 
Majority of interviewed directors of central and local SOEs related that there has been a 
huge gap between the demand for resources from the state budget and the supply of 
resources. Interviewed SOEs confirmed that it had been very hard to access the state 
budget and majority of them had not had any support from the state budget for the last ten 
years. For instance, a director of one central SOE (Firm S) said that  
 
it has always been hard to access resources, with a low rate of 
satisfaction. Only three to eight per cent of the demand for capital (has 
ever been satisfied). Now there is no support from the state budget, 
and there is no capital expenditure being financed by the state budget. 
 
With reference to the tight state budget, we identified two further remarkable facts. Firstly, 
there have been systematic delays in reimbursements from the state budget. Secondly, 
there has been intentional over-servicing156 by local SOEs (the provision of more services 
                                                     
156
 This is a situation that a company allocated by the state 10 km of work resurfacing 
the roads, but this company did 12 km of work without any consultation with the state in the 
expectation of extra payment. 
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than had been contracted for) and postponed payments from the state budget. A couple of 
directors of local SOEs complained that they had to borrow money from banks and pay 
interest on the loans to cover the costs of providing assigned works to the local state 
because the reimbursement from the state budget was delayed for two or even three years. 
This may explain the case of deferred payment by SOEs to firms which made transactions 
with SOEs reported in Gainsborough (2005: 11). The strict operation of the state budget 
expenditure hindered their business activities instead of improving the efficiency in 
public investment expenditure. Furthermore, other trading partners of SOEs are likely to 
be negatively affected as well. 
 
With regard to the observation of intentional over-servicing, we found at least a couple of 
local SOEs that often did more work than was assigned by the plan. The firms 
complained that the state budget was allocated too slowly and resulted in a lack of 
working capital. It sounded as though there was inefficiency in the reimbursement 
procedure but it turned out, from a cross-check with local officials, that a different issue 
was involved here. 
 
While the state budget is limited, these firms provide extra services 
ahead of schedule. We have not asked them to do this because the 
Department (of Finance) is short of budget to allocate, but they just do 
it. If the firms’ extra services are minimal, the Department can pay from 
the contingent fund. But if they do a significant over-service, we have 
to pay them next year or the year after. The firms understand this quite 
well but the planned demand (by the state) is too little for the number 
of workers they maintain. Dynamic firms should have explored other 
jobs. If you fail to get other jobs, one strategy is to provide excess 
services to the state and hope to be paid in the future (emphasis 
added). 
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Thus, some local SOEs intentionally provided excess services to justify more working 
days and payments for their workers. The real reason behind this was that the firms were 
not competent enough to find markets to justify their employment levels.  
 
In fact, many local SOEs mentioned that job creation was one of the most critical 
business obstacles and some of them submitted bids for projects run in other localities – 
not in Hai Phong – where they were treated as private companies and it improved the 
opportunity for them to win projects because there is only a limited opportunity to win 
the competition among SOEs in the region.  
 
This reflects the fact that some directors of local SOEs have not operated their businesses 
according to profit-maximising principles but have pursued objectives inherited from the 
days of state planning. This shows that some directors of local SOEs, twenty years since 
doi moi, still operated in ways inherited from the subsidised period even when they face 
hardened budget constraints.  
 
Selective state budget allocations as a reward 
Some of the SOEs interviewed, nonetheless, claimed that they benefitted from the state 
budget from time to time. It was said that there were irregular supports from the state 
budget to SOEs before 2004. Yet the amount was not so big. To get the state budget, as it 
was not allocated automatically, firms had to apply for the budget allocation with 
proposed plans. A director told that “it was very difficult to get the budget, submission 
may have no result. However, the submitted plans were neither feasibility studies nor 
sophisticated investment projects but were broad draft plans”.  
 
The confusion is that working capital has to be provided to the firm before the production 
process, while the payment for services should count as revenue and not as working 
capital. The SOEs were indeed getting paid for their services but not necessarily in 
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advance and not regularly. With regard to the irregular allocation, the answer from 
officials suggests the state budget faced a chronic shortage of funds. One of the officials 
from the DOF described the situation as follows: 
 
Too many firms were short of capital. So the most stricken units would 
be given a budget allocation first. Then the following year, other firms 
would be given priority. There are many firms to be paid and funds are 
insufficient. For example, if the local budget could only afford one 
billion Vietnamese dongs (equivalent to fifty-five thousand US dollars) 
per year, then each firm would have several million Vietnamese dongs 
(equivalent to few hundred US dollars) which would not help any firm. 
That is why we cannot give every firm an equal share but have to 
concentrate on certain firms and move to others in later years. 
 
The selection by the state has been done according to the annual turnover or profits of the 
firms. The higher profits and sales the firms recorded, the higher the possibility of 
winning the budget support the firms had. It was likely to be a self-reinforcing process.  
 
This pattern is not limited in Hai Phong. Gainsborough (2005: 9) argues that “profitability 
was the key criteria in determining whether companies were able to access capital” in 
four provinces including Hai Phong. For example, a large SOE in Can Tho “stressed the 
importance of profitability, saying that access capital had ‘become easier’ but only for 
companies that do business profitability” (ibid.). 
  
Contrary to general perception that financial support from the state budget is to help loss 
making firms, the support from the state budget in Hai Phong was to increase the size of 
working capital. The allocation from the state budget was to compliment SOEs on their 
good performance. An official interviewed told that “the state does not supply (capital) to 
the losers”. So the state as an investor uses budget support as a reward for well managed 
operation of firms to ‘keeping the big and releasing the small’ (Cheshier et al. 2006: 5-6). 
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Four (out of thirteen) local SOEs interviewed that their firms were allotted capital from 
the local state budget irregularly and the local state budget was one of their main sources 
of investment (see Table 25, p. 172). However, by cross-checking with the DOF of Hai 
Phong, we discovered that there was probably some confusion about what constituted 
capital. The officials of the DOF defined and explained the terms as follows: 
 
In the subsidy period, the state provided SOEs with two types of 
capital: fixed capital and working capital. Fixed capital was used for 
assets such as machines and office buildings, factories and workshops 
whereas working capital was used for input materials. The state 
calculated the amount of working capital allocated to an SOE by using 
a norm – dividing a firm’s annual turnover by the number of production 
cycle(s) over the year.  
Nowadays, there is no longer distinction between fixed and working 
capital. They are commonly called ‘business capital’. SOEs can either 
sell fixed asset which was not allowed in the past to convert into 
business capital or buy fixed asset from their revenues. Firms no 
longer need to depend on the state.  
Now, there is no more support of working capital to SOEs from the 
state budget. If an SOE director spoke (to you) that there was support 
from the state budget it must be the supplement of working capital 
which was done during the 1990s following a regulation to increase the 
size of working capital by maximum thirty per cent of charter capital. 
 
According to the officials interviewed the state budget no longer provides SOEs with 
working capital. It seems SOE directors were confusing general state investment 
expenditure with financial support from the state budget because the explanation of the 
officials was proved to be correct in another interview. The director of a public service 
company (Firm K) said that  
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our company received capital from the local state budget for the 
operation of the company, irregularly. The higher level department (the 
controlling organ) informs us about the availability of the state budget 
and then we ask for the allocation. 
 
Although the director used the term ‘capital for the operation of the company’, the capital 
provided to this company was the allocated budget expenditure for the purchase of the 
service, in this case maintaining telegraph poles and the traffic light system of Hai Phong. 
 
Summary 
Officials and SOE directors unanimously spoke that there is no more fiscal subsidies to 
loss-making SOEs to bail them out. If we include the budget allocation for public 
investment expenditures then the situation turns into a complexity. Some of SOEs, most 
of them are local SOEs, have been supported from the state budget in the form of 
payment for their products and services. In the sense that a proportion of turnover of an 
SOE occurs from transactions with the state, it can be considered that an SOE faces soft 
budget constraints. However, this conclusion should be made with caution. As clarified 
from the interview, the allocated amount is equivalent to few hundred US dollars on 
average in a year and furthermore, due to the lack of state budget, these allocations have 
been done in rotation. It is not straightforward whether this forced hard budget constraints 
have worked positively or negatively to SOEs’ performance. 
 
6.2. Application of taxation rules 
Our aim is not to examine the overall efficacy of the tax authority in Vietnam but to 
investigate the possibility of soft budget constraints operating for SOEs through 
exemptions, reductions or deferred payments of tax as methods of getting indirect 
financial support. SOE directors interviewed confirmed that their firms have not received 
any preferential treatment from the tax authority. We found no counter-evidence through 
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cross-checking with the officials of the DOF which is an organ in charge of taxation. Tax 
rules appeared to be applied according to the relevant rules in Hai Phong.157 
 
In general, the loose application of tax rules by a tax authority provides tax exemptions 
without clear reasons and can allow delays in the payments of tax. No SOE directors in 
our sample provided any evidence that their firms may have received any exemptions by 
the tax authority. In fact, every single director stated that the first thing their firms had to 
do with their revenues was to contribute to the state budget by paying corporate income 
tax at a rate of twenty-five per cent.  
 
Their answers are convincing because the tax contribution of SOEs account for a large 
share of the budget revenue and the state emphasises SOEs function of contributing to the 
state budget (Fforde 2007). As can be seen from Figure 20 (p. 184), the state sector is the 
major (if gradually declining) source of revenue for the state budget. The contribution 
from the state sector to the domestic state budget was 36.5 per cent (equivalent to USD 
1.8 billion) and 30.8 per cent (equivalent to USD 2 billion) in 2003 and 2004 respectively 
while the figures for the non-state sector were 13.1 per cent and 12.6 per cent in the same 
years.  
  
                                                     
157
 This however does not necessarily mean that the application of taxation rule is 
transparent. It is reportedly said that tax officers negotiate the amount of tax with businesses 
in order to obtain personal earnings which is again not necessarily purely ‘personal’ earnings. 
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Figure 20: Structure of the state budget revenue by source (%) 
 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Statistical Yearbook (2005 – 2013). Hanoi: Statistics 
Publishing House. 
 
With regard to tax exemptions and reductions, newly equitised firms received the benefit 
of a two-year tax holiday according to the rules that were introduced to encourage SOEs 
to change their ownership from state-owned to joint-stock. This finding is different from 
what Gainsborough (2005) finds. It is reported that some SOEs and equitised SOEs from 
Hai Phong admitted to receiving tax breaks. However, what interview team found was 
that SOEs operating in strategic areas are granted tax reduction by the regulation. It seems 
that we should carefully interpret the finding of Gainsborough in terms of ‘soft’ budget 
constraints on SOEs. 
 
 
Some of interviewed SOEs had affiliated companies in the form of ‘mother and children’ 
companies. We wanted to know if the mother companies paid taxes on behalf of their 
affiliated firms, to ascertain if the mother companies provided any financial support to 
their subsidiary companies in order to bail them out. The reply was “no, tax is the 
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responsibility of the affiliated firms”. However, when the mother companies were asked 
whether they would support their affiliated firms when the affiliated companies have 
difficulties in the future, the response was “yes, not because of paternalism but because 
our money has been invested in those subsidiary companies. We do not want to lose our 
invested money”. 
 
To summarise, neither central nor local SOEs operating in Hai Phong were treated in a 
favoured way with regard to tax payments. This equality of treatment also applied to 
equitised firms. They did not feel any change in the treatment by the tax authority from 
when they were under the ownership of the state to when they changed into JSCs. 
 
6.3. Accessibility to bank loans 
Using direct support from the state budget is a politically costly way of supporting SOEs 
because these transfers are more apparent to the wider public. In contrast, the banking 
system, in particular state commercial banks, can be used to provide support to SOEs 
without the same political cost because these transfers are not as transparent. This is one 
reason why centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe used the banking system 
frequently to support SOEs, and since a failure to repay loans did not lead to bankruptcy 
proceedings, this method of financing amounted to soft budget constraints on SOEs 
(Kornai et al. 2003).  
 
We observed a similar pattern of financing in Hai Phong. While direct fiscal support from 
the state budget or a loose application of tax rules was not observed, the use of the 
banking system to mobilise capital on relatively easy terms for SOEs was widespread. 
 
This section examines whether SOEs have easy access to bank loans and more 
importantly how connections – which are important for all business operations in 
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Vietnam – influenced access to loans. If the accessibility of loans is different from 
company to company, this is prima facie evidence that factors like differences in 
networks and connections could be playing an important role in determining accessibility 
of the firm to bank loan. But before we proceeding, it might be helpful how state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) are related to SOEs. 
 
Having easy access to credit does not necessarily carry value judgement because 
relationship-based lending can be established, resulting in improvement of credit 
availability to businesses particularly when there are small and medium-sized (see Allen 
et al. (2005) for the Chinese case, and Hansen et al. (2004) and Le et al. (2006) for the 
Vietnamese cases). Also this relationship-based lending is not unique to developing 
economies (Malesky and Taussig 2009). Banks in developed countries use soft 
information to ameliorate asymmetric information problems through careful screening of 
borrowers (Gerschenkron 1962) and firms with longer banking relationships receive 
better terms in the form of lower interest rates and less collateral requirement (Diamond 
1991). Nonetheless, we need to be careful to extend the relationship-based lending in 
developed economies into developing economies because the context may not be the 
same. The relationship-based lending in developed economies has worked in a way of 
enhancing the screening of risky projects while in developing economies the relationships 
are often defined as bonds that originate outside of banking relationship which are 
commonly referred to “connections” (Malesky and Taussig 2009: 537).  
 
There are five state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) in Vietnam of which two are 
solely owned by the state (Agribank and the Bank for Investment and Development of 
Vietnam) and three banks with state ownership between 80 to 92 per cent (Mekong 
Housing Bank, Vietcombank and Vietinbank). The share of SOCBs in credit allocation 
and deposits was between 70 and 80 per cent in 2000, which declined to 45 to 50 per cent 
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in 2010 because of the increasing number of joint-stock banks (JSBs) (World Bank 2012: 
28). 
 
The ownership structure of banks in Vietnam indicates that the state sector – the state, 
SOEs and SOCBs – exercise considerable ownership. By the end of 2010, the state has 
direct ownership in nine banks – five SOCBs and four JSBs – out of 29 banks. SOCBs 
have some ownership in six JSBs. The majority of state ownership in the banking sector 
comes through SOEs which hold charter capital in 19 JSBs (World Bank 2012: 29). 
 
While the presence of the state sector in the banking sector is large in terms of number of 
banks, but the state ownership in JSBs has progressively increased. Between 2005 and 
2010, the number of JSBs in which the state has ownership increased from 5 to 22. 
Nonetheless the size of state capital is small and declines. The share of charter capital 
held by the state in the entire banking sector rapidly declined from 87 per cent to 34 per 
cent between 2005 and 2010. The share of the state capital becomes much smaller in 
JSBs. It was 19 per cent in 2005 and fell to 10 per cent in 2010 (World Bank 2012: 29-
30). 
 
Why do SOEs have ownership in many banks while the size of ownership is rather small? 
The pattern of the state sector ownership in the banking sector is different from the 
industrial sector in which the state capital shows a high concentration ratio. In the 
banking sector the state sector ownership spreads out to many JSBs with a little amount 
of ownership capital. Why is that? It is because SOEs can use JSBs as a channel of capital 
mobilisation. World Bank (2012: 31) argues that there is a positive correlation between 
the ownership structure of the banks and their loan exposure to SOEs. Hence it is not 
always necessary “require a controlling stake in JSBs to influence lending activities in 
favor of” SOEs, although there are some exceptional cases (see Figure 21, p. 188). But it 
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should be noted that the state requires “SOEs and SOCBs to subscribe to the charter 
capital of JSBs to make the equitisation process successful” (World Bank 2012: 29). 
 
 
Adopted from World Bank (2012: 31, Figure 2.8). 
 
Let us return to the case of Hai Phong. We examine the softness of budget constraints by 
asking three sorts of questions to investigate the types of networks and business 
connections that determine the probability of getting a soft loan, following the analysis of 
Kornai et al. (2003) and Gainsborough (2005). The questions we used to structure our 
investigation were i) the duration of the bank loan, ii) the type of enterprise – 
distinguishing between centrally and locally managed SOEs and iii) the type of 
ownership – SOEs versus equitised JSCs.  
 
Both central and local SOEs in Hai Phong were largely dependent upon bank loans for 
mobilising capital. Most of the firms in our sample replied that bank loans were one of 
their main investment sources and financed a large proportion of the companies’ 
liabilities (see Table 25, p. 172). SOEs borrowed money not only from SOCBs but also 
Figure 21: Correlation between ownership and loan exposure in JSBs and SOCBs 
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from private banks. SOE directors agreed that they had personal relationships with banks, 
mostly with SOCBs, and the quality of these relationships were an important factor that 
was likely to have an influence on the successful consideration of loan applications. 
 
Long term versus short term loans 
It is disclosed that there were important differences between applications for long-term 
and short-term loans. Banks require firms to submit feasibility studies or project 
documents when long-term loans were applied for, whereas they request relatively simple 
paper work such as business contracts or annual business plans for short-term loan 
applications. Here are some director responses. 
 
For investment capital (long-term loans), (we) prepare project 
documents for the loan applications with calculations of the repayment 
period for each specific project. Banks review and appraise the 
feasibility and approve the applications. Upon disbursement, financial 
documents must be kept in banks. For short-term loans, banks 
negotiate the terms of the loans and the amount of annual loans based 
on business contracts, construction contracts and projected outputs. 
The short term loans are secured by collateral. In the past, banks 
determined the amount of loans based on construction contracts or 
business contracts based on trust (quote from an equitised local SOE, 
Firm G; emphasis added); 
 
 
A long-term loan requires technical and economic reports or 
investment project documents. Short-term loans only require business 
plans. Now we must also have collateral secured at the bank (quote 
from a local SOE, Firm I); 
 
 
The loan application is dealt with by (our) General Corporation. A large 
scale investment needs loans arranged and prepared by the General 
Corporation. However, our company has to sign the credit agreement 
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directly with banks and is responsible for paying the principal and 
interest. There is no difference in the application process between 
long-term and short-term loans. However, the portion of loans which 
require collateral has increased in the last five years (quote from a 
central SOE, Firm Q); 
 
As the quotations above indicate, central and local SOEs provided mostly similar answers 
about the differences in the application process for long-term and short-term loans. No 
discrimination based on the ownership type was detected in bank loan applications. 
 
Formal and informal rules in bank loans 
It was discovered that all firms are formally required to put up collateral or mortgage their 
assets when they applied for loans regardless of the term of borrowing. The interviewed 
directors pointed out that this was one of the biggest changes in the business environment 
over the last five years as of 2005. Putting up collateral was required from all SOEs when 
they applied for bank loans after Decree No. 178/1999/ND-CP on ‘credit institutions loan 
security’ promulgated on 29 December 1999 as the Decree introduced a condition that 
“The provisions at Point 1, Section II of Resolution No. 49/CP of May 6, 1997 of the 
Government on the State enterprises borrowing capital from the State commercial banks 
without mortgage and other previous stipulations on mortgage, pledge and security for 
bank loans cease to be effective” (emphasis added) in Article 38.158 
 
Tenev et al. (2003; see FIGURE 3.6 and FIGURE 3.7 on page 63) provide a nice 
reference to loans without putting up collateral. They find that 29 per cent of loans are 
made without putting up collateral among SOCBs while 53 per cent of loans are made 
without putting up collateral among JSBs. Also 65 per cent of private firms answer that 
                                                     
158
 The title in Vietnamese is Nghị định số 178/1999/NĐ-CP về bảo đảm tiền vay của 
các tổ chức tín dụng. This was amended with supplemented articles by Government Decree 
No. 85/2002/ND-CP in 2002 which did not contain any significant changes from Decree No. 
178. 
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putting up collateral as a main difficulty in getting bank loans while 12 per cent of SOEs 
pick this out as a main difficulty.159 Hence, we can conjecture that lending without 
putting-up collateral is found not only in SOCBs but also in JSBs. 
 
We, however, also found that the application of Decree No. 178 was not firmly 
established and banks applied the rules differently from firm to firm. For example, some 
SOEs were able to take out loans from banks on the basis of their credibility, reputation 
or trust. Gainsborough (2005: 10) calls this ‘unsecured’ lending referring to “borrowing 
on the basis of one’s reputation (tin chap) or by showing a business contract”. Like as in 
other provinces, the interviewed directors in Hai Phong used the term ‘tin chap’ – which 
roughly translates as creditworthiness in general – to describe the effects of reputation. 
The term can be used when there is a kind of long-term relationship between two parties, 
which enables them to ask for something, including a loan, without the requirement of a 
tight formal process. It does not mean a verbal promise between two parties. The long- 
term relationship refers to an established connection between two parties, which is 
extendable to third parties to establish new connections.  
 
In general, reputation is the result of repeated transactions. If a firm does engage in 
borrowing and re-paying properly over a long time, the firm builds a virtual relationship, 
often called prestige (uy tin), with banks and is able to take out loans on the basis of 
reputation without putting up collateral. Reputation can also be based on evidence of 
other connections that establish that a firm is well-connected. For instance, a firm that has 
been successful in getting access to land, in a context where land use is politically 
determined, can easily establish its reputation.  
 
                                                     
159
 The greatest obstacle for SOEs in getting bank loans is a high interest rate (Tenev et 
al. 2003: 65; FIGURE 3.8). 
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When we included a discussion of reputation it turned out that banks were very flexible in 
the application of Decree No. 178. For example, a local SOE director told us 
 
In regard to putting up collateral for bank loans, what we as an SOE 
have to do is to show our ‘red book’ to the bank in order to confirm our 
land use rights.160 That’s all. We do not have to give any collateral like 
ordinary citizens. What happens is that the bank will send a team to 
investigate and check our red book (quote from a local SOE, Firm C). 
 
In some cases, reputation was used to set the upper limit on loans that could be granted 
without collateral. Only if a firm took out a larger loan than the limit would it have to put 
up collateral. 
 
In a nutshell, there is equal treatment for all firms regardless of 
ownership type of theirs in Vietnam and therefore there is no 
favouritism when firms apply for bank loans. But as our company has 
been working with the bank for many years, we have a good reputation, 
prestige and a good relationship with the bank, so our requirement for 
collateral is smaller. It is the result of trust between the bank and the 
company. Now the bank gives us fifty per cent of loans on the basis of 
credibility and the rest is based on the collateral (quote from a central 
SOE, Firm N). 
 
It was in this sense that local SOEs and central SOEs experienced a difference in the 
confidence and reputation they could develop with banks. Many directors from local 
SOEs said that the value of their assets was not large enough to get bank loans. In 
principle, local SOEs were unable to borrow more than a certain amount of money 
without mortgaging assets. The actual value of the assets owned by local state companies 
was limited and this limited the loans they could take out. Therefore, according to the 
directors, they had to seek loans based on a ‘virtual relationship’. Several local SOEs felt 
                                                     
160
 The booklet of the land use rights is widely called as the ‘red book’ in Vietnam 
because the colour of the booklet is red. 
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insecure because banks could require them to put up collateral at any time or could lower 
the proportion of loans based on reputation.  
 
On the contrary, most directors of central SOEs were confident that they had good 
relations with banks. They thought they deserved the loans based on reputation because 
the value of their assets was high enough to make banks trust them and lend to them 
without putting up collateral.  
 
From the viewpoint of banks, the reputation and assets of a potential borrower are 
important considerations for banks. In advanced countries the asset base of a firm 
contributes to the security of the lender but in the Vietnamese case, the asset base appears 
to contribute to trust without being directly tied down as collateral. The link between the 
asset base and trust is therefore an interesting question and politics is at least one 
important intermediate variable in this relationship. One of our respondents puts this quite 
clearly: 
 
Local SOEs are under provincial departments. Maybe the departments 
at a provincial level are not capable of winning the trust of banks. We 
are a central state firm under the Ministry, and the Ministry is trusted 
by the banks. The assets of the General Corporation are also large 
and spread out from the South to the North (quote from a central SOE, 
Firm Q). 
 
It is not difficult to infer from the quotation above that the level of a state organ that 
governs an SOE, whether local or central, is one of the factors influencing the reputation 
and consequently the negotiation power of the SOE. The answers provided by central 
SOEs when they were asked about the application process for long-term and short-term 
loans were consistent with this analysis. Responses from the directors of central SOEs 
indicate that General Corporations, often called mother companies, were deeply involved 
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in dealing with bank loans for the children firms of theirs. As discussed earlier, General 
Corporations are founded based on Prime Ministerial decisions and their location in the 
administrative hierarchy is equivalent to that of ministries. This implies that General 
Corporations have considerable political power. It is therefore not surprising that the 
interview reveals that the central SOEs had better connections with banks than local 
SOEs and equitised JSCs did. 
 
The direct and indirect support from the governing organs of SOEs explains why banks 
prefer SOEs for their lending business. Both tangible and intangible backing makes banks 
feel that loans to SOEs and particularly to well-connected large SOEs will not turn into 
non-performing loans. Although SOE directors claimed that banks granted them loans 
because they built reputation, banks as business entities lend money to SOEs because 
there is a guarantor of last resort operating behind SOEs. This argument is supported by a 
local SOE director (Firm I) who said that  
 
it is easier for banks to grant loans to SOEs than to (private) limited 
liability companies because banks have more confidence in SOEs than 
in other entities (emphasis added). 
 
Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that banks manage loans to SOEs with 
substantial discretion with the confidence that however delinquent the firm, its 
connections with politics will effectively secure the loans. On the contrary, we do not find 
that banks are excessively flexible about dates of repayment or that they approve 
additional loans when a trusted firm has outstanding overdue loans. Only one central 
SOE (Firm S) director answered that it had been given a flexible repayment date and had 
been able to get another loan without paying off all outstanding loans. Many of the 
interviewed firms replied that it would be fine not to keep the due date once, but if they 
repeat then the bank would not provide loans with them any longer. Therefore, they need 
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to stick to the due date. The political power and backing that SOEs enjoy might help to 
some extent to get access to loans, but it works only if the SOE does not damage its 
reputation by breaking the agreed repayment schedule of loans. The informal rules 
therefore are important in one sense but they do not mean that gross violations of 
borrowing norms are tolerated. 
 
Equitised firms versus SOEs 
How did equitised firms perceive their access to bank loans before and after equitisation? 
All directors of equitised firms answered that there had been no significant change in 
terms of their access to bank loans. They had to put up collateral or mortgage assets – this 
change had started before they transformed the ownership type – and few of them still 
enjoyed the benefits of reputation (Firm C and J). The ownership change had not 
influenced the established relations between equitised firms and banks.  
 
Nevertheless, the ownership change could create difficulties for firms in mobilising 
capital due to related government regulations. A director of an equitised firm (Firm A) 
complained that  
 
(after changing the ownership type) the upper limit of loans decreased 
because it was now based on the size of legal capital of the company, 
so the company suffered. Now bank loans are insufficient for the 
mobilisation of capital and the firm has to invest its own resources 
together with the bank in case of projects which require long term 
investments. 
 
Can putting up collateral harden budget constraints? 
The interviewed SOE directors stated that putting up collateral is one of the most 
significant changes in business environment for the last few years, which made them feel 
the access to bank loans more difficult. Has this change really hardened the budget 
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constraints on SOEs? We may answer the question by addressing the issue that to whom 
SOE directors think the assets which were put up as collateral belong. An SOE director 
may do not care when banks foreclose on the mortgaged assets in the case of non-
payment of loans if s/he considers the mortgaged assets belong to the state. If, however, 
the SOE director regards the assets put up as collateral as what belong to the firm, s/he 
would try her/his best to ensure that banks did not foreclose on the assets mortgaged. 
 
Why is it assumed that the SOE director tries her/his best to keep the mortgaged asset 
which belongs to the firm not to her/him? Before proceeding, let us take a look at Table 
25 (p. 172) again. Listed sources of investment are bank loans, own equity161, state budget, 
employees mobilisation and investment development fund. All of them except bank loans 
belong to the assets of an SOE or the state. But actually whose? This, however, is not a 
simple question in the Vietnamese context because there is no clear distinction among 
own equity, employees mobilisation and Investment Development Fund. 
 
Own equity 
Firstly let us consider ‘own equity’. The owner of SOEs is the state and own equity is 
supposed to belong to the state. The analysis of the interview reveals that this is not 
always the case in Vietnam. Many of interviewed directors agreed that the assets of SOEs 
belonged to the state. Nevertheless, they also insisted that the SOEs had the right to the 
assets at the same time because the SOEs were allowed to manage and use the assets for 
firms’ own purpose. One director even said that the assets were not the state any longer 
because the assets were already assigned to the company. The right to ownership is 
blurred.  
 
                                                     
161
 It is ‘von tu co’ in Vietnamese which is translated into various terms in English such 
as ‘own capita’, ‘own equity’ and ‘owner’s equity’. The standard terminology used in 
accounting is own equity. 
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While the implication which own equity delivers has changed over time, the blurred 
ownership to own equity goes back to the 1980s. Own equity was understood to mean 
capital that SOEs themselves had accumulated (Fforde 2004, 2007) and which “therefore 
should be seen as theirs. Much of this seems to have been lost, however, in the crisis 
years of 1989–1990 or was then appropriated by higher levels in the early 1990s” (Fforde 
2007: 48) through the changes in depreciate fund and the imposition of capital tax, which 
caused significant resistance of SOEs because they “were arguing that that capital tax 
could not be applied to their ‘own capital’” (ibid.: 207). The right to tax own equity 
conflicted with the right to ownership of it.162 Similarly Gainsborough (2005: 6) argues 
that “how ‘own equity’ is defined and understood among SOEs is more complex given 
the more ambiguous property rights regime”. 
 
Nowadays own equity is understood to be ‘self-generated capital’ – two firms used this 
term, which was generally understood to mean ‘the additional capital of the firm derived 
from retained profits’.163 Many firms understood own equity as a fund which firms could 
use for re-investment or the fund remaining after paying tax. For example, according to 
an interviewee from a local SOE (Firm H), 
 
Profits are used first to meet tax obligations. Then there is a 
contribution to the reward fund and the welfare fund. For re-investment 
we have the investment development fund, and this constitutes own 
equity. … Providing public services which is our main product 
sometimes yields profits and investment development fund is 
accumulated from the profits. We consider this fund to be our own 
equity (emphasis added). 
 
                                                     
162
 See Chapter 8 of Fforde (2007) for in-depth description of the significance of own 
equity in the commercialisation of SOEs in the 1980s. 
163
 See Table A4 (page 239) in Appendix for the listed answers on own equity from 
SOE directors. 
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Other firms defined own equity differently like as “the accumulated the annual profits to 
be used for the procurement of equipment and machines” (Firm I); “money accumulated 
from profits after tax” (Firm R); “a fund created by the firm from the profits of 
production and business every year” (Firm Q); “the fund mobilised by the firm from 
various resources not the fund supplied from the state” (Firm B). 
 
Although various answers were returned to the question that what is meant by own equity, 
it can be summarised that profits minus tax payments minus required fund accumulation 
such as welfare fund, financial reserve fund and investment development fund. Mobilised 
or self-generate by ‘the firm’ was the word used by SOE directors to indicate that own 
equity is something belongs to the firm not to the state. Own equity was itself ambiguous 
and referred to various sources of funds and expenditure patterns within SOEs in the 
context of unclear property rights. 
 
In our sample of firms, the amount of own equity ranged from VND 1.35 billion 
(equivalent to USD 86,538) to VND 545 billion (equivalent to USD 34 million) and 
ranged from 0.7 per cent to 70 per cent of the total capital of the firm. The size of own 
equity had no correlation with types of ownership and whether the firm is locally or 
centrally run. 
 
Not surprisingly there was confusion of terms among interviewed directors. The most 
notable case was that they mixed own equity up with ‘investment development fund’ 
(Quy Dau tu Phat trien) which some SOEs pointed out as one of main sources of 
investment (see Table 25, p. 172). Why did such confusion occur? It might be due to 
government regulations. 
 
The Vietnamese government allows SOEs to use profits after tax for augmenting their 
capital, building up financial reserves and improving the material conditions of their 
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workers. According to Circular No. 64/1999/TT-BTC on ‘Guiding the distribution of 
after-tax profits and management of funds in SOEs’164, every SOE and equitised SOE can 
accumulate funds using up to a certain proportion of their profits: a financial reserve fund 
(ten per cent of profits)165, an investment development fund (fifty per cent of profits)166, a 
severance allowance reserve fund (five per cent), a reward and welfare fund (subject to 
additional rules)167. If there were any available profits after deducting all the funds 
stipulated in Circular No. 64, these profits would fall into the category of the investment 
development fund. This regulation coincides with what SOEs directors defined ‘own 
                                                     
164
 This was promulgated on 7 July 1999 and whose title in Vietnamese is Thông tư số 
64/1999/TT-BTC về chế độ phân phối lợi nhuận sau thuế và quản lý các quỹ trong doanh 
nghiệp Nhà nước. 
165
 As for the financial reserve fund, our interviewees had a more ambiguous and 
broader perception of the purpose of this fund. The fund was designated to make up for asset 
losses or damages incurred by the firm during the course of its business. In reality, the 
understanding of directors ranged across a wide range of possibilities. For example, the 
financial reserve fund is kept as a “contingency fund for financial risks”; to “cover the risks of 
business operations”; to prepare “contingencies due to unexpected losses or damage from 
force majeure”; or more broadly, to “support production and business and cover against risks”. 
Some unusual answers included the response that the fund was “retained to cover the 
reassignment of jobs”; for “contingency payments to cover bad debts”; and “to provide 
subsidies to jobless employees”. The ambiguity in regard to the perception of the appropriate 
uses of the financial reserve fund suggests that the firms spent the fund for a wide variety of 
uses and possibly beyond the legally appropriate ones. 
166
 The purpose of the investment development fund was to “supplement the capital of 
SOEs (bổ sung vào vốn kinh doanh của Nhà nước)” by investing in business expansion, 
renovation of technologies and equipment; contributing capital to joint ventures and 
purchasing shares or contributing stocks. Interviewees commonly used the term “re-
investment” to refer to the purpose of the investment development fund and they accumulated 
the fund at the proportion of fifty per cent of profits after tax in general. 
167
 The interview team asked questions referring to Circular No. 64 to see if SOEs had 
a clear understanding of the accumulation and usage of each fund. The answers of directors 
about the purpose of each fund and its amount revealed that the understanding about the 
purpose of some funds was relatively clear. Directors had a clear understanding about the 
usage of the reward fund and the welfare fund as stipulated in Circular No. 64 – to reward the 
innovative activity of workers and to secure the welfare of the workers. The amounts 
accumulated under the two funds varied from firm to firm as we would expect. Nevertheless, 
four local SOEs and two central SOEs deducted an unexpectedly high proportion of after-tax 
profits (between twenty to forty per cent) or VND 13 billion (equivalent to USD 833 
thousand). 
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equity’ – profits minus tax payments minus requested funds. Consequently, a proportion 
of investment development fund would be own equity.  
 
While the regulation does not define any own equity belongs to the SOE many 
interviewees believed that the firms had right to own. If we include investment 
development fund as a part of own equity, SOEs reliance upon own equity in investment 
expenditure is heavier than that upon bank loans. A similar result is found in the analysis 
of Gainsborough (2005: 8) and he uses this result to argue that the “heavy reliance on 
‘own capital’ for all firms regardless of ownership type … suggests that … companies are 
not especially ‘flush’ with budget or bank capital”. 
 
Capital mobilised by employees 
As we examined after doi moi, own equity came to mean accumulated (or retained) 
profits that were the result of the business activities of the firm separate from any capital 
injected by the state into the firm. The post doi moi period was one where there state did 
not have enough capital to inject into SOEs, leading the then Governor of the State Bank 
of Vietnam to say that “(the state) must find capital for the (economic) units. But if those 
units are to survive, they must provide at least half of their own equity” (emphasis added; 
Saigon Giai Phong, 21 May 1991; Translated in JPRS-SEA-91-019, 12 August 1991). 
Here is another ingredient of blurred property rights: ‘capital mobilised by employees’. 
 
Three local SOEs said that funds mobilised from their own employees was one of their 
main sources of investment funds but only one central SOE counted it as a source of 
funds for investment (see Table 25, p. 172). One local SOE (Firm I) said that twenty-five 
per cent of its working capital came from employees’ contributions.  
 
In general, companies mobilised capital from their employees and rewarded their 
contribution by paying interest at a higher rate than the average bank interest rate. These 
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mobilisations from employees were usually resorted to in emergencies when a firm 
encountered financial troubles or was unable to repay bank loans on the due date. The 
mobilised funds could be considered as short term loans from employees to protect the 
company’s reputation. In addition, these types of mobilised funds could be used for risky 
projects because it was hard to mobilise fund from banks or the state for such projects. 
 
Other regulations made the concept of own equity even more obscure. According to 
articles of Decree No. 50-HDBT168, promulgated on 22 March 1988, 
 
Article 4. Assets of enterprises belong to the entire people and are 
entrusted by the state to collectivised workers headed by enterprise 
directors for direct managerial control and use in developing 
production and business. Enterprises are responsible for maintaining 
and constantly supplementing and renovating their assets depending 
on the production requirements by using their self-procured funds, 
credits and other funds mobilised from various sources (emphasis 
added; SWB, FE/0133/C/1-8, 22 Mar 1988). 
 
It can be inferred from Decree No. 50-HDBT, together with the message of the Governor 
of the State Bank of Vietnam, that there was no clear differentiation between state capital 
and a firm’s capital and the ownership of the capital that was raised or of the profits that 
were earned as a result was not clear. 
 
This confusion reflects ambiguities in the law about the ownership of assets in SOEs. For 
example, of the total capital of a state enterprise, there is a portion contributed by 
employees, a portion injected by the state a long time ago at the early stages of the 
transition, a portion accumulated from profits and a portion contributed by firms as they 
were requested by the State bank of Vietnam, but it is not clear what the rights of the 
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 It was titled “Regulations for state industrial enterprises” (Nghị định số 50-HĐBT, 
về Điều lệ xí nghiệp công nghiệp quốc doanh). 
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different contributors are. The confusion over own equity is one reason why equitisation 
has proceeded so slowly. One of the important preconditions of equitisation is to know 
the value of the firm’s assets. Unless the ownership of assets or the claims of different 
parties can be clearly identified, it is technically impossible to assess the value of the 
equity. 
 
Is putting up collateral is likely to be effective? 
The revealed perception of directors is that the assets belong partly or wholly to the firm, 
and this explains why the requirement of collateral has had a binding effect on firm 
behaviour. This is different from the behaviour of firms in socialist countries that Kornai 
described. Firms and their directors stand to lose something real if they fail to pay their 
loans back. Furthermore, according to a central SOE director (Firm K), foreclosures do 
occasionally happen. He told a story where a bank auctioned mortgaged one SOE 
properties to recover some of its outstanding lending. 
 
There, however, was a different observation on the bank’s capacity of collecting 
outstanding debts. Gainsborough (2005: 11) cites companies’ comments such as “banks 
never manage to recover all of their capital in the event of a default” or “banks have to 
bear the losses if firms are unable to make payments because of corruption” (emphasis 
added). His interpretation is “banks could expect little help from the political authorities” 
(ibid.). We may need to draw attention on word ‘corruption’ or ‘default’ from which 
politicians are likely to reluctant to intervene to help relevant firms because of political 
burden. In the case of corruption, they would like to hide themselves and in the case of 
default, we can conjecture that those firms had not had to be in default if they had ‘decent’ 
political connections. 
 
In fact, the properties that they are requested to provide to banks belong to the state in 
principle as the firms are ultimately state-owned. The assets of SOEs are perceived by 
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directors as belonging both to the state and to the companies. This helps to explain why 
the requirement of collateral introduced by Decree No. 178 has worked as an effective 
constraint on SOEs in Hai Phong. 
 
6.4. Perception of SOE directors versus budget constraints 
As Kornai et al. (2003) argued, the hardest obstacle to removing soft budget constraints is 
the stubbornness of SOE directors who expect bail-outs. Gainsborough (2005: 5-6) 
assesses the changes in firm expectations by asking two respects: whether the access to 
state budget capital and to bank capital changes for the last 3-5 years. He finds that firms 
felt the access to state budget capital got harder and the access to bank capital got easier. 
 
As we examined our interview shows a similar result in terms of the access to state 
budget capital. Nonetheless, there was not clear evidence that the access to bank capital 
got easier for the last three to five years in our interviews. Rather, SOE directors 
responded that putting up collateral made them feel budget constraints got harder because 
SOEs were able to get bank loans without putting up collateral before Decree No. 178 
was promulgated. However, ease of access does not necessarily tells the hardness of 
budget constraints because easy access can be a result being exposed to the banking 
system (Gainsborough ibid.). 
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Table 27: How do SOE directors consider of bailouts by the state? 
Company Comments 
A, B, C, D, 
E, H, I, J, 
N, P, Q, S 
and U 
No support. 
 
 
 
F 
No support. But must consider why SOEs make a loss and if it is not the fault of 
director, the state can support.  
G 
Yes. Many schemes under construction are funded by the state budget. The 
reimbursement is very slow. Therefore the company has to get the loan and pay the 
bank interest. As a result, the schemes bring about low effectiveness and no profit. 
In that case the state budget must be mobilised to cover up the loss for the firm. 
K 
The Director is responsible for the loss. If the loss is caused by a policy change, the 
gov’t is responsible for it. The state budget should cover the loss for utilities which 
implement the assignment by the government. 
L 
Loss must be analysed to find reasons. The state budget cannot be mobilised to 
cover up the loss of the enterprise. When the loss is up to a certain limit, production 
could not be continued, the bankruptcy procedures must be applied according to 
laws. 
M 
The loss of the previous year must be filled up by profits of the following year. If the 
enterprise suffers loss for 2 consecutive years, the director must be dismissed 
according to legal regulation. 
O 
If it is the result of natural calamity it should be mobilised, if it is the fault of the 
subject it should not be mobilised. 
R 
Responsible for the loss: the Director; handling the loss: the gov’t. 
Firms working in the public services may make a loss due to objective reasons. The 
state should fill up the loss. Other firms not working for public do not need. 
T 
The Board of Directors are responsible for the loss; the whole firm needs to refund 
the loss after a course of years. 
 
To assess the perception of SOE directors, the interview directly addressed the question 
how directors think of bailouts. Many of them responded that they would not support the 
idea of bailouts in case of continuous loss-making (see Table 27 ). Some of them added a 
couple of conditions such as “if it not the fault of director, the state can support” (Firm K). 
There was, however, one director said ‘yes’ for bailouts but his argument was in the same 
context to others. He argued that  
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Many projects of this company are funded by the state budget but the 
reimbursement is made very slowly. Therefore the company has to rely 
on bank loans and pays interest. As a result, the projects bring about 
low efficiency and no profit. In that case the state budget must be 
mobilised to cover up the loss for the firm (emphasis added; quote 
from an equitised local SOE, Firm G). 
 
Combining these responses with the perception of SOE directors on the assets of the SOE, 
we may draw a conclusion with caution that the hard resource constraints in the state 
budget have effectively changed the expectations of directors of SOEs. They do expect 
that financial support from the state budget will be limited. It appears that there has been 
a notable change in the expectations of SOE directors which is supposed to be the hardest 
part to change in the issue of soft budget constraints. In contrast to the conventional claim, 
the budget constraints on SOEs have become ‘harder’. 
 
6.5. Concluding remarks: soft for big and hard for small SOEs 
The analysis of the interview suggests us a couple of preliminary conclusions in terms of 
the softness of budget constraints on SOEs. Firstly, contrary to the conventional claim, 
there is evidence to show that the budget constraints on SOEs in Hai Phong have 
hardened. The expectation of being bailed out among SOE directors were low and the 
support from the state and local budget has dramatically decreased. The lack of state 
budget allocation deteriorates the operation of local SOEs resulted from the delayed 
public investment expenditure. Furthermore, the state divests of the assets of loss-making 
SOEs and allocates them to well-performing SOEs to increase the capital size of them. 
This is how the Vietnamese state has reduced the number of SOEs but been able to 
maintain the dominance of the state sector – divestiture plus concentration. 
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Secondly, there is evidence that large SOEs face softer budget constraints than small 
SOEs do. Centrally-managed SOEs which are large in terms of the number of labourers 
and the size of capital have better access to bank loans with the support of their powerful 
controlling organs such as General Corporations and SEGs compared to locally-managed 
SOEs whose controlling organs are local government departments and local People’s 
Committee if they are equitised. There were informal modifications of the formal rules 
guiding access to bank loans. The formal rules required SOEs to put up collateral when 
they took out loans, but in fact, some SOEs received favoured treatment from banks 
because they were granted loans based on their ‘reputation’ without having to put up 
collateral. Furthermore, there appeared to be various interpretations of reputation and one 
dimension of reputation is likely to depend on the level of the state organs governing the 
firm. The higher the level of the governing organ the greater the SOE appeared to score 
on this aspect of reputation.  
 
Two preliminary conclusions suggest that the budget constraints on SOEs in Hai Phong 
tend to have been hardened during the last decade. At the same time some large SOEs 
have faced relatively soft budget constraints. The conventional claim that SOEs operate 
with soft budget constraints could be simple generalisation made from the observation of 
macroeconomic data and mass media coverage. We, however, have to explain why some 
SOEs especially large centrally-managed SOEs have faces softer budget constraints. 
 
A telling argument is that the connections which an SOE director has established largely 
affect the softness of budget constraints (Gainsborough 2005, Malesky and Taussig 2009, 
Tenev et al. 2003). From this viewpoint, reputation we mentioned above could mean 
something different in some cases. For large central SOEs, reputation was an assessment 
that the enterprise had adequate political backing and would be able to honour its 
obligations even if the economic operations turned out to be flawed. Thus, reputation 
could also be a metaphor for the level of informal connections of an enterprise, and a 
207 
 
well-connected firm found it easier to access bank loans. SOE directors have a very 
strong motive to put their effort into managing their connections. Nonetheless, this did 
not mean that there were no limits to the application of this informal rule. The reputation 
of the firms also needed to be maintained by repaying loans on schedule. The structure as 
a whole, therefore, created implicit soft budget constraints for well-connected large SOEs, 
particularly those with strong connections at the centre. 
 
The obligation of SOEs to repay bank loans and to contribute to the state budget to 
maintain their reputation and consequent connections and political backing may explain 
why SOEs have diversified into non-related business areas which are likely to create 
quick cash flows. As Fforde (2007) argues the role of SOEs as a firm tax base caused the 
recentralisation through which the state tries to increase its influence over SOEs. This 
decreased the autonomy of SOEs but it does not mean that the state effectively increase 
its controlling power over SOEs. The outcome of this attempted recentralisation is ‘tax 
paying SOEs without being supervised’. A central SOE director (Firm R) said explicitly 
that “as long as our firm accomplished the goal of making profits and paying the tax 
payment, it does not matter how this is achieved”. A firm specialising in transportation 
could therefore easily diversify into the real-estate business to make quick profits. 
 
The fact that enterprise directors diversified the activities of their firms and often 
diversified into risky activities suggests they had incentives for doing so in terms of 
informal benefits that managers, directors and their contacts in the political and 
administrative structure could access. The combination of formal and informal practices 
and arrangements, therefore, created private stakes in public enterprises. 
 
It is not impossible that enterprises could seek profits through activities that were new 
and outside their areas of competence, through speculative investments and sometimes 
even by subverting the law. Obviously, in new areas where it does not have core 
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competences the risks are also much greater, and in some speculative and grey areas of 
activity (like betting on stock prices, exchange rates and so on), the risks can be very 
considerable. Our respondents would not tell us about the possible sharing of benefits 
between enterprise directors and the political and bureaucratic elites their firms were 
closely interacting with at the local or national level. However, the close collusion of 
supervisors, the regulatory apparatus of the state and the enterprise suggests that the 
principal-agent problem was not between the state and supervisors as principals and the 
enterprise as agent, but rather between the collective national state as principal and a 
closely colluding group of enterprise directors, state officials and supervisors as agents. 
 
A significant problem of the system was that the collusion amongst state and enterprise 
players at the appropriate level meant that productive dynamism became difficult to 
distinguish from asset stripping behaviour or corruption. The colluding group could 
benefit from this behaviour because while they were residual claimants for the profits 
from such actively, they did not face the full costs of the downside of risky or illegal 
activities, in much the same way as some financial institutions in Western countries 
before the global financial crisis of 2008. 
 
While the connections among SOEs director, politician and bankers play an import role in 
deciding the softness of budget constraints provides insightful analysis, this dissertation 
raises a question whether the connection is a necessary and sufficient condition of soft 
budget constraints for an SOE. To get political backing, having connections is a 
necessary condition but may not be sufficient and what is required is a political decision 
regarding whether this SOE deserves to be selected for survival or not. Provided that the 
political gains of the state are smaller than its financial spending, it is unlikely that the 
state helps the SOE in difficulty. 
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For example, the National Assembly of Vietnam approved the allocation of VND 5 
trillion (equivalent to USD 250 million) from the state budget to five large SOEs in 
December 2010. They were the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group (PetroVietnam), the 
Electricity of Vietnam Group (EVN), the Vietnam Railway Corporation (VRC), the 
Vietnam Post and Telecommunication Group (VNPT) and Vietnam National Shipping 
Lines (Vinalines).  
 
This example is interesting because direct fiscal support was provided to five big 
businesses and also it was probably a disguised bailout programme for a bankrupt SEG, 
the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin), with USD 4.4 billion of debt in 
June 2010. Vinashin, according to its restructuring programme, was divided into three 
parts which would respectively be under the management of PetroVietnam, Vinalines and 
Vinashin itself whose name was changed later into the Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 
(SBIC). 
 
Coincidently, PetroVietnam, ranked in the top five largest SOEs and unlikely to make a 
loss, was allocated VND 3,500 billion (equivalent to USD 175 million) without 
publicising the list of projects which the state funds were to be used for. In addition, 
Vinalines, currently ranked in the top 100 largest firms, was included in the list of firms 
receiving support from the state budget. Although there is no clear evidence that the state 
bailed out Vinashin, it was probably no accident that the two companies which were to 
take over parts of the collapsed Vinashin were included in this state budget support 
programme whose objective was not clearly announced.  
 
This experience suggests that the ‘too big to fail’ criterion comes into play due to both 
political and economic reason so that budget constraints may be hard for small SOEs but 
may not be for large SOEs. We could find that few centrally-managed director has the 
belief that the state would help them in the last resort because they are SOEs and big. An 
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SOE director answered to the question “does your company have any advantages in 
comparison with a JSC?” as follow:  
 
There are many advantages of being a state-owned company. The 
state gives us priority and creates better conditions for our business. 
Ultimately the state has to take care of us and this is just like 
subsidisation (quoted from a central SOE, R; emphasis added). 
 
Finally, SOEs are criticised because of their inefficiency. Macroeconomic data indicate 
that the SOEs consume too much resources compared to their outputs. Nonetheless, the 
data we examined in Chapter 4 show that the proportion of profit-making SOEs is over 
70 per cent while some of loss-making SOEs make large amount of loss. As Matheson 
(2013: 9) shows SOEs show a wide range of profitability. For example, returns on equity 
for 95 largest SOEs in 2010 varied from less than zero to more than 25. EVN and 
Waterway Construction fell to the first category and Viettel, Vinacomin, HUD belonged 
to the second category. We found that many of SOEs pointed out ‘own equity’ as one of 
main sources of investment and own equity as we examined can be defined as turnover 
minus costs in which tax contribution, all variable and fixed costs and obligatory funds 
are include. This implies that the interviewed SOEs were in fact making enough profits so 
that they rely on their own sources instead of external sources such as bank loans and aid.  
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7. Conclusion 
The main aim of this dissertation is to revise the conventional claim that SOEs face soft 
budget constraints based on the examination of banking sector data. There, however, are a 
limited amount of studies on the topic of soft budget constraints on SOE. What existing 
studies point out as evidence of soft budget constraints on SOEs is easier access to bank 
loans but the key aspect of the soft budget constraint syndrome is the formation of 
expectations of being bailed out by the state among SOE directors. None of existing 
studies directly addresses this issue except Gainsborough (2005).  Furthermore the focus 
of analyses is not SOEs but private firms so that the data set of some insightful firm-level 
analyses such as Tenev et al. (2003) and Gainsborough (ibid.) include both private firms 
and SOEs and that of Malesky and Taussig (2009) contains private firms only. 
 
To fill this gap, this dissertation conducted interviews with twenty two centrally-managed, 
locally-managed and equitised SOEs which operated in Hai Phong in 2005 by 
supplementing the method used in Gainsborough (2005) whose data set is composed of 
twenty-four private firms and SOEs from four provinces. Also our interviews directly 
address the issue of expectations of being bailed out among SOE directors. While the 
sample size is our data set is not big, this does not harm the consistency of our findings. 
The analysis of the interviews produces similar outcomes of Gainsborough (ibid.) and 
Tenev et al. (ibid.) in various respects. 
 
One of our notable findings is that the budget constraints on SOEs in Hai Phong has been 
hardened since the late 1990s and within this trend some large centrally-managed SOEs 
have faced relatively soft budget constraints. One of interviewees from the Department of 
Finance of Hai Phong told us that the state implemented divestiture of the assets of loss-
making SOEs and allocated capital to profit-making SOEs to increase their capital size. 
So the state enforced a mixed policy to reduce the number of SOEs but also make 
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leftovers bigger – divestiture plus concentration. Table 18 (p. 151) confirms this pattern. 
The number of centrally-managed SOEs reduced by 13 per cent between 2000 and 2012, 
while that of locally-managed SOEs reduced by 60 per cent over the same period. 
Cheshier et al. (2006: 6) describe this as ‘keeping the big and releasing the small’ and 
General Corporations and State Economic Groups are the result of this move (also see 
Table 20, Table 21 and Table 22 of this dissertation). 
 
However, it appears that hardening the budget constraint on large SOEs has not been 
successful. The access to bank loans is significantly affected by the ‘reputation’ of SOEs 
which is the result of long-term relationship between banks and SOEs. What we find is 
that centrally-managed SOEs have better reputation than locally-managed SOEs do. This 
can be explained by extending the telling argument of Gainsborough (ibid.) that the 
connections which firm managers have with politicians and banker largely determine the 
softness of budget constraints regardless of ownership type of a firm. The controlling 
organs of centrally-managed SOEs we interviewed are either ministers or General 
Corporations whose General Director reports directly to the Prime Minister while those of 
locally-managed SOEs we interviewed are department heads. It is not difficult to 
conjecture that the political backing of centrally-managed SOEs in general is stronger 
than that of locally-managed SOEs. 
 
The degree of political backing directly affects the expectation of being bailed out among 
SOE directors. Many of SOEs directors answered that the director of loss-making SOE 
has to take responsibility for the loss occurred but a couple of centrally-managed SOE 
directors answer that the state will help them at last. From this fact, we can develop two 
theories. One is that SOE director are likely to put their efforts in managing connections 
and the other one is that while the connections which the SOE director has established 
play an important role in determining the softness of budget constraints but this is not a 
sufficient condition of soft budget constraints. 
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If an SOE director knows that the state will bail out the firm in case of making a loss, the 
director is not likely to spend his/her time to improve the performance of firm. Instead 
s/he puts more effort in managing connections to maximise the likelihood of getting help 
from politicians when the firm performs badly. Furthermore, if this firm has monopoly 
power, the director is less likely to put effort in managing the firm. The business area of 
the director quoted above is waterway dredging which has monopoly power in the 
domestic market. On the other hand, if the director knows that the state will not bail out 
the firm, s/he puts more effort in managing the firm. One more condition we have to 
consider is that the salary of SOEs directors is very low. This suggests that the 
opportunity costs of losing his/her position is not large enough to deter the director from 
shirking. Consequently, the rational behaviour of SOE directors is establishing and 
managing connections, which is likely to bring him/her unofficial revenues. 
 
However, having connections is not sufficient to bring soft budget constraints. A factor 
we have not considered is that the state will determine whether to allow financial support 
or not. In what circumstance, is the state likely to offer financial support to SOEs in 
difficulty? In case of bailouts, the state will bear financial loss but it also will have 
political benefit. A commonly known gain is that the state can maintain people’s trust in 
it by bailing out the firm which hires a large amount of workers or keeping the firm in 
strategic areas which are not profitable but essential to national interests. 
 
In the context of Vietnam, the state seeks to keep the leading role of the state sector in 
society, which is closely related to the legitimacy of the CPV as well. Leaving SOEs in 
difficulty without helping is not compatible with this political goal. However, the state 
cannot keep helping SOEs in difficulty because it keeps accumulating budget deficits. 
Therefore the rational choice of the state is to help selected SOEs which have substantial 
impact on the economy. Consequently, large SOEs are likely to be chosen for being 
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offered financial support. Hence, the findings that large SOEs faced softer budget 
constraints compared to small SOE did in Hai Phong, and a couple of large SOE directors 
replied that they believed the state would help them at last are the outcome of a rational 
choice of the state and SOE directors. Without referring to individual connections among 
SOE directors, politicians and bankers, we are able to broadly explain a pattern of budget 
constraints on different group of SOEs. 
 
On the other hand, this dissertation considers the budget constraints on SOEs as a proxy 
of state-business relations. There a number of different types of state-business relations 
are widely acknowledged in the field of political economy169: authoritative, predatory, 
developmental,170 entrepreneurial171 and clientelist172 relations. These originate mainly in 
                                                     
169
 Baum and Shevchenko (1999) classify political systems into four sorts according to 
the ties between politics and businesses: developmental, predatory, clientelist and 
entrepreneurial. Krueger (1993) categorised political systems into benevolent, authoritative 
and predatory system according to the nature of individuals who composed of the government 
and politics. 
170
 Developmental relationships between government and business were observed 
during the industrialisation of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan where economic growth was 
achieved mainly through the extensive use of industrial policies such as intensive investment 
plans in several core industries, export drive with strong negative and positive incentives to 
related firms, forced saving polices, tight control over financial markets and effective 
acquisition of advanced technologies (Amsden 1989, Aoki et al. 1998, Chang 1994, Evans 
1992, 1995, 1997, Johnson 1982, Wade 1990, White 1988). Some studies argue that Vietnam 
has a feature of the developmental state while it has a relatively weak enforcement (Abuza 
1998, Esterline 1988, Kolko 1997, Porter 1993). 
171
 Entrepreneurial relationships between business and government have mainly been 
observed over the course of economic growth in local Chinese governments (Blecher 1991, 
Duckett 1998, Nee 1992, Oi and Walder 1999, Rodrik 2007). The main feature of 
entrepreneurial relationships is that politicians are directly engaged in business activities. For 
example, local governments set up firms related to state functions and doing business in ways 
adapted to the changes in political and socio-economic conditions that allowed a growing 
non-state sector to engage in economic activities. Staffs of the firms were normally composed 
of retired or departing workers from related government departments and the profits of the 
firms were shared with the relevant departments. Therefore, the business activities of the 
firms established by local departments were directly related to local economic development. 
172
 Clientelist relations are frequently referred to as ‘patron-client’ relationships 
between government and society, including business organisations. The model explains why a 
bureaucrat’s authority is likely to depend more on his personal following and extra-
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studies of the economic growth in East Asian and South East Asian countries because the 
path of economic growth in this region was quite different from that observed in 
advanced Anglo-American developed economies based on rule-based relationships 
between business and government.173  
 
When the political leadership or ruling coalition organisations have effective enforcement 
capabilities, dense ties with the business community can lead to a developmental 
relationship. A developmental state has effective state and political organisations that can 
impose discipline on lower-level members of these organisations; when the political 
leadership is dominated by individual profit maximisers, the same dense ties can result in 
a clientelist state or even predatory one. 
 
Assessing state-business relations in terms of budget constraints is not a usual approach. 
This dissertation addresses this question by considering whether the state uses SOEs in 
seeking its specific political goal as compares the case of Malaysia and Singapore with 
that of Vietnam which share common features such as the dominance of the state sector 
and murky distinction between the public and the private sector.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
bureaucratic connections than on his formal post (Scott 1972). The essence of clientelist 
relations is the exchange of resources based on asymmetric power and dependence between 
patrons and clients They are observed in many developing countries including South East 
Asian countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (Doner and Ramsay 1997, Eisenstadt and 
Roniger 1980, Khan 2005, 2010) – and also both in China (Pearson 1997, Ruf 1999, Wank 
1995) and Vietnam (Fforde 2002, Herno 1998, Vasavakul 1999, 2003). The political centre in 
Vietnam is not strong enough to suppress the evolution of clientelist relations (Fforde 2010, 
Fforde 2011, 2013). 
173
 Chang (2002) effectively argued that the Anglo-American developed economies 
used to have modes of development which were not based on free market mechanism but 
based on widespread intervention of the politics via industrial policies. Consequently, it is 
unfair for now developing countries to be forced by developed countries to follow modern 
economic orders represented by the Washington Consensus. The author agrees to this 
argument but the historical background of developed economies is not the main focus of the 
thesis whose aim is to compare the currently dominant political system of developed countries 
to that of developing countries. 
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We examined that a political priority is given to keep the leading role of the state sector in 
Vietnam and the state cannot let SOEs die. Hence it has to support some selected SOEs in 
difficulty due to its own budget constraint. Consequently, some large SOEs face softer 
budget constraints. In Malaysia, strengthening Bumiputras economic share is a top 
political priority. Privatisation and running GLCs have largely been affected by this 
political goal which made the state choose wrong incompetent partners as private 
Bumiputra shareholders and the state had to support poorly managed privatisation 
projects and bad performing GLCs to maintain Bumiputras’ capital share. The state-
business relations in Malaysia and Vietnam might hamper economic growth. 
 
In Singapore, in contrast to the case of Vietnam and Malaysia, the state sector and GLCs 
work efficiently given its large state sector and blurred distinction between the state and 
the private sector. Not least it is presumed that holding multiple positions in both private 
and public organisations is likely to cause conflicts of interest and result in corruption but 
this presumption has been proved wrong in Singapore in which the state has deployed 
GLCs based on a profit-making goal only, not even the generation of employment in a 
growth-enhancing way. Nonetheless, it is not clearly explained why the murky border 
between the private and the public sector has not resulted in conflicts of interest which is 
likely to hamper economic growth. 
 
Can this approach supplement the existing taxonomy of state-business relations? It is 
widely acknowledged that developmental connections enhance economic growth while 
clientelist connections hamper it. However, not all developmental connections can be 
growth-enhancing.174 For example, the state is supposed to be rather independent for the 
                                                     
174
 Some clientelist connections, however, could enhance economic growth. An 
economy dominated by patron-client relations is unlikely to have a coherent state as a ruling 
organ (Khan 2005). Hence, the patron allocates resources to the clients. There can be various 
types of patrons and clients. Some patrons can be predatory and others can be developmental, 
and some clients can be rent-seeker and others can be productive business entities. According 
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interests of businesses and firms are likely to face hard budget constraints. At the same 
time, the developmental state runs trade and industrial policy to improve the country’s 
competitiveness. Hence a firm operates in strategic sectors is likely to have softer budget 
constraints because the state would provide policy financing. If the state pursues purely 
an economic goal, there will be a strict application of the ‘carrot and stick’ rule. In that 
case, firm managers expect that the policy financing provided will be revoked sooner or 
later depending on their performance and they will have to bear the responsibility for loss. 
The strict application of the rule can be deterred not only ex post but also ex ante if the 
state seeks other goals. 
 
Limits of this study and further research 
The data set of this dissertation has three limitations. It was collected in 2005, from 
twenty-two SOEs, in one location. The data can be outdated and may have failed to 
reflect some variations which can be found in other provinces and other SOEs. The 
findings of this dissertation, however, are not significantly different from Tenev et al. 
(2003), Gainsborough (2005) and Malesky and Taussig (2009) in which the date were 
collected from many firms in various locations. Nonetheless, generalisation of 
preliminary findings in this dissertation should cautiously be made and further 
supplementary works are required by extending the sample size across various locations. 
Furthermore, as Gainsborough (2005) argues individual connections of SOE directors 
with politician and bankers is important in determining the softness of budget constraints 
on SOEs. The dissertation can be augmented largely if data set includes bankers 
particularly from SOCBs.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Doner and Ramsay (1997) and (Khan 2010), Thailand’s political economy in the 1980s and 
1990s during its high growth was a typical example of patron-client relationships generating 
high levels of economic development. Here the alliances between patrons in the state and 
client entrepreneurs resulted in high rates of growth because entrepreneurs got access to 
resources for investment and competition between patron-client networks ensured that 
enterprises kept investing in a competitive export-oriented market economy. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: The list of GC-91 and SEGs 
GC-91 Name 
1  Housing and Urban Development Corporation   
2  Song Da Corporation (Construction and power) 
3  Vietnam Northern Food Corporation   
4  Vietnam Southern Food Corporation   
5  Vietnam Paper Corporation   
6  Vietnam National Coffee Corporation   
7  Vietnam Airlines Corporation   
8  Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation   
9  Vietnam National Shipping Lines   
10  Vietnam Railways   
11  Vietnam Steel Corporation   
12  Vietnam Cement Industry Corporation   
SEGs Name 
1  Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group (VNPT)   
2 
 Vietnam National Coal – Mineral Industries Holding Corporation Limited 
(VINACOMIN)   
3  Vietnam Oil and Gas Group   
4  Vietnam Electricity   
5  The Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group   
6  Vietnam Rubber Group   
7  BaoViet Holdings (Insurance)   
8  Viettel Group  (Telecommunication) 
9  Vietnam National Chemical Group   
10  Vietnam National Petroleum Group   
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Table A2: Criteria of small, medium and large enterprises in Vietnam 
 
  
  
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishery 
Industry and 
construction 
Trade and 
services 
Micro enterprises 
Capital Not defined Not defined Not defined 
Employees ≤ 10 ≤ 10 ≤ 10 
Small enterprises 
Capital 
(billion VND) 
≤ 20 ≤ 20 ≤ 10 
Employees 10 < L ≤200 10 < L ≤200 10 < L ≤50 
Medium 
enterprises 
Capital 
(billion VND) 
20 < K ≤ 100 20 < K ≤ 100 10 < K ≤50 
Employees 200 < L ≤300 200 < L ≤300 50 < L ≤100 
Large enterprises 
Capital 
(billion VND) 
K > 100 K > 100 K > 50 
Employees L > 300 L > 300 L > 100 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2009: 33). The criteria follow Decree No. 
56/2009/ND-CP dated 30 June 2009. 
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Table A3: Proportion of gainers and loser (2000-2002, 2005-2011, per cent) 
 Economy State Non-state Foreign-invested 
Year Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
2000 78.3 19.39 78.82 17.45 79.75 18.2 43.02 54.03 
2001 72.8 19.76 79.35 16.69 73.55 18.77 38.94 49.88 
2002 75.14 21.03 82.96 14.67 75.57 20.44 46.53 49.83 
2005 62.53 27.38 79.59 17.16 62.36 27.06 48.66 47.96 
2006 65.65 31.12 82.37 14.33 65.71 31.05 49.45 47.73 
2007 67.56 29.66 85.52 12.18 67.69 29.49 51.24 46.62 
2008 69.37 27.7 85.67 12.73 69.76 27.25 47.17 51.19 
2009 61.86 26.5 85.86 12.23 61.85 26.03 49.83 49.83 
2010 64.12 25.14 84.61 13.65 64.13 24.67 54.28 44.32 
2011 53.93 42.88 80.8 17.37 53.65 43.09 53.82 44.97 
 
Sources:  
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2013), Development of Vietnam Enterprises in the 
Period of 2006-2011. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
2. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2009), The Situation of Enterprises through the 
Results of Surveys Conducted in 2006, 2007, 2008. Hanoi: Statistics Publishing House. 
3. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2004), Industrial Complete Survey 2001-2003. Hanoi: 
Statistics Publishing House. 
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Table A4: Understanding of ‘own equity’ by SOE directors in Hai Phong 
Firm Answer 
A n.a. 
B 
The fund mobilised by the firm from various resources – not the fund supply from the state 
resources. 
C 
The fund that the SOE has by accumulating income from production selling products after 
deducting the required taxes to be paid. 
D n.a. 
E n.a. 
F n.a. 
G The fund accumulated from results of production and business generated by the firm. 
H The fund of the firm accumulated from the retained profits. 
I 
The accumulated fund from the annual profit to be used for procurement of equipment and 
machines for re-investment. 
J The fund of the firm generated by the enterprises from its own profits. 
K n.a. 
L The fund established from profitable business run by the firm. 
M The fund established from production and business and from the non-refundable grants. 
N The capital generated by the firm from profit. 
O The capital formulated from the retained profit. 
P The capital retained from profit after tax. 
Q 
In accordance with the state regulation, the “self-generated capital” is created by the 
enterprise from the result of production and business every year. 
R The money accumulated from profit after tax (Fund for Production Development) 
S 
The ‘self-generated capital’ is owned by the firm (supplied by the state; fund accumulated 
during the production and business). 
T The fund obtained from the firm business activities. 
U n.a. 
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Table A5: Questionnaire for an SOE 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SURVEY OF SOEs IN TP. HAI PHONG 
 
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 
 
Explain the nature of the research, emphasise that nothing the person says will be directly 
attributable either to them or their company. Please attach their business card the final report. 
 
Name of firm  
1) Vietnamese:     
2) English: 
 
A. COMPANY ACTIVITY 
1 When was the firm founded? 
 
2 Who is the firm’s controlling institution(s)? 
 
3 Has this changed in the last 10 years? If there were any changes, please specify. 
 
4 What is this company's primary product or activity? 
 
5 Has this changed in the last 10 years? Describe. 
 
 
6 Does the firm have any shareholdings in other firms or banks? If yes, are they subsidiary 
firms/banks? 
 
 
 
 
7 Describe the share of capital (% of total) of the firm: 
a) State budget (central / local): 
b) Loan: 
c) Own capital: 
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8 How many people does the firm employ? 
 
9 What is the annual turnover of the firm? 
 
10 What is the annual investment of the firm? 
 
 
B. DIFFICULTIES / OPPORTUNITIES IN RUNNING THE BUSINESS 
11 What are the most severe obstacles to your business (encourage interviewee to provide at 
least three)? 
1)  
 
2)  
 
3)  
 
12 What important changes in the business environment have positively impacted the running 
of the firm over the last 3-5 years? 
1)  
 
2)  
 
3)  
 
 
C. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT / REGULATION 
13 Describe your interaction with local government.  
 
 
 
 
14 Has this interaction changed over the last 5 years?  
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15 Are there any production plans (industry, sector, and/or firm specific) that the firm is required 
to follow?  Please describe, including who formulates and disseminates the plan(s).  
 
 
 
 
16 If yes, what mechanisms (investment approval, allocation of state budget capital, etc.) are 
used to ensure the firm follows the plans? 
 
 
 
  
17 Does government provide any tax incentives, such as tax reductions and/or exemptions? 
Please describe, including for what purposes the incentives are given.  
 
 
 
 
18 Does government provide market research or other information to assist in finding buyers for 
the firm’s products? Describe. 
 
 
 
19 Does government restrict and/or facilitate movement into new product lines or changes of 
business? Describe, including the incentives used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Is government involved in determining staffing levels? Describe.  
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21 Does government provide job training or retraining for employees? Describe. 
 
 
 
 
 
D. FINANCE 
22 In what areas has the firm invested over the last 3-5 years? 
 
 
 
23 When was the last time the firm invested in new capital equipment?  
 
 
24 If land was acquired in the last 5 years: 
a) How was it financed?  
b) Who made the decision?  
c) How much did it cost?  
d) What was done with the land?  
e) Who was the land acquired from? 
 
25 What have been the sources of investment capital over the last 3-5 years (pick as many as 
apply and what is the most important source)? 
0. State budget central    1. State budget local 
2. State-owned commercial bank  3. Joint stock bank 
4. Foreign bank     5. Domestic investors 
6. FDI     7. Own equity 
8. Investment Development Fund  9. Capital mobilised from employees 
10. Sale of state houses   11. Other: 
 
26 How do you understand the term ‘own equity’? 
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27 Describe the process of applying for bank credit and who actually gives final approval for the 
application. 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Has the application process and/or terms of loans (collateral, favoured interest rates, etc.) 
changed in the last 5 years? If so, how?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 Are the processes and/or terms of loans different for long term and short term loans? If so, 
how? 
 
 
 
 
30 Please list the last 5 major investments by the firm. Describe the selection process, rationale, 
and the role of the controlling institution in each decision.  
a)  
 
b)  
 
c)  
 
d)  
 
e)  
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31 Has access to capital from the state budget become harder to secure in comparison with the 
last 5-10 years and 3-5 years? Please describe. 
 
 
 
 
 
E. DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
32 Describe any obstacles you face in carrying out your role in the firm. 
 
 
 
 
33 Describe the use of the following enterprise funds: 
a) Financial Reserve Fund 
 How much: 
 What purposes: 
 Who decides: 
b) Welfare Fund 
 How much: 
 What purposes: 
 Who decides: 
c) Reward Fund 
 How much: 
 What purposes: 
 Who decides: 
d) Has it been paid to any individuals or units outside the firm? If yes, to whom and why? 
 
 Who decides:  
 
34 If the firm makes a loss, who is responsible and how is the loss financed?  
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35 Do you think the state budget should be mobilised to cover losses?  
 
 
 
 
36 How do you resolve confusions and disagreement with the controlling institution(s)? Please 
describe the process and the role of the controlling institution(s).  
 
 
 
 
37 Which outside institutions do you refer to in making decisions on the following issues (if 
applicable)? 
0. Personnel issues (fire and hire) 
1. Increasing/decreasing and ceasing production 
2. Increasing investment 
3. Selling assets, plant or equipment 
4. Decisions to raise wage 
5. Decisions to pay bonuses 
 
 
 
F. DIRECTOR / ENTREPRENEUR 
38 What is your place and date of birth? 
 
39 Give a brief outline of your career (including education, wartime, and at other SOEs) . 
 
 
 
 
 
END 
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Table A6: Questionnaire for a government officer 
 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS IN TP. HAI PHONG 
 
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 
 
Explain the nature of the research, emphasise that nothing the person says will be directly 
attributable either to them or their company. Please attach interviewee’s business card the final 
report. 
 
A. ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE IN RELATION TO FIRMS 
1 What is your position?  
 
2 Please describe your duties.  
 
 
 
 
3 Describe the role of your department and its relation to SOEs. 
 
 
 
 
4 Do you or anyone else in your department sit on the management board of any SOEs? If 
yes, which ones?  
 
 
5 What is your role in supporting the management of SOEs?  
 
 
6 Describe your day to day interaction with SOEs.  
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7 Describe the types of decisions that you refer to higher authorities.  
 
 
 
8 Describe the types of decisions that SOEs can take on their own without your involvement.  
 
 
 
9 Are you or your department involved in determining product lines of SOEs? Describe.  
 
 
 
10 Are you or your department involved in the financing decisions of SOEs? Describe your role.  
 
 
 
11 Are you or your department involved in developing investment plans? If yes, please describe.  
 
 
12 Are you or your department involved in the identification of buyers and sellers for SOEs? 
Describe.  
 
 
 
13 Are you or your department involved in determining staffing levels and/or recruiting for SOEs? 
Describe. 
 
 
 
14 Do you or your department provide training for SOE employees? Describe.  
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15 Have any of these roles changed in the last 5 years? Describe.  
 
 
 
 
16 How do you resolve confusions and disagreements with SOEs? Please give examples.  
 
 
 
 
17 Are there production plans (industry, sector, and/or firm specific) that you or yo ur 
department are tasked with implementing? Describe.  
 
 
 
18 If yes, who formulates them and what is the formulation process?  
 
19 If yes, has the process changed in the last 5 years? Describe.  
 
 
 
20 If yes, how are the plans implemented? (state budget, bank credi t, etc.)  
 
 
 
 
21 If yes, has the ability to implement the plan(s) changed in the last 5 years?  If yes, how?  
 
 
 
22 How do you evaluate the performance of SOEs?  
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23 What do you do if SOEs are not performing well?  
 
 
 
 
24 Does your department provide market research or other information to SOEs to assist in 
finding buyers for the firms’ products? Describe.  
 
 
 
 
25 Has the process whereby SOEs access state and/or local budget capital changed in the last 
5 years? Describe. 
 
 
26 Has the process whereby SOEs obtain bank loans changed in the last 5 years?  Describe.  
 
 
 
 
27 How do you think the business environment has changed over the last 3-5 years? 
(encourage the interviewee to provide at least three responses) 
1)  
2)  
3)  
 
28 How has the 2002 State Budget Law changed your role and the ro le of local authorities?  
 
 
 
29 How has TP. Hai Phong secured own-source revenue? What types of revenue has the City 
secured? 
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B. PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
30 What is your place and date of birth? 
 
31 What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
 
 
32 Have you had the opportunity to go abroad for study or training? If yes, how many times and 
how long?  
 
 
 
33 Give a brief outline of your career.  
 
 
 
34 How long have you worked in this position? 
 
35 Are you a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party (if yes, how many years)?                         
 
36 What did / do your parents do? If you are married, what does your spouse do? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
END 
